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I. A Frame of Reference
The patent laws confer on a patentee power to exclude all others
from making, using or selling his invention.' In furtherance of a con-
stitutionally recognized goal-"To promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts"-Congress has thus adopted a constitutionally
authorized means--"securing... to Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective . . .Discoveries."2 The constitutional clause is re-
markable in several respects. Its recognition of the possibility that
invention might require encouragement implies not only that techno-
logical innovation is desirable but also that, but for legal subsidization,
the quantity of innovation forthcoming would or might be less than
optimum. This recognition, coming on the morn of an era during
which the tendency of a free market to achieve optimality in all activ-
ities was greatly and religiously overestimated, 3 prompts brief inquiry
into the soundness of the supposition.
Several considerations support the view that the market would yield
less than optimum innovative activity.4 Invention consists primarily of
knowledge; and he whose research, experimentation and insight has
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 1951, LLB. 1956, Stanford University.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
2. US. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
3. Cf. JAFFE, A m mTr LAw, CASES AND MATERus 3-8 (1954).
4. See, e.g., Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources For Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION or INVENTIVE Acrrvry: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FAcTOrtS 609
(1962); Machiup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study #15 of the Sub.
committee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the U.S. Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-62 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Machiup, Study
#15].
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created it has no obvious means of appropriating it to his own reward.
It is fruitless unless used, but any extensive use virtually assures dis-
closure and, in time, equal availability to all. As a form of economic
activity, invention is attended by much risk even apart from the prob-
lem of appropriation, and difficulty of appropriation greatly increases
the economic risk. A man debating whether to commit his resources
to manufacturing shoes can estimate with tolerable accuracy both how
many shoes he can produce in a month and their worth upon com-
pletion. If, alternatively, he considers committing those resources to
the process of innovation, he can have little confidence in either the
quantity of his informational output or its worth when and if pro-
duced. A production process characterized by highly uncertain outputs
as a function of given inputs will generally attract less than optimum
inputs.' For these reasons innovative activity is subsidized in some way
and to some extent in almost all advanced economies.0
But to conclude that some subsidization is appropriate is a very
short step down the road to firm conclusions about "how" and "how
much." This paper is addressed principally to issues raised by the
question: "how"; the very little that can be said on the question: "how
much," is best said immediately.
In the abstract, the criterion for how much subsidy is appropriate
is simply stated. Innovative activity should be subsidized as much and
no more than is necessary to attract to that activity those inputs which,
if invested in any other activity, would yield a product of lesser social
value. 7 Market forces can generally be relied upon in areas where no
substantial disparity exists between private and social value of either
inputs and outputs. Private investment will be attracted to activities
in which the private value of output most exceeds private cost of in-
puts; and if social and private valuations are comparable, activities
with outputs of high social value will not be neglected.
The input costs of innovation, both privately and socially valued,
are often very large and so too is the social value of its outputs. But
the private value of innovative output, if left to be determined by
market forces, would usually be small because of unappropriability.
Hence private investment in innovation would stop at the point where
the next private dollar invested would yield greater private gains if
5. Arrow, supra note 4, at 610-14.
6. WHITE & RAVENSCROFT, PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2d ed. 1944).
7. This is the classic economic criterion for optimal allocation. See, e.g., IBouLDINo,
ECONOminc ANALYSIS 168-72 (3d ed. 1955).
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invested elsewhere. Yet the social value of additional innovative out-
put, being greater than its private value, would exceed the social value
of the output to which investment had been diverted. Corrective
diversion of investment from other activities to innovation is desirable
because the social value of output gained thereby exceeds that of the
outputs lost. That corrective diversion can be accomplished by subsidy.
Though subsidy is thus shown to be desirable, the question of how
much subsidy is desirable could only be answered by a controlled
experiment that would permit measurement of the social value of
innovative output and of unsubsidized alternative outputs at each of
a series of subsidy levels. Any such experiment is well beyond the
reach of present techniques.8
Implicit in the assertion that there is an optimum amount of sub-
sidization and that it cannot be determined with any precision is the
further assertion that the present amount probably is somewhat too
large or too small. Consequently the resources presently being devoted
to innovation probably are somewhat too large or too small. The fact
that we may already be devoting too many resources to innovation
seems worth emphasis because so many commentators accept as abso-
lute truth the contrary assumption that additional encouragement of
research, or at least the present amount of encouragement, is
desirable. 9
That too many resources could be, and perhaps are being, devoted
to innovation becomes obvious once it is noted that total resources
available are not infinite and that there are competing activities of
great social utility to which resources would move if the subsidy for
innovative activity were decreased. If fewer hours of highly skilled
manpower and lesser quantities of expensive equipment were devoted
to innovation, as a society we could have more medical care, education,
housing and police protection, just to give a few examples. This would
be true even if the output of innovative activity were directly pro-
portionate to input at all levels of input; but presumably the law of
diminishing returns applies with as much validity to innovative activ-
ity as to other activities. The now frequent example of simultaneous
8. Machiup, Study #15, at 60-62.
9. This is true not only of pro-patent writers from whom the assumption might be
expected, see, e.g., Frost, The Patent System and the Modern Economy, Study #2 of
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-20 (1957), but also from anti-patent
writers who are forced by the assumption into the position that the patent s~stem does
not significantly encourage innovative activity and does have undesirable side effects.
See, e.g., Kahn, Deficiencies of American Patent Law, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 475 (1940).
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independent discovery of some new process or product is an illustra-
tion of diminishing returns. 10
As is implied in the foregoing paragraphs, subsidization by direct
payments from tax revenues and subsidization by conferral of a legal
monopoly are analogous from the standpoint of their capacity to in-
crease, and perhaps to increase too much, the flow of resources to in-
novative activity. One might argue that over-investment in innova-
tion could not be induced by the monopoly approach. That argument
would run as follows.
Conferral on the inventor of a monopoly over his invention is a
direct attack on the problem of unappropriability and thus tends to
equalize the private and social values of the invention. Resource alloca-
tion to innovation approximating the optimum would result if in-
ventors were granted a total and permanent monopoly over their in-
ventions. The inventor could then garner from all who wished to use
it the value of his invention in each context in which it was useful,
and its private value to the inventor would equal its utility to society.
Since no prospective user could be induced to pay more than the value
of the invention to that user, private value to the inventor could never
exceed social value; and over-investment in innovation would not
occur.
The argument is unsound because it fails to take into account in-
direct costs not borne by the inventor that the monopoly device im-
poses on society. These costs diminish the net social value of the
invention and upset the private value-social value equation. One
of these indirect costs is the following: The monopoly over the inven-
tion decreases the incentives of innovators other than the initial pat-
entee to engage in further research within the field covered by the
monopoly. For any improvement discovered will be subservient to the
initial patent and useless in the hands of anyone but the initial patent
holder; and in dealing with the initial patent holder the subsequent
inventor will occupy a weak bargaining position since he faces a mo-
nopsonistic buyer. The extent of this dampening effect increases as
the legal life of the initial monopoly is made longer. A second im-
portant indirect cost is the resource misallocation which results from
under-utilization of past inventions for the use of which a monopoly
price is charged, a point on which more will be said.
10. For a splendid, more extensive articulation of the thesis of this and the next
paragraph on which I have drawn extensively, see Machlup, Study #15, 44-78.
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The two social costs described by no means exhaust the list, but
reference to them is sufficient to make the point that the monopoly
device, like direct subsidy payments, is capable of diverting too many
resources to innovation and that the question of how much monopoly-
subsidy to confer is a difficult one. Thus one debating whether to make
a marginal change in the amount of monopoly-subsidy should draw up
a balance sheet on the following order. As assets supporting an in-
crease, one would list: (a) the social value of having those inventions
which never would have been made but for the increase; (b) the social
value of having sooner rather than later those inventions which would
not have been made until later but for the increase. As liabilities one
would list: (a) the social value of the medical care, education, etc., not
achieved because of resource diversion; (b) the greater cost of admin-
istering the larger subsidy-patent office personnel, patent solicitors,
lawyers, judges, their secretaries, clerks and the buildings in which
they work; (c) the greater amount of equipment discarded and labor
temporarily displaced as a result of more rapid obsolescence of exist-
ing production processes; and, perhaps most importantly, (d) the social
cost of conferring more monopoly and hence more output restriction,
not only with respect to the marginal inventions listed as assets because
they were generated by the subsidy increase, but with respect to all
the inventions that would have been made without the increase. The
same balance sheet with the "asset" and "liability" column-heads
switched and with minor changes in wording would indicate whether
the present amount of monopoly-subsidy should be decreased.U1
To speak of balance sheets is misleading in its suggestion of pre-
cision; for the point remains that, given the existing state of the eco-
nomic art, we cannot say how much subsidy is optimal. The foregoing
discussion of optimality is not wholly futile however, for the total
intractability of the question seems to me significant in several im.
portant respects. As a practical matter the question, despite its intrac-
tability, must be answered either explicitly or implicitly by some
authoritative rule-maker if a society is to take action on the knowledge
that analysis does yield-namely that some subsidy is appropriate. The
answer will necessarily be a rough judgment and almost certainly will
be "wrong" in the sense that a somewhat different answer would have
come closer to achieving optimality; but if the answer is given with
awareness of the nature of the problem and with a modicum of intel-
ligence, the resulting situation is very likely to be an improvement
11. See note 10, supra.
271
The Yale Law Journal
over that which market determination of innovative inputs would
produce.
For the United States the judgment has been made by Congress and
made in a way, by conferral of monopoly, which inextricably inter-
twines the issues of "how" and "how much." In view of the intracta-
bility of the question "how much," it seems peculiarly appropriate
that the answer should have been given by a political branch, and the
same consideration reinforces traditional doctrine in dictating that
the judiciary should accept that judgment not grudgingly but with
full acquiescence.
It is also true that the Congressional judgment of "how much" was
made with no explicit attention to the nature of the problem as I have
described it. In part the amount of subsidy is implicit in the monopoly
technique through which subsidy is afforded. The other determinant
of amount, one more susceptible to adjustment, is the period for which
the monopoly is conferred. The monopoly technique was adopted with
little attention to possible alternatives, 12 and a term of 14 years was
provided for in the first patent act without any recorded discussion
of alternative periods of time.13 Subsequently, however, the issue of
term length has received more direct attention. A proposal to shorten
the patent term to 10 years was made and rejected in 1793.14 In 1836
12. That means of reward is suggested by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, but the records of
the Convention do not reveal any discussion of why that means was selected. Very prob-
ably it was adopted because the same means had been employed in England for many
centuries. For a colorful, lucid and brief discussion of the English history, See WALTON
HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FIR ENTERPRn, (TNEC Monograph No. 31, 1941). This tech.
nique would also commend itself to a new government because it depends largely on
private enforcement and minimizes official administration.
Various types of direct subsidies are reported to have been used in the Colonies.
Colonial Monopolies and Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 35 (Centennial Number, July,
1936). And in the first Congress allusion was made to the use of direct subsidy; but
doubt was expressed whether any but that means expressly mentioned in the Constitu.
tion was within Congressional power. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (1789). At one point the
Senate passed an amendment to a bill which would have "invest[ed] the judges of the
Supreme Court with a power to determine the compensation which persons shall receive
for their inventions ... " 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1519 (1790). But the monopoly technique
was incorporated in the first patent statute. 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
13. 1 Stat. 109 (1790). In discussions recorded in the Annals the phrase "for a term
of years" occurs repeatedly. See, e.g., I ANNALS OF CONG. 170, 950, 951, 955 (1789-90).
Several petitions for patents sought exclusive rights for a specific period; e.g., id. at 233
(21 years); id. at 266 (21 years), but most of them also referred to "a limited time," e.g.,
id. at 328, 424, or "a term of years," e.g., id. at 335, 342, 642. On the time period, too,
it seems probable that the primary causal factor was familiarity with the prior English
law which provided for a 14 year period. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1624). The
selection of that time period in England has been attributed to the fact that 14 years
corresponded to two successive terms of apprenticeship and thus allowed for training
two generations of apprentices in the new art. HAMILTON, op. cit. surra note 12 at 16;
Origin and Early History of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 33 (Centennnial Number,
July, 196).
14. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 860 (1793).
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a provision was passed authorizing extensions of the term for an addi-
tional 7 years upon a showing that the patentee had not yet been ade-
quately rewarded for his contribution;'8 but the extension provision
was repealed in 1861, and the present 17 year term was adopted as a
compromise.16 On numerous occasions since 1861 the question of term
length has been debated in Congress.17 Hence the amount of subsidy
presently afforded, though initially founded on practices of a totally
different culture,' 8 must be accepted as a deliberate act of legislative
judgment.
As a means of paying the subsidy the monopoly device, while con-
ducive to the end, is not the only means that might have been con-
ceived; and it would be rash to suppose that by authorizing one means,
the Constitution by implication forbids others. A monetary reward,
scaled to the value of the invention and payable out of the federal
treasury, might serve the end as well. Both direct subsidy and monop-
oly-subsidy have advantages and disadvantages. The primary advantage
of monopoly is that it eliminates the need for a governmental insti-
tution charged with the task of adopting and applying criteria by
which the total amount of subsidy would be determined and by which
that amount would be apportioned among individual inventors. It is
very unlikely that the history of an institution so charged would be
a credit to its parent polity.
In place of such an institution, the monopoly technique substitutes
a market mechanism. The extent of the inventor's reward is the
amount he can induce others to pay him in exchange for his waiver
of the exclusive right conferred upon him. The aggregate subsidy is
the aggregate of such payments to all inventors. The monopoly device
15. 5 Stat. 124-25 (1836). Note that this provision required official determination of
what constituted an adequate reward and therefore involved all the administrative diT.
culties that would inhere in direct governmental subsidization; yet it eliminated none
of the economic costs that inhere in the monopoly technique of subsidization. Its repeal
was inevitable; only the fact that repeal took 25 years is surprising.
16. 12 Stat. 249 (1861).
1'7. Hearings on S.3325 and S3410 Before the Senate Committee on 11e Judiciary, 67th
Cong, 2d Sess. passim. (1922); Hearings Before the Temporary Economic Committee of
the Congress of the United States, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 852-55, 860-63, 892, 944-45 (1939);
S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1941); Hearings on S.2303 and S2491 Before the
Senate Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1748 (1942); H.R. Doc. No. 239, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1943); Hearings on H.R. 323 and HiR. 4054 Before the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. passim. (1951); H.R. RxP. No. 1297, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. passim. (1955); Hearings on H.R. 2128, 3134, and 4700 Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. passim. (1955): Hearings Before the
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Ses.
99-100, 143, 152 (1955); S. REP. No. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 13 (1956); S. Rr. No.
72,85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 80 (1957).
18. See note 13, supra.
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does not leave the aggregate subsidy, the primary determinant of re-
source allocation, wholly to chance; for Congressional control over the
term of monopoly affords a control valve at least as precise as the
criterion for the valve's adjustment. Hence the system may be viewed
as embodying two quite different distributional theories in happy
symbiosis: to the inventor in proportion to his contribution; to inno-
vative activity generally in accordance with the needs of society.
But other aspects of the monopoly device are less satisfactory. The
first of these returns us to the problem of social value. Here the con-
cern is not, as it was before, social value of innovative activity in the
aggregate, but the social value of a particular invention. The principal
determinant of the social value of an invention is the extent to which
it is useful and used. Resource allocation in an economy is optimum
when each type of good and service is being used to that extent at
which the social cost of producing the last unit of a quantity of product
equals the utility or satisfaction consumers derive from the last unit.
Other things being equal, inexpensive products will and should be
used more extensively than costly ones. An invention is knowledge;
its acquisition may have been very expensive, but once it is acquired it
costs no more to use it extensively than sparingly. All the costs repre-
sented by the invention are "fixed" or "sunk" costs; and the incre-
mental or marginal cost of an additional use made of it is zero. Opti-
mally, an invention should be used in every context and to whatever
extent it has any utility at all; and such use would occur if the in-
ventor's reward were provided by direct government subsidy rather
than by monopoly-subsidy. Reliance on monopoly imposes a cost on
the user which has no marginal cost counterpart either to the inventor
or to society as a whole. Hence use is undesirably curtailed; resource
allocation is distorted.19
The monopoly-subsidy device also has a drawback in that it distorts
thinking. In its economic impact, the device closely resembles a federal
excise tax on the use of recent innovations collection of which is fol-
lowed by appropriation and payment of corresponding amounts to the
inventor. The patent monopoly is an officially authorized charge that
does not correspond to any cost of incremental use. If the device were
transformed into the analogous tax-subsidy, its consequences would be
19. The problem discussed in this paragraph is the familiar one of indivisibility. its
classic exposition is, Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation
and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONoM ErmcA 242 (1938).
The fact that an incremental use of an invention has a marginal cost of zero gives
rise to other problems, principally those of economic or monopolistic discrimination,
discussed at pp. 280 et seq., infra.
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far more apparent. There are objections to excise taxes because of their
effects on income distribution that cannot be examined here.- a The
resource allocation effect of excise taxes certainly is difficult to defend
when the subject of the tax is use of information.2 And if the present
monopoly-subsidy to innovative activity appeared each year as an item
in the federal budget, the erroneous but prevalent notion that encour-
aging innovation is costless -2 would vanish.
The final, and for the purpose of this paper the most important,
objection to the monopoly-subsidy is that it is subject to grave abuse.
From the Congressional viewpoint this fact must be taken into account
with all the previously described advantages and disadvantages of the
monopoly device in deciding whether to retain the device as a means
of subsidy. But for the courts the potentiality and frequent actuality
of abuse pose problems distinct from the other considerations. So long
as Congress retains the patent statutes in essentially their present form,
those statutes represent a legislative judgment that, on balance, the
monopoly-subsidy is desirable; and the courts have neither responsi-
bility for that judgment nor authority to change it. With respect to
the problem of abuse their responsibility is different; for they have
been given both the task of enforcing the patent monopoly, which
carries the appurtenant responsibility of deciding what conduct is a
proper assertion of the monopoly reward and what conduct is an abuse,
and the task of enforcing the antitrust laws with which improper use
of the monopoly often conflicts.
II. The Patent Monopoly
The patentee's exclusive right to make, use and sell his invention
is deceptive in its apparent simplicity. Very rarely would a patentee
choose to invoke his right in accordance with the literal meaning of
the statutory terms and deny to others all that he might deny. The
holder of a process patent who was an integrated manufacturer-seller
of an unpatented product yielded by the process might choose to li-
cense no one and extract his reward exclusively through monopoly
profits in marketing the product. In such a case no one but the patentee
would be making, using or selling the invention. But if the patent is
on an endproduct, then, though no formal licenses are issued, those
20. See, e.g., SIMONS, FEDE,AL TAX REFOMI 36-37 (1950); Eldridge, Distribution of
Sales and Excise Tax Burdens, F'.cise Tax Compendium, Committee on Ways and
Means, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 73-87 (1964).
21. For a good general discussion of this and other aspects of excise taxes, see DuM,
GovxNm-Nxr FnAicEC ch. 19 (2d ed. 1959).
22. See note 9, supra.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
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to whom the product is sold will use the invention and have an im-
plied license to do so. In the vast majority of cases the patentee obtains
his reward not by affirmatively asserting his exclusive right but by
extracting a consideration for a total or partial waiver of that right.
As the reference to partial waiver underscores, the patentee is not
limited to the alternatives of full assertion or total waiver but can,
for a price, allow others to engage in some but less than all of the
conduct that assertion of his exclusive right would preclude. Thus as
T. R. Powell insisted with characteristic lucidity almost a half century
ago,24 analysis is aided if the patentee is viewed as having not a single
right but a whole bundle of rights to exclude, all, any one or none of
which may be waived. The courts, in giving effect to the statutory
phrase, have consistently arrived at results incompatible with any other
view. 2
5
Just as the use of the word "right" in the statute quite properly
did not preclude results consistent only with use of the word "rights,"
so also no dictate of grammar or metaphysics should be thought to
allow waiver of one particular group of patentee rights but to preclude
waiver of another, nor to allow waiver of a group of rights in exchange
for one type of consideration but preclude it for another type. On
these points, however, the courts have had more difficulty. A license
to use a patented machine with, but only with, supplies furnished by
the patentee was first upheld 0 and later struck down.27 A license to
resell a patented product purchased from the patentee at, but only at,
a price set by the patentee was struck down;28 but a license to manu-
facture and sell a product at, but only at, a price set by the patentee
was upheld. 29 These results may be right or wrong, but sound answers
to the problems the cases posed cannot be reached by parsing the
highly general language of the statute,30 by metaphysical assertions that
the right to exclude totally necessarily embraces the right to exclude
partially3' or by framing question-begging generalities about what is
24. Powell, The Nature of a Patent Right, 17 COLUmN. L. REv. 663 (1917).
25. See, e.g., Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788 (1869).
26. Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co, v.
Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
27. Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
28. Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
29. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); Bement v. National
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
30. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
509-13 (1917).
31. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519
(1917) (dissenting opinion, Holmes, J.); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka
Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288, 291, 294-95 (6th Cir. 1896).
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"normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward."3 2 By
the first sale of a patented article, the Supreme Court has said, "the
article ... [is] thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law
and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt
to put upon it."33 But quite obviously the article is not carried outside
the monopoly in the sense that a chair may be carried outside a room;
no phenomenon susceptible to empirical validation is involved. The
Court's statement was not made because it was true; it is "true" only
because the statement was made and will be "true" only until the
Court or Congress makes a contrary statement.
No one type of consideration more than any other extracted in
exchange for a waiver of all or part of the patentee's rights is, for
merely logical reasons, "normally and reasonably adapted to secure"
the objectives of the patentee. The disadvantages which attend use of
the monopoly-subsidy device are tolerable only because of the off-
setting advantages of private bargaining-only because private bar-
gaining simultaneously can yield to both the patentee and the licensee
more of what each, given his unique situation, deems of value. A
promise by the licensee to murder the patentee's mother-in-law is as
much "within the patent monopoly" as is the sum S50.00; and it is
not the patent laws which tell us that the former agreement is un-
enforceable and subjects the parties to criminal sanctions.
The last example, while silly in its extremity, nevertheless illustrates
two important points. The value to the patentee of the licensee con-
duct sought by the patentee may exceed its cost to the licensee. Hence
both parties may be better off as a consequence of their exchange.
Therein, of course, lies the great value of private arrangements. But
therein, too, lies their danger; for conduct of value to the patentee
may be highly injurious to third persons. Indeed it may be of value
to the patentee precisely because it is injurious to third persons. Courts
should be alert to penalize such bargains by imposing on the imme-
diate parties the sanction of nullity and other appropriate sanctions.
Only rarely will the policies calling for protection of third persons
be found in the patent laws; to search for them there is generally
futile, to purport to find them there is generally duplicitous and
confusing.34
32. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 US. 476, 490 (1926).
33. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
34. In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film lffg. Co., 243 US. 502 512-13
(1917), the Court purported to find a basis for invalidating a tie-in in the patent laws.
For a devastating criticism of the court's analysis, tee Powell, The Nature of a Patent
Right, 17 CoLU.L L. REv. 663 (1917). Persuasive reasons for the xeut are available, see
pp. 318 et seq., infra, but not where the court pretended to find them.
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Effect of licensee conduct on third persons may or may not, depend-
ing on the circumstances, constitute adequate reason for striking down a
license agreement. But only in most extraordinary circumstances will
the effect on the licensee justify so doing. As a class patent licensees
are unlikely candidates for "ward of the court" status, and cases that
rest on the premise of overreaching are likely to be unsound, either
in their reasoning35 or in both reasoning and result.30
From this conclusion-that legality of a patent license properly turns
on its impact on third persons and on whether the parties are privi-
leged to impose this effect-it follows that too much significance has
been accorded in the past37 to the distinction between condition and
covenant. Any of the typical license limitations can be imposed through
either device. A license can be broad in its waiver of patentee rights
and contain a promise by the licensee that he will not sell the pat-
ented product for less than a specified price; or it may license only
those sales which are made at prices equal to or exceeding a specified
price. A license may authorize generally use of a patented machine
and contain a promise by the licensee to buy all supplies used with
the machine from the patentee; or it may license use of the machine
only in conjunction with supplies purchased from the patentee. It may
license manufacture and sale generally and contain a licensee covenant
to confine his activities to Hecate County; or it may license the activi-
ties only in that county. If in each of these cases the conduct of the
licensee will be the same, then the third person impact will be the
same and there is no basis for upholding one form and invalidating
the other.
In general the distinction between covenant and condition should be
disregarded because there is no reason to suppose that licensee conduct
will be affected by the form used. In either case he is liable to sanctions
if he engages in unauthorized conduct-damages for breach and per-
haps an injunction in the case of covenant; an infringement suit for
damages and injunction in the case of condition. To the extent that
the licensee is dependent upon good relations with the patentee,3 8
unauthorized operations are as much deterred by condition as by
35. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
36. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959).
37. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBcoIA.h. No. 5, HouSE COMA. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84Tit CONo.,
21) SEss., ANTITRUsT PROBLEMS IN THE EXPLOITATION OF PATENTS 8 (Comm. Print 1956);
Automatic Radio Mlfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950) (dictum);
Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co. v. Lanova Corp., 79 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Del. 1948).
38. Dependence on the patentee for "know-how" in the use of the invention is an
example.
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covenant: infringers no less than promise-breakers are pariahs in the
business community.
That the distinction between covenant and condition is generally
without substance is so clear that one seeks explanation of how it
came to be accorded significance. Explanations of nonsense are neces-
sarily somewhat speculative, but the probable origins of the foible are
several. First, availability of a federal forum often turns on the dis-
tinction. Suit to enforce a condition usually takes the form of an in-
fringement charge and hence "arises under" the patent laws;30 but
suit for breach of covenant must be brought in the state courts unless
diversity is present.40 Second, there is great confusion in the cases
regarding the circumstances under which a defendant in a contract
action may assert an anti-trust defense,41 but where the suit is for in-
fringement a defense of "misuse" generally is allowed. 2 Finally it is
more difficult, apparently, for courts to perceive anticompetitive ef-
fects of conditions than of covenants. 3 A promise not to sell at prices
below the patentee's or outside a set territory falls neatly alongside
the "contract in restraint of trade" phraseology of the Sherman Act.
But when faced with a comparable condition, the courts tend to reason
that all competition was forbidden before the license and hence no
suppression of competition could be attributable to a license which
made some competition possible. Even to the extent that this latter
analysis is sound-and it sounds much better before careful scrutiny
than afterward-the distinction between condition and covenant is not
aided; for it is equally true that there would have been no occasion
for the promise not to compete by certain acts but for the authorization
found in the same document to compete in other ways. Maximum
rational significance is accorded the distinction between covenant and
condition when it is viewed, in conjunction with other circumstances,
as probative of future licensee conduct.
III. Some Basic Economics
In considering more particularly just what the patentee's monopoly
does entitle him to do and which techniques of exploitation should
89. See, e.g., Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); White v. Rankin, 144 U.S.
628 (1892); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLum. L. REV.
157 (1953).
40. See, e.g., Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1882).
41. Compare Kelly v. Kosuga, 858 U.S. 516 (1959) with United States Gypsum Co. v.
National Gypsum Co., 352 US. 457 (1957).
42. See Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947);
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 US. 402 (1947).
43. Cf. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 828
(1950); Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co. v. Lanova Corp., 79 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D. Del.
1948).
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be denied to the patentee because of their effect on third persons, fre-
quent reference to economic concepts will be necessary. In an Appen-
dix I have attempted to set forth some basic concepts and definitions.
Reference to the Appendix may be helpful to some readers at this
point.
IV. Price Discrimination in Patent Licensing
Running through much of the controversy over legal limits on a
patentee's freedom to exploit his monopoly is a thread I will call eco-
nomic, or price discrimination."4 Territorial and field limits and tying
provisions, for example, can and probably are used to achieve the
private gains of economic discrimination under appropriate circum-
stances. Each may be used to facilitate segregation of licensees into
categories with differing demand elasticities; and returns can then be
maximized by setting a different royalty rate for each category in
accordance with the marginal revenue function of that category.
A patentee obviously has a fertile field in which to practice price
discrimination. He has a legal monopoly; to the extent it represents
an economic monopoly as well, competitors cannot seek out and take
away his high paying customers. Assuming the enforceability of the
license restrictions and prohibitions against sublicenses that are used
to segregate purchasers, retransfer of the patentee's product from fa-
vored to disfavored purchasers need not be feared.45 Thus the legal pro-
tection afforded a patentee, if unaccompanied by any legal prohibitions
which will block discriminatory pricing, places the patentee in a
unique position: no regulatory body reviews his rate structure "in the
public interest"; no private party may enter his market and spoil his
game; the monopoly source of his power to discriminate is immune
from direct attack under the anti-trust laws. His opportunity and in-
centive to extract maximum consumer surplus from his licensees and,
perhaps in the course of so doing, to impair or destroy the ability of
one licensee to compete with another is great.40 Does law have a role
to play here? Or must the situation, its apparent potential for harm
notwithstanding, be viewed as necessarily implicit in the choice to use
monopoly to subsidize inventive activity?
44. I do not intend to suggest by my -caution in applying this label that either the
label or the concept it usually represents is original with me; obviously they are not.
Rather, I apply the label hesitantly because, as will be explained, the phenomenon ex-
amined here differs in an important respect from that to which the label is usually
attached; and whether the label is appropriate is therefore disputable.
45. The term "favored" purchaser or licensee designates the one with a more elastic
demand who therefore is charged a lower price or royalty rate.
46. Cf. Grand Caillou Paddng Co., TRAnE RE. REP. (1963.65 Transfer Binder)
16,927 (1964).
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One's instinctive inclination to curb patentee discrimination encoun-
ters the difficulty that effective prohibition presupposes an ability to
articulate criteria for what does and does not constitute forbidden dis-
crimination. That task is extraordinarily troublesome. In the broadest
sense, price discrimination may be said to exist whenever any two prod-
ucts are being sold in an economy at prices which bear differing ratios
to the respective marginal costs of the products. This definition is in-
dependent of product definition and of seller identity; it requires only
that price-marginal cost ratios be ascertainable. But the definition is
too broad to yield a workable prohibition. Elimination of discrimina-
tion in that broad sense is a major purpose ot the entire competitive
market system; and legal attack upon it in that broad sense would in-
volve wholesale substitution of administrative for market mechanisms.
For this reason the term economic discrimination is usually defined
in much narrower terms, 47 and legal attack upon it is confined to much
narrower channels. 4 A typical definition would be, sales by a single
seller of closely related or identical products at prices bearing disparate
ratios to their respective marginal costs4 9 Even if one is willing to
ignore the substantive arbitrariness inherent in this narrower defini-
tion, it is very difficult to build upon the definition a legal prohibition
that will prove administrable in the patent licensing context. An at-
tempt to construct such a prohibition will be made, as much for the
purpose of exploring the difficulties as for the utility of the result.
Initial problems are posed by the vagueness of the narrower defini-
tion. It contains three concepts, each of which is difficult to apply: "a
single seller, .... closely related products," and "price-marginal cost ra-
tio." Like all concepts, these lack inherent meaning and must be given
content in accordance with the purposes sought to be accomplished by
their use. To ascertain these purposes it is necessary to focus more
carefully on the phenomenon of economic discrimination and its as-
serted evil consequences.
The nature of production processes is generally such that, in any
but the very long run, some part of total costs is fixed-independent of
output-and another portion varies with output. Marginal cost is a
mathematical function of the variable cost component. The seller's
interest is never advanced by selling at prices below marginal cost; but
47. See, e.g., Machlup, Characteristics and Types of Price Discrimination, in Busm',in
CONCENTRATION AND PRicE PoLIcy 398 (1955).
48. See, e.g., Robinson-Patman Act § 2, 49 Stat. 1526 (193A), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964);
Interstate Commerce Act §§ 2-4. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (1964).
49. See, e.g., Machlup, supra note 47, at 398.
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if the demand function he faces is sloped, he will sell above marginal
cost. The returns earned by reason of the fact that price exceeds mar-
ginal cost may serve to cover his fixed costs or to yield him a monopoly
profit or both. For present purposes consider the seller's fixed costs and
his monopoly profits as a single category labeled "excess needs."610 The
pricing problem faced by the seller may now be put in this form: "I
will sell no unit of product at less than marginal cost. Having made
that decision, I have implicitly decided how I will allocate my aggre-
gate variable costs among the units of product I sell-I will allocate
an equal portion to each unit. But how shall I allocate my excess needs
among those units?"
A rule against price discrimination is a normative answer to that
question: "You must allocate excess needs so that the same percentage
of each unit's price is a contribution to those needs," or, "To set price,
always mark up marginal cost by the samie percentage."r1 If price dis-
crimination is possible because customers with disparate demand elas-
ticities can be segregated, then the objective to maximize yields a dif-
ferent normative answer: "To maximize, allocate so as to achieve prices
scaled to demand elasticity."
The last answer given sets forth explicitly the private objective that
dictates it: to maximize. What are the social criteria that dictate the
first answers? I can perceive only three, the first two of which are rather
crude and emotive rather than utilitarian.
(1) Regarding the relationship between seller and disfavored cus-
tomers, fairness requires that the seller desist from maximizing revenue
at the customers' expense. Revenue maximization to the point per-
mitted by a uniform-price price structure is all community standards of
equity will tolerate. Charging disfavored customers a price in excess of
the maximizing uniform price cannot be justified by the fact that an-
other group of customers is simultaneously charged a price lower than
the maximizing uniform price.
(2) Regarding the relationship between favored and disfavored cus-
50. This and the preceding sentence assume that marginal cost equals or exceeds
average variable cost at the level of operation involved, a condition that will be satis-
fled in the bulk of cases. But the analysis in the text is valid even if the condition Is
not satisfied; a more complex definition of "excess needs" would be the only necessary
change.
51. The substance of the sentence in the text may be stated in several ways that are
mathematical equivalents of one another. Let p = price, m.c. - marginal cost and
e.n. = excess needs. Then p = m.c. + e.n. The statement in the text imposes the con-
straint that for each unit e.n..= (x%) (p). This is equivalent to the statement that e.n./p
must be the same for all units and to the statement that p/m.c. must be the same for
all units. The last mode of statement corresponds to the classic definition of discrimlna-
tion.
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tomers, the community standard requiring equal treatment of persons
.similarly situated applies; all purchasers are to be regarded as similarly
situated notwithstanding those dissimilarities which account for their
differing demand elasticities. Hence, you may not charge some more
than others.
(3) The third and more utilitarian argument is similar to criterion
(2): When the favored and disfavored customers are not ultimate con-
sumers but are themselves members of an industry and each group is
in competition with the other, then a persistent pattern of price dis-
crimination will cause the disfavored group to have higher costs and to
be handicapped in its competition with the favored group. Entry to
and exit from the customer industry can be expected to bring about
structural changes in that industry which at best will be artificial in
that they are unrelated to real cost savings to society, and at worst will
be undesirable in that real economies available to the disfavored cus-
tomer category will have been overbalanced by the discriminatory pric-
ing and eventually those savings may be lost to society.5 2
In attempting to give content to the concepts of "a single seller,"
"closely related products" and "price-marginal cost ratios," what guid-
ance can be derived from the foregoing objections to discrimination?
The first two "fairness?' arguments yield no assistance at all. They
make clear that homogeneity or similarity of the discriminatorily priced
products is relevant only insofar as it increases the visibility of the as-
serted inequity. The disfavored customer is being treated no more un-
fairly, vis-i-vis the seller or the favored customer, than is any customer
who has a relatively inelastic demand for a product sold under rela-
tively monopolistic conditions. Both the disfavored customer of a
discriminating monopolist and the customer of a single-price monop-
olist are being deprived, without economic justification, of consumer
surplus to a greater extent than are other consumers in the economic
system. The unfairness is not caused by, but is made obvious by, the
availability to others of a "closely related product" at a lower price.
Similarly, it is irrelevant from the standpoint of equity whether the
disparately priced products are being sold by the same or by different
52. This argument, obviously, is the economic premise underlying the basic provisions
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). The adminis-
tration that Act has received should not be permitted to generate false doubts about
the soundness of the premise.
The "primary line" Robinson-Patnan cases suggest a fourth reason why discrimination
may be undesirable; it may be used as a predatory device by a seller against his owm
competitors. This argument, however, has difficulties of its owm and adds nothing helpful
for present purposes to the three stated in the text.
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sellers. Again it is true that the obviousness of the asserted injustice
rather than its existence gives significance to unified control over price.
Even when attention is shifted to the third and most concrete pur-
pose of an anti-discrimination rule, to prevent distortions of structure
in the industry which purchases the disparately priced products, no
guidance can be found. A disfavored customer will be impaired in his
ability to compete if he is subjected to monopolistic exploitation with
respect to any important factor input. This will be no less true whether
the disfavored customer buys that factor input from the same or a dif-
ferent source of supply than does his rival and whether the factor input
is exactly the same as or very different from the functionally analogous
factor input used by his rival.5a Here, too, it is true that the existence
of a common seller and of physical or functional similarity between the
factor inputs merely enables us to see how and by whom the disfavored
purchaser is being prejudiced.
I do not mean to suggest that the law should not strike at ascertain-
able evils merely because they are indistinguishable in principle from
evils not ascertainable. But I do argue that the scope to be given to the
prohibition against economic discrimination must be determined not
on an economic basis but by reference to problems of proof and other
factors relating to ease of administration and enforcement.
The foregoing analysis is applicable to the pricing of the mine-run
product; but when the product is the right to practice a patented in-
vention, a further difficulty appears. The marginal cost of any incre-
mental use of a patented invention is zero, and hence it is impossible
to make any useful statement about the ratio between price (royalty)
and marginal cost. All costs associated with a patent are those past re-
search and development costs which were necessary to bring the patent
into existence; and once they have been incurred the patent may be
used in one field or ten, in one geographic area or ten, extensively or
53. It is not even necessary that the competing purchasers require functionally
analogous factor inputs. Assume the existence of two groups of cotton growers who sell
in a single national market but produce in geographically distinct regions. Both require
factor inputs 1 through 9 in comparable amounts, but Group A needs a specific fertillzer
as input 10 which is not needed by Group B because of different soil conditions. Group B,
but not Group A, needs a specific insecticide. The marginal cost of a unit of insecticide
and of a unit of fertilizer is the same, the unit in each case being that quantity ap.
propriate to use in conjunction with the production of 1 bale of cotton. Thus neither
Group has any real cost advantage over the other. A diversified supplier, S, sells both
the fertilizer and the insecticide; S has competitors in fertilizer but not in insecticide
sales. S will sell fertilizer at a lower markup over marginal cost than the markup he
applies to insecticide and Group B will be at an artificial cost disadvantage. Is S engaging
in economic discrimination? Suppose S now spins off its insecticide division which be.
comes independent Company I and which continues to price as before. Is I engaging
in economic discrimination?
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not at all, all without any additional cost54 Thus any two royalty
charges, however disparate they may be from one another, bear the
same ratio to the marginal cost of the product: in each case the ratio
is infinite.
Another way to put the difficulty is as follows: If rights to use a
patented invention were being sold under conditions of perfect com-
petition, price would approach marginal cost of zero. If such rights
were being sold by a perfectly discriminating monopolist, the price to
his most favored customer would approach the marginal cost of zero.
Only the existence of monopoly makes possible the imposition of any
price in excess of zero. Any revenue received through successful impo-
sition of a price is a return, either to fixed cost or of monopoly profit-
the category previously described as "excess needs"; none is a return to
variable cost, for there is no variable cost. Since a rule against economic
discrimination is a rule that requires allocation of "excess needs" in
proportion to marginal cost, the rule is not susceptible to application
in the patent license context because there is no base figure against
which to allocate "excess needs."
It may seem at first as though the foregoing argument is a mere math-
ematical trick, depending perhaps on the impermissible step of di-
viding by zero, with which "men of affairs" need not be concerned.
"Surely," the reader may argue, "we can at least require an equal
royalty charge in patent licenses of identical scope."
But, subject to a possible exception to be discussed shortly, these
reactions are wrong; no mere mathematical trick underlies the diffi-
culty. What does underlie the foregoing position is the arbitrariness
inherent in the basic concept of price discrimination. No normative
principle but only a very rough and elusive sense of equity dictates that
"excess needs" be allocated in proportion to marginal cost. In the gen-
erality of situations, a rough sense of equity is enough, however; for
any conceivable allocation of "excess needs" among customers is quite
as arbitrary as any other, and proportionality to marginal cost, being
no worse than any other, needs only to be supported by a feathenveight.
That featherweight, moreover, receives the support of familiarity; for
in competitive markets the existence of rival sellers compels propor-
tionate allocation. And since competition does compel that allocation,
other allocations are probative of monopoly and are therefore viewed
54. This statement ignores the cost of administering the license s)stem: the cost of
negotiating the license, of collecting the royalties, etc. These costs are roughly analogous
to "selling costs" of a more typical product. The existence of these costs does not impair
the basic validity of the point made in the text for reasons that will be explained.
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with suspicion and hostility. Finally, and of most substance, since in
the generality of cases marginal cost is a very large percentage of price,
proportionality of "excess needs" to marginal cost is the allocation least
likely to induce, in the market structure of customers who compete
among themselves, structural features inversely related to efficiency.
In the patent licensing context, however, since marginal cost is zero,
some other basis for allocating "excess needs" must be found. And that
basis must be sufficient in itself to justify legal enforcement of that
allocation, for the reinforcement derived outside the patent area from
familiarity and anti-monopoly policies are absent here. If possible, the
new basis of allocation must be consistent with, and perhaps shaped
entirely by, the objective of avoiding structural distortion in consumer
industries, the one traditional purpose of prohibition against discrimi-
nation not yet shown to be totally vacuous in this context.
The preceding paragraphs point by inference to the exception sug-
gested earlier. Although a patent license often is unaccompanied by
any transfer of a product and consists merely of a grant of legal per-
mission to practice an invention, the contrary is often true. When a
patented product is sold or leased, a license to practice the invention at
least to the extent of using the product is granted, usually by implica-
tion but sometimes expressly. "5 If an undifferentiated price (or rent) is
charged for the product in such a case, it obviously comprises several
elements of return to the patentee-manufacturer, the cost of the prod-
uct and his monopoly return as patentee. But the price need not be
undifferentiated: the patentee may put a price on the product and
charge a separately stated royalty for its use, and to do so is usually the
purpose of an express license accompanying such a sale or lease. The
question then may arise whether the total charge to each purchaser (or
lessee) must bear the same ratio to marginal cost of the product. A
workable rule which imposes an affirmative answer to that question
could be adopted, either a rule limited to those situations where struc-
tural distortion of customer industries was a realistic concern or a more
pervasive rule. Hence the license in conjunction with the transfer of
a product is an exception to the statement that the classical concept of
economic discrimination can have no application in the patent license
context. Whether such a rule would be desirable is, of course, another
question; and an attempt to give a difinitive answer will be deferred
55. See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1 (1912); Grand Caillou Packing Co., TADE REG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder)
16,927 (1964).
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pending further consideration of royalty discrimination unaccompa-
nied by product transfer.
I return to the situation of a license unaccompanied by product
transfer and dispose briefly of two remaining objections that might be
raised against the asserted proposition that the classical concept of eco-
nomic discrimination cannot be applied. One might object that mar-
ginal cost is only equal to zero when the situation is viewed as of the
point in time when the patent has been acquired; that all costs are
variable in the long run and hence that long-run marginal cost neces-
sarily exceeds zero and can be used as a basis for allocation. The objec-
tion fails for several reasons. First, in the theoretical sense in which the
assertion of "long-run variability" is true, it affords no workable basis
for assigning a particular marginal cost to a particular patent license.
The assertion presupposes options about the scale at which an activity
yielding a more or less homogeneous product will be conducted. It
might conceivably have relevance to one establishing a research labo-
ratory intending to produce a series of patentable inventions over a
sustained period of time. But it has no relevance to royalty charges
under a single patent which, by definition, is unique and may have
been substantially more or less costly to develop than the next preced-
ing or following patent.
Second, a suggestion to invoke long-run marginal cost as a royalty
criterion necessarily implies parity of royalty charges for licenses under
successive patents of a single patentee. Hence it is totally antithetical
to the statutory scheme which has the dominant purpose of utilizing
the market mechanism to determine, patent by patent, the value of the
patentee's contribution and to generate rewards to the patentee com-
mensurate with the value of each individual patent.
The basic feature of statutory purpose might be thought to have
even more extreme implications. It plainly contemplates rewards based
upon value of the invention to users rather than upon cost to the
patentee. One might argue, therefore, that any cost-related limitation
on royalties was incompatible with the purposes of the patent laws,
that the law calls for royalties commensurate with value to the licensee
and that "value to the licensee" is a mere synonym for the licensee's
elasticity of demand. This view, though tenable, is surely not inevitable.
Rewards "as great as the traffic will bear" can be permitted with respect
to each individual patent without going further still and permitting
royalties from each licensee under a single patent to be as high as the
patentee can bargain for. The patentee can thus be permitted to take
into account the elasticity of aggregate demand of all potential users
of a particular invention but denied freedom to charge some users of
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a patent more than other users of the same patent in accordance with
their individual demand elasticities. Hence, while statutory purpose
requires that each patent be looked at singly, that purpose would not
be thwarted by and thus does not preclude a rule against discrimina-
tion among licensees of a single patent.
Compatibility with statutory purpose is a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition to the adoption of a no-discrimination rule. Since that
purpose does require that any such rule be constructed on a patent-
by-patent basis, the question remains whether a rule with beneficial
economic impact can be articulated and applied.
One might assert that even in the short run patent-by-patent view
imposed by statutory purpose, it is not true that marginal cost equals
zero. At least some minimal cost to the patentee is involved in the ne-
gotiation and administration of each individual patent license. But
even assuming that a figure could be derived from such costs, it would
be a totally inappropriate basis by which to allocate the patentee's fixed
costs and monopoly return. These "selling" costs will usually be an ex-
ceedingly small percentage of the royalty charge and they will often
vary substantially from one licensee to another. Used as a mandatory
basis of allocating all other costs and monopoly return, they would
compel royalty structures of wild absurdity that would not comport
with but contravene both the equity objectives and the customer-indus-
try structure objectives underlying the classical concept of discrimina-
tion.50
Once it is conceded that marginal cost is not available as a basis for
allocation (price formation) in the patent license context, the question
arises whether there is some other basis on which a rule of law might
56. The obviousness of the fact that the fragmentary costs of negotiating and ad-
ministering individual licenses are an inappropriate basis for allocation (price fornma.
tion) might seem to suggest that the allocation problem discussed here is very different
in principle from those to which the classical discrimination concept is traditionally
applied. However, I think the difference is merely one of degree. The fact is that there
is no very sound reason why "excess needs" should always be allocated in proportion
to marginal cost. No criterion for allocation is "right" except because it conduces to a
social objective; and as has been argued, the identifiable objectives of a no-discrimination
rule are fairly elusive. The generally observable loyalty among economists to the classical
concept probably owes much to the logically impermissible step from a descriptive
statement regarding price formation under competitive conditions to a prescriptive
statement regarding price formation generally. The assertion "Price should be proportional
to marginal cost," is often used as a synonym for the assertion, "Prices should be formed
under competitive conditions." In the context of a legal monopoly, the synonym breaks
down.
Even outside the context of legal monopoly, however, the adequacy of short-run
marginal cost as a criterion for price formation would seem to diminish as marginal
cost became an increasingly small percentage of total cost and price and as the homo.
geneity of the units of product decreased.
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be constructed that will minimize inequity and customer-industry
structural distortion. Since the objective of profit maximization will
lead, without the social costs of litigation and enforcement, to price
formation in accordance with customer elasticity of demand, the ques-
tion is more appropriately cast in this form: Can we identify an ascer-
tainable basis for price formation that will more fully achieve the
objectives of prohibition against discrimination than will price forma-
tion in accordance with customer elasticity?
A requirement that each licensee must be charged the "same" roy-
alty is delusive in its apparent simplicity. I use a variation of the facts
in the Grand Caillou Packing case57 as an illustration. There the pat-
entee had invented an automatic shrimp peeling machine. Prior to the
introduction of the machine, a substantial part of the cost of canned,
peeled shrimp was attributable to the labor cost of hand peeling. On
the Louisiana Gulf, where the shrimp were comparatively large, a
shrimp canning industry had developed. No significant industry
emerged in the Pacific Northwest despite the abundance of shrimp in
those waters; for Pacific shrimp are comparatively small. Since it takes
at least as much hand labor to peel a small shrimp as a large one, the
hand labor cost per pound of peeled shrimp was prohibitively high in
the Pacific Northwest. Let us assume that if the patentee had issued
royalty-free licenses to all applicants, a shrimp canning industry on the
Pacific, freed of the prior cost disadvantage, would have emerged and
thrived in competition with the Louisiana Gulf industry.rs But the
patentee was entitled to and did charge a royalty. To maximize his
returns, he should have set a royalty rate on a per-shrimp basis roughly
equivalent to each licensee's prior labor cost of hand-peeling a shrimp.0
57. Grand Caillou Packing Co., TPADE Rrc. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) rd 16,927
(1964), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nora. La Peyre v. FTC, ATRE No. 071, p. x-1
(5th Cir. Sept. 13, 1966). In that case the patentee leased the patented machines to
licensees for a minimum annual fee plus a royalty per machine revolution. Hence the
case involved transfer of a product with a real marginal cost. In my hypothetical varia-
tion it is assumed that the patentee authorizes licensees to build and use their owm
machines.
58. This situation, of course, is the social optimum; for since the real social cost
of an incremental use of an existing innovation is zero, any deterrent to use results in a
misallocation of resources. But this misallocation, hopefully limited in duration to the life
of the patent, is obviously a contemplated cost of the patent systems selection of the
monopoly device is a means of encouraging innovation.
It is assumed throughout the discussion that the two groups of shrimp canners are
in competition with one another and that their other inputs are supplied under com-
petitive conditions.
59. Under certain circumstances the patentee would make greater returns by setting
a royalty enough below prior labor cost to induce a reduction by his licensees in the
price they charged for shrimp. This would be true if, after adopting the invention,
the aggregate marginal cost curve of the industry, computed without regard for royalties,
intersected the marginal revenue curve confronting the industry at an output greater
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Actually, the rate to Gulf licensees would have to be slightly lower
than Gulf labor costs to induce those canners to shift their production
method. And although the rate for the Pacific canners per pound of
peeled shrimp would be higher, their rate would have to be an even
smaller percentage of their prior labor costs, they having demonstrated
in the past that survival was impossible if they had to pay full hand
labor costs. I will refer to these maximizing rates as GL (Gulf Labor)
and PL-x (Pacific labor less an amount essential to survival). From the
facts of the case we know that PL exceeded GL and that x was suffi-
ciently small so that PL-x exceeded GL. In summary, the maximizing
royalty structure is such that Gulf canners would have continued to
use hand labor had the charge to them been any higher and the Pacific
canners were just barely earning the opportunity cost of their invested
capital at the rate charged to them. Such a royalty structure could be
expected to result from the self-interest of the several parties without
the delay or any of the private or social costs of official intervention.
And as I read the Caillou case, just such royalty structure did in fact
emerge.
Can a persuasive case be made for the legal imposition of any dif-
ferent royalty structure? Is there inequity or misallocation that the law
might correct?60 I can perceive no inequity between the patentee, on
the one hand and, on the other, either group of licensees. The patentee
has afforded the Gulf canners that minimal cost saving necessary to
induce them to use his invention and has afforded Pacific canners an
even greater cost saving. It is true Gulf canners are less well off than
they were before. Their prior labor cost advantage has been diminished
and they must now share the market for canned shrimp with the Pa-
cific interlopers. If they were engaged in perfect competition before,
some Gulf canners may now fail; if not, prior monopoly profits will
not again be earned to the same extent. But surely losses such as these
do not warrant legal remedy.
The Pacific canners, on the other hand, while better off than before,
may be less well off than they will be in the future when patent pro-
tection expires. It may be that they have some cost advantage over the
Gulf canners which has heretofore been rendered inoperative by the
dominating cost-of-labor disadvantage; any such advantage will now be
absorbed by the patentee through the royalty charge and will inure to
than that at which the prior marginal cost curve, including labor costs, intersected the
demand curve.
I have assumed that this circumstance did not exist. A contrary assumption would
not affect the substance of the analysis but would affect its verbalization.
60. There is, of course, the misallocation referred to in note 58 supra; but that is
inherent in the monopoly-subsidy approach of the patent law.
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their benefit only when the patent expires.0 ' Does the present denial
to Pacific canners of the private benefit that is potential in such a cost
advantage give them a basis for complaint of discrimination vis-i-vis
the Gulf canners? If so, my equal protection antenna fails to perceive
it. If there is a problem here, it seems to me to be one of resource
allocation, an issue which remains to be considered, and not one of
equity. Arrayed against any equity argument are the following points:
(1) Unlike the Gulf canners, the Pacific canners are better off than
before if worse off than hereafter; why is hereafter a more persuasive
touchstone of fairness than heretofore? (2) The cost advantage of the
Pacific canners was rescued from total irrelevance by the innovation of
the patentee; the advantage is a measure of the innovation's value and
seems as justly captured by the patentee as by the licensee. (3) If the
Pacific canners operate under competitive conditions, the private gain
potential in the cost advantage will be short-lived in any event because
it will signal entry or expansion in the Pacific industry segment and
contraction in the Gulf.
The last observation places emphasis where it belongs-not on
equity but on resource allocation between the Gulf and Pacific seg-
ments of the industry. The optimum allocation is that which would
prevail if the peelers were available to each segment royalty-free, but
this precise allocation will be precluded by any royalty charge.02 The
question therefore can again be refined: given the fact that any royalty
charges will force a departure from optimum resource allocation by
the industry as a whole-it will under-produce relative to other in-
dustries--is it nevertheless possible to describe a royalty structure
61. If the heretofore inoperative cost advantage of the Pacific canners werc suffi-
dently great, it would be in the interest of the patentee to license only those canners
and supply the entire demand for shrimp through them. This circumstance would
imply that the former labor cost disadvantage was very substantial-it necessarily ex.
ceeded any present cost advantage-and hence that the invention is of very substantial
value to the Pacific canners. But even under this circumstance the patentee will absorb
much of the now operative cost advantage and allow Pacific canners only the return
on capital essential to induce production.
62. If both segments of the industry were engaged in production at the time of
patenting, then, in the short run, a royalty charge would only distort resource allocation
from the post-patent optimum if it affected short-run marginal cost. Traditional royalty
structures, based on units of output or licensee sales revenue do affect those costs. Lump
sum royalty charges, although they do not affect short-run marginal cost, do not offer
a practical alternative however. First, except in the short-run they are equally distortive.
Second, if as in the shrimp-peeler case, one segment of the industry is more a potential
entrant than a present competitor, the distorting effect will occur even in the short-run.
Third, if it were required that the lump-sum demanded of the several segments be
equal in dollar magnitudes, an artificial economy of scale would be created which would
distort allocation and which would be politically unacceptable; and if the several sums
need not be equal then the entire problem of discrimination will be reintroduced into
the cost structure of the licensee industry.
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which will not make matters worse by distorting allocation between
the several segments? To speak of distortion presupposes a norm, and
it should be explicit: production at minimum average cost per unit
of output is desired. If either industry segment can produce all that
society wants at a cost per unit below the unit cost at which the other
segment can produce any units, then the first industry segment should
produce all units. If the two segments jointly can produce the desired
aggregate output more cheaply than either segment alone, then each
should be producing that part at which the aggregate costs of both
are minimized.
One's first impression may be that the task of dictating a royalty
structure which will not distort the division of production between
segments is quite simple: it is merely necessary, it might seem, to
require royalty charges to be equal; then any other cost advantage
will make itself felt in the process of production allocation through
competition. Equality in such a context, however, is a very elusive
criterion. Should each segment pay an equal number of dollars during
the 17-year patent life? Regardless of its output? Regardless of the
number of years it was engaged in production during the 17-year
period? Equal dollars, then, per shrimp? Per pound of raw shrimp?
Per peeling machine? Per machine revolution? In the Grand Gaillou
context, and in many patent licensing contexts, each of these appar
ently equal royalty requirements would have had very different eco-
nomic effects, and no one of them has any normative justification. Each
is equal only in its impact on the unsophisticated ear, and totally arbi-
trary in the only important sense of having the capacity to distort
allocation of production between the segments. Deprived, as we are in
this context, of the criterion of marginal cost to the seller, alternative
criteria for price formation must be examined with considerable
skepticism.
I return to the question not satisfactorily answered by the fruitless
pursuit of audio-equality: given that the output of the licensee-indus-
try will be restricted below optimum by any royalty charge, is it pos-
sible to describe in generally applicable terms the characteristics of
a royalty structure which will achieve a second-best solution to the
allocation problem? If the phrase "second-best" is taken in its techni-
cal sense, the answer is, no, not except by a linear programming solu-
tion based in each case upon the cost, demand and cross-elasticity func-
tions for both segments of the industry. Such a solution requires that
these functions be known in their entirety; and such knowledge will
never be available as a practical matter.
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It is possible to say, on the other hand, that a royalty structure
which induces to the same percentage allocation of market between
the segments of the industry as would prevail if royalties were zero
is preferable to a royalty structure dictated by patentee maximiza-
tion. In more cases than not the market allocation will approximate
the technical second-best solution more closely under the former roy-
alty structure than under the latter. Given that royalty structure, the
absolute output of both segments will continue to be smaller than
under the royalty-free optimum. One cannot generalize whether utiliza-
tion of the invention would increase or decrease.6 But since cost
savings in one segment of the industry would be preserved, at least
in part, a tendency toward greater aggregate licensee endproduct out-
put would exist under such royalty structures that does not exist under
structures dictated by patentee maximization.
Thus, since the second-best allocation is theoretically determinable
only in each specific case and not generally, and since, as a practical
matter, it cannot be determined even case by case, the best normative
rule regarding royalty structure that I have been able to identify is one
which would achieve the same percentage market allocation between
the segments as would prevail under royalty-free conditions.
Can even so limited a rule be articulated in an administrable form?
A royalty charge to each segment of an equal percentage of that seg-
ment's total variable costs would not give precisely the desired result.
The resulting change in output will be a function of the slopes of the
marginal cost curve and of the marginal revenue curve, and the respec-
tive slopes for the two industry segments need not be identical. Simi-
larly, a royalty charge of an equal percentage of the gross sales of each
segment may not effect precisely the same percentage of output reduc-
tion in each industry segment; again the change in output will be a
function of the slopes of both marginal cost and marginal revenue.
But since cross-elasticity betwveen the demands in the two segments is
implicit in the problem, the slopes of the several demand curves are
unlikely to be markedly different; and therefore, unless the technology
in the two segments is markedly different so as to produce marginal cost
curves of very different slopes, a royalty structure based on either a
sales percentage or a variable cost percentage might serve as a workable
approximation.
Emphasis is warranted on the fact that it is not the absolute level or
amount of cost but the slope, or rate of change, of the marginal cost
63. See Appendix, infra, at note 5.
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curve that is one of the determinants of output restriction as compared
with the royalty-free optimum output. Very substantial differences be-
tween cost magnitudes of the two segments may exist, and it is the
central objective of a rule governing royalty structure to assure that
such differences do affect the market allocation that emerges between
the two segments of the industry. If such differences in cost magnitude
do exist, their impact on inter-segment allocation will not be substan-










64. These diagrams illustrate some of the relationships discussed in the
preceding paragraphs. In figure (a) a royalty of 10% of variable cost raises the position
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Tentatively, then, one might conclude that desirable economic ob-
jectives would be achieved in the generality of applications by a rule
forbidding royalty structures which imposed on different segments of
an industry charges that were disproportionate to the sales or to the
variable costs of the respective segments. Since the figures to which
the royalty percentage is to be applied are those that prevail after the
industry is using the invention and since sales figures are more easily
determinable and less likely to be regarded as confidential by the li-
censee than are variable cost figures, a royalty percentage based on
dollar sales would constitute the more desirable of these two approaches.
However, I will show in the next section of this article that royalty
structures based on endproduct sales generally wil have a more restric-
tive impact on licensee output than a royalty structure based on an
input selected to measure use of the invention. The argument of the
next section applies equally to a royalty structure based on variable
cost of all inputs other than the invention. The restrictive effect of
endproduct royalty structures would introduce a tendency in opposi-
tion to that toward greater output introduced by the preservation of
cost advantages in one of the industry segments. In my opinion the
restrictive effect of endproduct royalty structures would fully offset
any increase in output that might result from preserving the cost ad-
vantage. Certainly it would nullify to a substantial extent any tendency
toward increased output. For this reason, I conclude that any attempt
to forbid royalty structures based on licensee elasticity of demand in
cases not involving transfer of a product having substantial marginal
cost would involve costs of administration and enforcement far in ex-
cess of any gains that might be derived. Hence no such attempt should
be made.
In fact, however, the Grand Caillou case involved transfer of a prod-
uct, a lease of the patented peeling machine. And although FTC coun-
sel urged that patentee be required to file a royalty structure based on
endproduct sales, the Commission rejected the request, at least tenta-
tively, and ordered only that patentee submit a new royalty structure
of the marginal cost curve by 10% of its absolute magnitude at every point and results
in an output restriction of q-q'. In figure (b) a royalty of 10% of sales lowers the demand,
or average revenue, curve and the corresponding marginal revenue curve by 10% of its
absolute value at every point and results in an output restriction of q-q'. In each case
it can be seen that the change in output is the line xy, the altitude of an approdimate
triangle two sides and the apex of which are determined by the slope of the marginal
cost and marginal revenue curves near the point of their intersection.
In both cases it can be seen that dramatic alterations in curve slope would be neces-
sary to cause substantially different changes in the percentage of output restriction.
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free of the objectionable "discrimination." 65 What type structure would
be deemed by the FTC to comply with that order is therefore open
to conjecture.
In a case such as Grand Caillou which involves transfer of a product,
the patentee does have a marginal cost upon which the law could base
a requirement that "excess needs" be allocated proportionately. That
fact does not answer the question whether such a requirement should
be imposed in those cases.
Surely the answer to that question should not depend on whether or
not the patentee states the purchase or rental price for the machine
separately from the royalty for its use subsequent to transfer. Nor
should it depend upon whether the transfer is a sale or a lease. The
first distinction is wholly verbal, and the second may or may not have
significance for other purposes but is surely irrelevant in the present
context. To apply the act to sales but not leases would merely encour-
age sellers to distort their distribution arrangements to achieve insu-
lation. In my view, the language of Robinson-Patman is broad enough
65. Grand Caillou Packing Co., TRAnE REG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) 16,927,
at 21,982 (1964). The patentee sought judicial review of the FTC order and apparently
has not filed a new royalty structure with the Commission pending review. 3 TRAvV
REG. REP., 25,901.
Apparently patentee has in fact renegotiated its royalty structure, however. See Laitram
Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1966). The new structure Is not
described in the published opinions.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that part of the FTC order which
relates to the problem discussed in this paper. La Peyre v. FTC, ATRR No. 271, p. x-1
(5th Cir. Sept. 13, 1966).
The FTC order is described differently in the Court of Appeals opinion than In the
report of the FTC opinion. In the court opinion, supra, at x-3, It is stated that the
Commission's order defined discrimination as ". . . rental terms which result In any
lessee paying a higher rate than the rate charged to any other lessee for use . . . for
the same period of time or through the same number of mechanical revolutions . ..."
Read literally, this definition suggests that the rate must be equal when computed
against a machine revolution rate base and when computed against a time-presumably
calendar time-basis. Unless all licensees use the machines an equal number of revolu-
tions per unit of calendar time, compliance with the FTC order, thus interpreted, would
seem to be impossible. Therefore the order probably should be interpreted to require
rate equality when computed against at least one of those rate bases.
The proper requirement is that rates be equal when computed against a base that
corresponds closely to the useful life of the machines. In theory, any differences in
delivery or maintenance costs borae by the patentee-manufacturer should also be re-
flected; but as a practical matter of administration, unless such differences are large,
they might well be ignored.
In assessing useful life, technological obsolescence as well as physical e.,diaustion should
be taken into account. Hence both the calendar-time base and the machine-revolutlon
base have prima facie validity, Whether one of these bases has substantially greater
validity than the other, or whether some third basis would be better than either, would
depend on issues of fact and prediction not easily resolved.
Minimization of both private and public costs of administration dictates that a
royalty base selected by the licensing parties be accepted unless it obviously correlates
less well with useful life than does some other practicable alternative. Once the FTC
has intervened in accordance with this standard, as in Grand Caillozi, FTC selection of
an appropriate royalty base should be accorded similar deference on review.
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to cover all the situations if coverage is desired;co but if that language
is thought confining, then resort should be made to the spaciousness of
§ 5 of the Trade Commission Act to achieve parity among these several
situations.
67
To require prices proportionate to marginal cost where a product
transfer is involved is, as a matter of practical administration, to re-
quire prices proportionate to physical units of product transferred sub-
ject to a cost-saving defense by a patentee who asserts that different
units of product had different costs. To impose that requirement is,
in short, to assert the desirability of applying to these situations the
Robinson-Patman Act, either directly or via the assimilation of § 5 of
the Trade Commission Act. Surely our experience with that baleful
statute and its past administration affords little reason to believe that
administration in the present context would be highly satisfactory.
Although the question is a close one, on balance I think allocation
of "excess needs" in proportion to cost should be required. First, in
a case involving a sale of a patented product, it would be very difficult
to construe Robinson-Patman as being inapplicable. Both the language
of the act and its purpose, however ill-conceived that purpose may be,
embrace the situation supposed. One might argue that the monopoly
creating the potential for discrimination here is legally conferred and
hence the situation is not of the type at which the act was aimed, but
the argument is not persuasive. The dominant purpose of Robinson-
Patman, as opposed to old section 2, was to protect the structural in-
tegrity of the customer industry; and legality of the seller's monopoly
is irrelevant to that purpose. Moreover, while the patented product in
the type of case now under discussion will usually be a durable good
not intended for resale, the logic of the "legal monopoly" argument
extends equally to sales for resale of nondurables-patented drug prod-
ucts for example. Certainly no persuasive argument could be made for
exempting sales of the latter type.
Second, application of Robinson-Patman to transfers of patented
durables is less likely than most applications of the statute to be at-
tended by the undesirable side effect of rigidifying price structures and
impairing competitive processes. The very short-run price fluctuations
and geographically spotty price competition which do and should occur
66. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
67. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
In the Grand Caillou case the FTC based its order on § 5, apparently because the
Robinson-Patman Act was thought inapplicable. Grand Caillou Packing Co., Tnrn REo.
REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) 16,927, at 21,992 (1964) (concurring opinion).
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in the distribution of nondurable consumer goods are unlikely to occur
in the case of patented durable goods; and Robinson-Patman enforce-
ment thus is less likely to impair such competition as does exist in the
markets for such goods.
Third, when discrimination does occur with respect to patented dur-
ables, it is likely to be of the enduring type which may affect signifi-
cantly the structure of customer industries. A requirement of propor-
tionate allocation of excess needs will diminish the patentee's ability
to absorb cost advantages extraneous to the invention that may be pos-
sessed by one segment of the customer industry. For all these reasons
the argument for applying Robinson-Patman standards to these cases
is probably stronger than for applying them in the typical Robinson-
Patman case.
Application of Robinson-Patman standards, even assuming flawless
administration of the process, is in no sense an ideal solution: it is
merely better than any other practicable alternative that occurs to me.
It is better than allowing patentee maximization through royalty
charges scaled to demand elasticity, for it will diminish the patentee's
ability to absorb a potential cost advantage available to a segment of
the industry. It thus will permit a partial shift of resources toward the
more efficient segment, a shift in the direction of that allocation be-
tween segments that presumably will prevail after patent expiration.
This shift should achieve, in the generality of cases though not neces-
sarily in any particular case, a better resource allocation. Second, it is
better than allowing the patentee to base royalties on the unpatented
endproduct. Although an endproduct royalty structure would induce
an even closer percentage approximation of post-patent resource allo-
cation between the industry segments, that royalty structure maximizes
the restraint imposed on the endproduct market for reasons explained
in the next section.
Since Grand Caillou did involve product transfer, the result reached
by the FTC seems justifiable although the majority opinion furnishes
no support either for the result or for the traditional raison d'ctre of
administrative agencies. 8 Rejection of the endproduct royalty structure
suggested by its staff was sound. Whether the Commission will now
68. The Commission explicitly rejected direct testimony that the royalty structure
was adopted by reference to the saving in labor cost that the invention afforded. This
rational and highly probable explanation was held "not worthy of belief." Id. at 21,976.
The Commission found, instead, that the structure was intended 'to protect . . . (patentee's)
own interests as shrimp canners." Ibid. That explanation is not only wholly Irrational
but the evidence cited to support it is unconvincing. Id. at 21,977. Commissioner Elman,
in his concurring opinion, noted this error in the majority's analysis, but to no avail.
Id. at 21,991-92.
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reduce the entire proceedings to absurdity by accepting a new royalty
structure that has only audio-equality to recommend it remains to be
seen.
V. Substitutability of Factor Inputs
Like the problem of discrimination, a second economic phenomenon
that has received inadequate attention by legal scholars is involved in
much patent license litigation; I will refer to it as input substitut-
ability. 9 A producer will use various goods and services, or inputs, in
his production process including land, products produced by others,
capital and labor; and at any given point in time he will be using them
in a certain proportion to one another-in accordance with. his current
recipe. For simplicity assume the producer uses only two inputs, a and
b. Even if his recipe remains unchanged, his consumption of each a
and b will increase or decrease as his own output fluctuates; and in all
but most extraordinary cases he also has the possibility of varying his
recipe-using more a and less b to produce any given output. Obvi-
ously there are limits on the -variability of production recipes: a given
amount of corn can be raised by using more fertilizer and less land,
but only up to a point. The law of diminishing returns states that in-
creases in one input while other inputs are held constant will yield
greater total outputs up to some ratio and then outputs will start to
decline. The economic term for that change in output that results from
an incremental change in the quantity of a single input, the amount
of other inputs being held constant, is the marginal physical product of
the varied input. Input a will be used in a proportion to other inputs
never exceeding the ratio at which marginal physical product of a be-
comes negative (a further increase in input a results in reduction in
output), and never less than the ratio at which the marginal physical
product of other inputs becomes negative (a reduction in other inputs
69. The role of this concept in legal control of economic activity has been noted
in several sources of which I am aware. In Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Prob-
lem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 25-27 & nn. 19-20 (1957), Professor Bowman alludes to the con.
cept; but his examination is exclusively from the sellers viewpoint in a tie-in context
and fails to make explicit the implications for resource allocation at the level of the
buyer and the buyer's customers.
Professor Merton Burstein discusses the general problem at length in his splendid
article, A Theoy of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1960). He also treats the
problem in a shorter, more technical piece, The Economics of Tie-In Sales, 42 REV. oF
FcoN. & STATLsTcs 68 (1960).
In Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 Ax-rrausr Buu.. 743 (193) Pro.
fessors Baldwin and McFarland discuss the problem in the tie-in context. Like Bowman,
supra, they neglect the more general application of the concept and, by dealing with
tie-ins of consumer products, leave obscure the significance of the concept for resource
allocation.
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results in increased output). Within this range, the producer obtains
output at minimum cost per unit of output by a recipe such that the
ratio of each input's marginal physical product to its cost is the same
as that for every other input.70 It follows that any change in price of
one input will dictate a change in the production recipe so as to re-
establish the parity of ratios between marginal physical product and
price for all inputs. In the simple two input case, assume the producer
is using a recipe of 3 units of a to 1 unit of b, the unit cost of a being
$1.00 and that of b $2.00, and their respective marginal physical prod.
ucts being 5 and 10 at that ratio. If the unit cost of a now increases to
$1.25, he will use more than 1 unit of b for each 3 units of a: by in-
creasing the absolute amount of b used or decreasing the absolute
amount of a, he will increase his proportionate use of b until its mar-
ginal physical product falls and that of a rises to values proportionate
to prices, at which point parity is re-established.
The foregoing paragraphs may first appear to be no more than a
restatement, in unnecessarily complex form, of the rudimentary prop-
osition that use of a product will vary inversely with its price, ceteris
paribus. It is true that the two propositions are closely related, but the
foregoing statements about factor inputs permit a further conclusion.
Assume that patented factor input a has no'use other than as an input
of unpatented endproduct x. The quantity of x that can be sold will
vary inversely with the price of x with some degree of elasticity. Since
the consumption of a is derived from the demand for x, demand for a
will vary in direct proportion to that for x if the production recipe of
x remains constant. But if the cause of a price increase (and quantity
decrease) of x is a production cost increase attributable to input a, the
percentage change in the demand for a will necessarily be at least as
great and in most cases will be greater than the percentage change in
demand for x. The quantity of a consumed will diminish proportion-
ately apart from any recipe change and will diminish further to the
extent that input substitution occurs. Conversely, a reduction in the
price of input a will stimulate an increased use of a more than propor-
tionate to any resultant increase in x output. The situation can be
summarized by the statement that, given input substitutability, the
elasticity of demand for a factor input is always greater than the re-
70. This recipe is a theoretical ideal and, at best, can be achieved only in the long
run. For it implies freedom to vary all inputs, some of which will be fixed in the
short run. And it assumes that all inputs can be varied by appropriately small incre-
ments, whereas in practice problems of indivisibility will be encountered. Neither of
these qualifications, however, substantially impairs the basic point made in the text.
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sponsiveness of endproduct output to a price change of that same factor
input.
In this context one must be very wary of the terms "complement"
and "substitute." In general usage two goods are called complements
if an increase in the price of one leads to a decrease of consumption
of the other-typically because they are used extensively in conjunction
with one another, like nails and lumber. And two goods are called
substitutes if an increase in the price of one leads to an increase in
the consumption of the other-typically because they are widely sub-
stitutable for one another, like copper and aluminum. Goods which
are complements to one another in this general sense nevertheless will
be technical substitutes for one another, within limits, in most of their
joint uses; and the foregoing analysis will apply to them.
Substitutability of factor inputs has obvious implications for one
who has a monopoly on a factor input. If he can devise a way to block,
or to lessen the incentive of his customers to engage in, factor sub-
stitution, he can lessen the elasticity of demand for his patented
product and increase his monopoly profits. In the case of my two-input
endproduct x, the theoretical limit on the monopoly profits of a
patentee of input a (a having no other uses) is the consumer surplus
area under the demand curve for unpatented x. That area necessarily
equals or, given substitutability, exceeds the consumer surplus area
under the demand curve for a.
There are various ways the monopolist of a can garner larger
monopoly profit. One is by vertical integration: he buys input b
himself, uses a and b in proportions indicated by his costs for each to
produce x and sells x at the maximizing price indicated by the inter-
section of his marginal cost curve and the marginal revenue curve for
endproduct x.
Precisely the same result can be achieved by devices not requiring
entry into the process of producing and selling unpatented x. A second
method is to buy b on the competitive market and tie sales of a to
re-sales of b, either in a fixed proportion of a to b as dictated by the
ratios of their marginal physical product to his costs, or at prices which
induce the x producer to use them in that same ratio. The tie-in
device, thus used, will call for a lower nominal price for a and a
higher nominal price for b than would prevail had the monopolist
been limited to earning his profit by exploiting the demand for a.
Consequently more a and less b will be used in producing x. Since
less b is used and more is nominally paid for it, one can permissibly
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say that the monopolist has "extended" his a monopoly to b. 71 Where
the tied and tying products are the only inputs as in my simplified
example, no possibility of input substitution remains; and by correct
pricing of inputs the a monopolist will bring about the same higher
price and lower output of x and will garner the same profits for him-
self as would a monopolist of unpatented x. If there are other inputs,
the monopolist of a will have succeeded in that objective to the extent
that he has selected a tied product b against which inputs c, d, .. .n
cannot be substituted to a substantial extent in the x production
process. Hence, it may be more helpful to characterize the situation
as one in which the monopolist of the tying product has extended his
monopoly to the unpatented endproduct x rather than to input b.
The tying device has great potential usefulness to the patentee.
Since incremental uses of his invention are costless to him, they
should be used-by him if he is integrated forward to the endproduct
market or, if not, by his customers if he is to obtain maximum reve-
nues-up to the point where the marginal physical product of the
invention becomes zero. In short, the patentee should make incre-
mental use by his licensee costless and should derive his revenue by
levying a tax on some other basis. To tie a different factor input, one
not extensiv ely subject to input substitution, is a simple solution. How-
ever, the emergence of a very rigid legal prohibition against tie-ins
has placed this solution beyond the patentee's reach.
There is still a third solution for the patentee, however, and
anomalously it is the most time-honored and legally blessed of royalty
structures: a royalty based on a percentage of licensee sales of an un-
patented endproduct. Plainly the licensee cannot substitute against
his own output other than by restricting it and raising his prices just
as a monopolist would. Under an endproduct royalty structure, a
licensee pays nothing for incremental use of the invention in the
production of any given output. And through royalties the patentee
may drain off the full monopoly potential inherent not in the invention
71. See Bowman, supra note 69, at 25-27. The tying cases repeatedly use the charac.
terization, "extending the monopoly" to the tied product, but they do so with equal
glibness in contexts which plainly do not involve the phenomenon under discussion as
they do in contexts which may. Hence it is fair to conclude that in present judicial
use the phrase is gibberish-a confused and confusing way of stating the conclusion of
illegality. Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Inv, Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-65 (1944); Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940); Carbide Corp. v. American Patents Dev,
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931).
There are, of course, other undesirable potentials of tie-in sales, principally economic
discrimination among purchasers and establishment of entrenched positions in the market
for the tied product which may be longer-lived than the tying-product monopoly. The
foregoing criticism of case law is not intended to imply general disagreement with the
judicial prohibition.
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but in the unpatented endproduct of which the invention is only one
of many inputs.
There is a limited sense in which the consequences of sales per-
centage Toyalties are desirable: resource allocation btveen factor in-
puts in the given production process are not distorted. Each production
process does have a socially optimum recipe. It is that mixture of
inputs at which the marginal physical product to price ratio of each
input is the same, and each input price equals the real social cost of
producing the last or marginal unit of that input. In a process in-
volving an existing invention a and other inputs b, c, ... n, economic
waste attends the substitution of costly units of b, c or... n for costless
incremental units of a. Assuming that b, c,... n are produced under
competitive conditions, the optimum recipe results from a sales per-
centage royalty.
A choice of evils is thus presented. If the patentee bases his royalty
charge on incremental uses of input a, the consequence is partial
monopolization of the endproduct x and an inefficient production
recipe which under-utilizes a and consumes b, c, ... n in proportions,
though not necessarily in absolute amounts, in excess of optimality. If
through vertical integration, or tie-in, or a sales percentage royalty,
the patentee blocks the substitution effect, the consequence is that
x is monopolized to an even greater degree, and all inputs are under-
utilized although in an efficient production recipe. Since one or the
other of these evils necessarily attends the patent monopoly, is there
a rational basis for a general choice of one over the other? I believe
that a general choice in favor of greater x output is appropriate.
I can offer no formal proof of my answer to this question, but I
believe that something more than a purely intuitive answer can be
given. In all situations of the type under consideration, the greater
impairment of social welfare that attends the more extensive monopo-
lization of endproduct x argues for limiting the patentee's monopoliza.
tion strictly to incremental uses of the inventive input a. Unless some
offsetting social disutility attends that choice of royalty structure, that
choice should be preferred. Prima facie it may appear that the less
efficient production process and the more extensive consumption of
inputs b, c,.. . n resulting from that choice is an offsetting disutility.
The magnitude of the disutility will be considered both from the
standpoint of x production and from that of the rest of the economy.
From the standpoint of the x production process the answer is
implicit in the fact that output is greater and more nearly optimum
if only input a is monopolized. Under either type of royalty structure,
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the aggregate private cost of output of x is greater than the aggregate
social cost, the difference between the two in either case being royalty
payments for a which has no social cost. Hence under either royalty
structure, output is suboptimal and the social utility of additional x
output would exceed its social cost. A shift from an endproduct
royalty structure to a structure based on input a will increase x output
by some percentage and result in a greater percentage increase in con-
sumption of b, c,... n. The social utility of b, c,... n in their alterna-
tive uses, from which they are now drawn away, will be reflected in
their prices; and their prices will be a primary determinant of the
extent to which they are now substituted for a. Their value in x pro-
duction is diminished by the inefficiency of the production recipe, and
they will be drawn away from alternative uses only to the extent that
their value in x production, thus diminished by inefficiency, neverthe-
less exceeds their value in alternative uses. From the standpoint of x
production, then, the apparent disutility of the inefficient recipe has
already been taken into account; the social gain attributable to greater
x production is net gain and need only be weighed against disutility
elsewhere in the economy imposed by the incremental consumption
of b, c,... n.
Whether there is disutility elsewhere in the economy depends on
the slope of the supply functions for b, c, . . . n. Will the prevailing
price charged to other users of b, c,... n rise, fall, or remain constant
as a result of the increased consumption of those inputs in the produc-
tion of x? Assuming the inputs are produced under competitive condi-
tions, their prices will follow the incremental social costs involved in
supplying the additional units consumed in x production. If these
incremental units of b, c, ... n can be produced as cheaply as the next
preceding units, there will be no disutility to set off against the social
gain of greater x output. If they can be produced more cheaply-if,
for example, there are returns to large scale still to be realized in their
production-there will be no disutilities but rather gains elsewhere in
the economy which add to the social gain of greater x production. But
if the incremental units have greater costs than preceding units, then
the prices of b, c, . . . n will rise to all their users and there will be dis-
utilities which may be equal to or greater or less than the utility gained
by increases x production.
In any particular situation, then, a shift from one royalty struc-
ture to the other might have desirable or undesirable consequences;
and in the particular case one could ascertain the consequences only
if he had knowledge far beyond that likely to be available. In the
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totality of situations covered by a legal rule forbidding one royalty
structure or the other, confident prediction is less difficult. If patterns
of rising, falling and constant marginal cost of input factors appeared
with equal frequency and degree, the royalty structure yielding
greater x output obviously would be preferable; for there would be
in each case the utility gain to x users and the consequences elsewhere
would, in the generality of cases, offset one another. But rising supply
functions are probably more common than falling functions; and since
that state of events is least hospitable to my analysis, I assume it to be
true. Given that assumption, less than all the gains of greater x output
are likely to be realized by such a rule.
Since one is forced to concede that some indefinite fraction of the
social gains of greater x output will be lost through rising supply
functions elsewhere in the economy, one might question the assertion
of a confident conclusion that the fraction lost will be less than and
not greater than one. In a more technical context that question would
call for a general examination of the developing literature on the
theory of second best,72 but such a treatment would be out of place
here. A simpler answer, one that proceeds by analogy, is offered.
Why has the law set itself against monopoly at all? The effect of
monopoly is to lessen output, raise prices, increase returns to producers
and diminish social utility in the particular market monopolized;
hence it is generally condemned. But monopolistic restrictions on
output in a particular market reduce consumption of factor inputs, and
elimination of monopoly increases their consumption. Most considera-
tions of monopoly satisfy themselves with condemnation of the utility
loss in the restricted market and ignore the external consequences
attributable to the supply functions of inputs. But if rising input supply
functions are assumed to predominate, as realism compels, then
welfare gains in the monopolized market resulting from elimination
of monopoly are not inevitably net gains. Yet, for good reason no one
doubts that net welfare gains generally are realized. In part this confi-
dence is based on the not wholly persuasive factor that the gains in the
monopolized market are immediate and measurable whereas the
external losses are remote and indefinite. More soundly, the confidence
stems from conceptions of resource allocation. Monopolization of x
causes under-utilization of endproduct x and under-utilization of factor
inputs in x production. Rising supply functions of those inputs there-
72. See, e.g., Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best. 24 RM. oF
ECON. STUDIEs 211 (1957); Mishan, Second Thoughts on Second Best, 14 OxroRD EcoNomic
PAPEas 205 (1962).
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fore lead to utilization of those inputs elsewhere in excess of optimality.
Hence, it is soundly assumed that welfare gains realized in the monopo-
lized market upon destruction of monopoly will exceed diminutions of
utility elsewhere which result from reductions in output from their
present excessive rates.
Of course, in the world of pure theory, in which all segments of the
economy except the malignant monopoly sector under attention are
subject to perfect competition, there can be absolute confidence in the
desirabilty of destroying monopoly; for then the system proceeds forth-
with to Pareto optimality and perfect resource allocation. But no
sensible economist or economically literate lawyer supposes that is the
justification for attacks on monopoly in the real world. Defects re-
mained elsewhere in the economy after Alcoa's aluminum monopoly
was broken and Pareto's conditions were not met. Yet surely allocations
were shifted in the right direction and the overwhelming probability
is that net welfare gains were realized.
The patent problem is different only in that the remaining defect-
the continued patent monopoly-is more apparent, having been a
stipulated part of the problem from the outset, and in that the rele-
vance of supply functions of other factor inputs is more apparent-the
problem being one of input substitutability.
VI. Royalty Structure
The foregoing analyses of discrimination and input substitutability
obviously have implications for royalty structure. As I observed earlier,
the principal implication of each phenomenon conflicts with that of
the other. In my discussion of discrimination I concluded that, since
incremental uses of an existing invention-essentially knowledge-
had no marginal cost, the classical test of discrimination, proportion-
ality of unit price to marginal cost, could have no application. I con-
cluded further, however, that one of the major evils of economic dis-
crimination, the potential misallocation of resources between segments
of an industry, could stem from patent royalty structures and could be
avoided by requiring that the units upon which the royalty percentage
was based be units of endproduct as measured by sales.
In the discussion of input substitutability I concluded that exploita-
tion of the patent monopoly occasioned less damage to the economy
if the monopoly charge was attached to incremental utilization of the
patented input than if attached to incremental units of output. The
apparent inconsistency between these two conclusions calls for exami-
nation.
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Each conclusion is sound for a category of situations, and the ap-
parent conflict between the conclusions disappears if the category to
which each pertains is defined more precisely. In my discussion of input
substitutability, I examined the effect of the two royalty structures on the
output, prices and input recipes of "a producer of x." This might be
a single producer, or it might be a large number of producers provided
that their production technologies were very similar. Under these
circumstances the feasible range of input substitutability for each
would be similar, and all would respond to input price changes by
making similar recipe changes. The input substitutability analysis is
valid, in short, when the demand elasticities of the licensees are
roughly equal and the potential for profitable discrimination between
licensees is therefore lacking.
In the discrimination analysis I examined the effect of different
royalty structures on the prices, outputs and inputs of "two segments
of an industry" in one of which the invention had significantly greater
potential for cost savings than in the other. Under these circumsances,
where production technologies differ substantially in a relevant respect
and hence give rise to different demand elasticities for the invention
on the part of different industry segments, the discrimination analysis
is valid.
Two further points of clarification are necessary before turning from
these economic analyses to the legal rules that might be founded on
them. The discussion of input substitutability assumed that it was a
practical possibility for the patentee to base his royalty charge on
incremental uses of the invention. Essentially an invention is always
knowledge, and measuring the extent to which it is being used is elu-
sive. But generally the invention, in application, has some physical
embodiment-a machine whose revolutions can be counted, a chemical
whose quantity can be expressed in grams or gallons. But this is not
invariably so: process and combination patents pose difficult problems
in this regard, 3 and often force the patentee to base his royalty on
some physical input less directly related to the invention itself than
was the peeling machine in the Grand Caillou case. In any event, it
will be the physical unit on which the royalty is based, often but not
necessarily a patented product, whose use will be restricted by the
monopoly charge and for which substitutions will be made in the pro-
duction recipe. Whenever there is a choice of physical units to which
73. This difficulty was the practical problem that underlay the legal problem in the
Mercoid cases. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercold
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 US. 680 (1944).
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the royalty charge might be applied, the patentee will attempt to select
that unit least susceptible to substitution; and to the extent he succeeds
he will have achieved the effects of imposing a royalty on endproduct.
Secondly, the physical input adopted as proxy for the invention will
invariably have some real social cost, if only its transportation to the
point of use. In my input substitutability analysis I treated incremental
use of the invention as being socially costless; and the invention as
opposed to its physical proxy is costless. This factor causes no com-
plication so long as the patentee does not supply the physical proxy.
Then, presumably, it will be supplied by another under competitive
conditions, and the costs of the proxy and of using the invention will
be separately stated. But if the patentee supplies the proxy, then a
difficulty arises of separating the real social cost of the proxy from
the monopoly charge for practicing the invention.
The foregoing considerations suggest the possible desirability of
adopting either or both of two rules limiting patentee freedom to
shape his royalty structure: (1) When granting licenses to each of a
group of licensees who are in competition with one another, if the
technology of one subgroup differs significantly from that of another
subgroup such that their demand elasticities for the invention differ,
the patentee must base his royalty percentage on the endproduct sales
of his licensees. (2) When granting licenses in circumstances other than
those described in rule (1), a patentee must base his royalty charge on
the licensee's consumption of a particular input or group of inputs
closely associated with the practice of the invention.
Adoption of both rules would be desirable in some ideal society
where addressees of rules always complied in good faith and without
significant cost to themselves in ascertaining what rule applied to their
immediate situation. It is very doubtful that adoption of both rules is
desirable under more realistic conditions. The two rules call for
precisely opposite courses of conduct-one for an input-based royalty
and the other for an endproduct royalty. The conduct called for in
each situation is opposed to the patentee's financial interest: in each
type of situation the forbidden royalty structure would maximize
royalty income. And the dividing line between the two categories-
substantial technological differences which result in demand elasticity
differences-will be difficult to apply in many situations. The person
against whom sanctions must be applied, the patentee, will have less
ready access to the facts determinative of which rule applies than will
his bargaining opponents, the licensees. Finally, the prohibition of
endproduct royalties would forbid, when it applied, the most familiar
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and easily administered of all royalty systems, that based on a percentage
of licensee sales. All these factors suggest that the adoption and effec-
tive enforcement of both rules would be attended by substantial ad-
ministrative difficulty, both on the part of patentees and on the part
of the enforcement authority. Certainly it would be unwise to adopt
both rules as self-applying rules, violation of which could be punished
after the fact through judicial proceedings.
It would be equally unwise to adopt neither rule and continue our
present course of ignoring the implications of both economic phe-
nomena. Patentees, within the limits of their ability to characterize
the situations of their licensees, would pursue their self-interest and
adopt in every case that royalty structure that causes greater economic
harm.
Of the two phenomena, that involving economic discrimination is, in
my opinion, the less important. Resource distortion and incremental
restrictions on output through discriminatory royalties can occur only
in a narrowly limited set of circumstances. There must be two groups
of licensees who are in competition with one another and who have
substantially different production technologies. One group must have
a potential cost advantage over the other that is independent of the
invention; yet the cost advantage must not be so great that it benefits
the patentee to license only that one group and supply the entire
market for the endproduct through that group. Even when all these
conditions are met, it is doubtful that a substantially greater output
of the endproduct would be achieved if an endproduct royalty structure
was adopted. A tendency toward greater output will be created since
the potential cost advantage of the one group will not be wholly ab-
sorbed. But the tendency will be countered by the more restrictive
effect on output of endproduct-based royalty structure.
The significance of the input substitution phenomenon, on the other
hand, is very broad. It applies in every case except those in which the
patent applies to an ultimate consumer good and those very few, if any,
cases in which there is no possibility of varying the licensee's produc-
tion recipe. Surely if one of the two economic phenomena is to be dis-
regarded by the law, the discrimination phenomenon should be dis-
regarded. Unpatented endproduct royalty structures should be pro-
hibited.
A legal pattern which takes both phenomena into account may be
practicable, however, if the rule against discrimination is not made
self-applying. The legal pattern that holds the greatest promise is, I
think, the following. First, adopt a rule forbidding unpatented end-
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product royalty structures. The imposition by a patentee of such a
royalty charge would constitute patent misuse and an agreement in
restraint of trade within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Second, provide an officially administered procedure by which an
existing licensee can apply for an order directing the patentee to con-
vert his license and that of all other licensees with whom he is in direct
endproduct competition from an input-based to an endproduct royalty
structure. To entitle himself to such an order the petitioner would have
to prove: (1) that he is in, or proposes to enter into, direct endproduct
competition with other present licensees; (2) that the endproduct
market is quantitatively substantial; (3) that petitioner has a real cost
advantage over existing licensees who hold a significant share of the
endproduct market; (4) that the existing royalty structure imposes on
him royalty charges that represent a certain percentage of his sales;
(5) that the royalty charge currently imposed on the technologically
different competing licensees, expressed as a percentage of their sales,
is two or more percentage points less than his royalty charge so ex.
pressed; (6) and that, but for the differences in royalty percentage, he
would probably be able to increase significantly the fraction of end-
product sales he is presently able to make.
If petitioner establishes those propositions, the official -authority
will then enter an order directing the patentee to tender to all licensees
who are in competition in the endproduct market new licenses, sub-
stantially identical in their terms, in which royalties are expressed as a
percentage of sales. The patentee will be free to impose any percentage
not exceeding the presently effective percentage to the petitioner,
and each prospective licensee will be free to take or reject the new
license. On a date set in the order all old licenses become invalid
and all who have not accepted new licenses are enjoined from prac-
ticing the invention and excused from making any royalty payments.
Under this legal system, input-based royalty structures would be the
norm and endproduct royalties would be used only when sought by a
competitor from whose activities resources were being diverted by a
structure that nullified real cost advantages. If administered with
reasonable intelligence and perception of the goals being sought, the
system might work quite well.
A final observation is appropriate regarding the relationship between
cases which do and cases which do not involve transfer of a product by
the patentee to his licensees. As I have indicated, I would apply Robin-
son-Patman standards to product transfer cases. Cases involving product
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transfers can be viewed as a subcategory of input-based royalty structure
cases in which the product transferred is a mandatory royalty base. In
cases not involving product transfer, the patentee is initially required
to adopt an input royalty structure and, necessarily, the input or inputs
he selects as a base will be measurable units of goods or services not
supplied by the patentee. In this latter type of case a licensee could
resort to the official proceedings just described and, upon proper proof,
would be entitled to an order directing license renegotiation which
would shift the royalty structure to an output-based structure. The
question arises whether similar resort to official proceedings to obtain
an endproduct royalty would be available to licensees in cases involving
product transfer. The answer is no.
Proportionality of royalty charges to some particular input or inputs
is no guarantee against patentee absorption of a potential cost ad-
vantage of one group of licensees. In the Grand Caillou case, for
example, royalties were roughly proportionate to the number of raw
shrimp processed, an input which measured with considerable accuracy
the prior labor cost disadvantage of the Pacific canners and thus
nullified any raw material or other cost advantage those canners may
have had. The susceptibilty of input bases of royalty calculation to be
thus used is the fact that argues for the establishment of the official
procedure described.
But selection of an input which will measure elasticity of demand
and thus maximize royalties and nullify a potentially significant cost
advantage of one group of licensees requires considerable discretion in
the selection among various possible inputs. In cases not involving
product transfer, the patentee has a range of discretion in selecting an
input: the only restraint that can practicably be placed upon him is
that he select one or a small group of inputs closely related to practicing
his invention. That restraint leaves sufficient discretion to create the
risk insurance against which is afforded by the official machinery
described.
But in product transfer cases the royalty base is required to be the
product transferred. While in theory the patentee has discretion to
decide what precise product he will produce and transfer, as a practical
matter his range of discretion is very narrowly limited. He must select
a product over which he can maintain a legal monopoly since he must
transfer it at a monopoly price to earn his royalty. Therefore, the
product must be one covered by the patent or one which "constitutes]
a material part of the invention ... [is] especially adapted for use in
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... [practicing the invention] and [is] not a staple article or commodity
.. suitable for substantial... [alternative] use....174
While it would be presumptuous to assert that a case can never arise
in which a product transferred subject to Robinson-Patman standards
will both meet the foregoing requirements and also serve as an accurate
measure of licensee elasticity, such cases will be rare. Their rarity
would not justify excluding them from the official machinery if they
could be handled by that machinery with the same ease as cases not
involving product transfer; but they could not be so handled. In a
product transfer case licensee payments are attributable to two eco-
nomic factors: the actual cost to the patentee of producing and deliver-
ing the transferred product and the patentee's monopoly return. To
achieve sound results in shifting to an endproduct royalty structure, it
would be necessary to separate these two components, to require the
licensees to continue paying the cost component in proportion to physi-
cal units of product transferred, and to convert the latter component
into endproduct royalties. Separation into the two components would
require a cost analysis similar to public utility cost-of-service rate-
making. The social costs of administration are not warranted by the
magnitude of the goal being pursued.
VII. Restrictions on Licensee Conduct
The basic thesis of this paper is that validity of patent license agree-
ments is determined by the nature of the conduct the agreement is
likely to induce. The patent law explicitly authorizes the extraction
of monopoly profits by restricting utilization of and raising the price
for using the invention. The antitrust laws explicitly forbid inter-
ference with the processes of competition to the end that prices will be
reduced, ouput will be increased and resource allocation will be
more nearly optimal. It is convenient to describe the patentee's freedom
to monopolize as an "exception" to the antitrust laws' general mandate
of competitive behavior; but I do not suggest that because the freedom
is an "exception" to the general mandate it should be narrowly con-
strued. It should be construed neither narrowly nor broadly but rather
to achieve its obvious purpose-the subsidization of innovative activity.
Yet, because the patentee's authority is an island of permission in a
sea of prohibition, there is no area at the edge of permission toward
which the law is indifferent: what is not authorized is forbidden. Every
case which presents the issue of patentee freedom to monopolize neces-
74. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1964).
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sarily presents a reciprocal issue of prohibited interference with com-
petitive processes.
If the patentee has engaged in, or induced by agreement, conduct
which restricts output of his invention, it would seem that he stands
safely on his isle of permission. If he has engaged in or induced conduct
that restricts output of any other good or service, it would seem that he
has stepped into prohibited waters. But the metaphor is too simple, and
fails. A restriction on use of the invention will in almost every case have
the consequence of restricting output of other goods and services. If,
for example, the invention has a physical embodiment, restriction on
the invention will necessarily restrict the unpatented goods and
services which are production inputs of the physical embodiment.
One is tempted, therefore, to fall back either to language of patentee
"purpose" or to language of "direct" and "indirect" restraints. But in
this context as in others those phrases tend more to obscure than to
clarify. Articulated as tests, the concepts inevitably degenerate to in-
articulate statements of legal conclusion. I suggest a formulation less
crisp to the ear but better calculated to focus the mind on relevant
differences: a patentee is entitled to extract monopoly income by re-
stricting utilization of his invention, notwithstanding that utilization
of other goods and services are consequently restricted, provided that
in each case he confines the restriction to his invention as narrowly
and specifically as the technology of his situation and the practicalities
of administration permit. This formulation, I believe, gives appropri-
ate scope to both antitrust and patent policy, is sufficiently specific to
enable courts to reach reasonable results through reasoned applications,
and, in the process of application, will be suggestive of even more
specific subsidiary rules.
The standard must be read with emphasis on its first phrase: The
patentee is entitled "to extract monopoly income by imposing restric-
tions." Generation of returns to patentees is the immediate objective
of the patent laws and the only justification for tolerating the many
baleful results of those laws. The only justification for using monopoly
as opposed to direct government subsidy to induce innovation is to
utilize the competitive processes of the private economy to assess and
reward proportionately the value of each particular invention. This
process of competitive assessment assumes that licensees will resist
patentee demands and that out of the bargaining process between them
will emerge a stream of benefits to the patentee and a stream of detri-
ments to the licensee roughly comparable to the ultimate value of the
invention to the licensee and to society. If the licensee conduct de-
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manded by the patentee is only the payment of royalties, the hoped
for comparability of monopoly income with invention utility will
usually be achieved. But if other types of licensee conduct are de-
manded, no such comparability is necessarily to be expected. The
value to the patentee of licensee conduct may far exceed its detriment
to the licensee; indeed, the conduct may be as beneficial to the licensee
as to the patentee, in which case the licensee has no incentive to resist
the demands, and any expectation of comparability is foolish. In the
absence of comparability, the social loss caused by restricting the use
of the invention and otherwise permissible incidental restrictions on
other goods and services may exceed, and often far exceed, the value
of patentee contribution to knowledge.
There are then two critical points that underlie analysis of any par-
ticular situation: first, minimizing incidental restriction to the extent
technologically and administratively feasible; and second, forbidding
patentee demands for conduct of a nature that destroys assurance of
comparability between restriction and invention utility. From these
two points of vantage, I turn to specific problems of application.
A. Royalty Structure: A Second Look
1. Input vs. Output Based Structures. The relationship between
the general standard and my previous analysis and conclusions regard-
ing royalty structure is clear. A royalty based on licensee output is
necessarily at least as restrictive and usually is more restrictive of
licensee utilization of goods and services other than the invention as
is a royalty based. on 'invention-related inputs. Therefore, royalty struc-
tures based on unpatented endproducts, including the traditional per-
centage of licensee sales, should generally be forbidden.
The exception to that prohibition, if any is to be recognized, in-
volves accomodation of the "discrimination" phenomenon through the
officially administered procedure previously described.
2. Royalties that Vary with Output. Another royalty structure that
should be forbidden is one which involves two or more licensees in
competition with one another and which, when expressed as a per-
centage of licensee sales of an endproduct, increases as licensee output
increases and therefore has the actual or potential consequence of
limiting a licensee's share of the market. This prohibition should
apply whether or not the endproduct is patented. Although such a
structure calls explicitly for no conduct other than payment of money,
it destroys any reasonable assurance of comparability. Where a licensee
is in competition for endproduct sales with another licensee, this
royalty structure establishes a division of the market between them
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corresponding to the set of outputs at which their royalty costs per
unit of output are roughly equal. Any new efficiency that one licensee
may achieve that would otherwise enable him to reduce endproduct
price and capture a larger market share is wholly or partially nullified
by the rising royalty rate that attends increased output. Comparability
is destroyed because licensees may affirmatively desire and be willing
to pay for such a market division without regard for the actual value
of the invention to them. They might be in a position to show the
invalidity of the patent or to design around it and nevertheless be
willing to take licenses and pay a modest royalty to achieve market
division under a patent license umbrella. The licensees will restrict
their output, at least in accordance with the royalties they actually pay,
and this restriction will exceed that that would be dictated by royalties
corresponding to the value of the invention. And if their industry
structure is oligopolistic they are likely to restrict output and raise
prices even more sharply than is dictated by actual royalty payments
so as to exploit the monopoly position the market division affords them.
When licenses take this form, the patentee is not selling the right to
use the invention but rather a package which includes that right and
a sanctuary from interlicensee competition."
It would be appropriate to except from this prohibition royalty
structures which impose a constant charge per unit on the licensee's
utilization of an input related to the invention. Royalties under such a
structure will not normally vary disproportionately with output, al-
though a small variance would occur if the optimum production recipe
varied with output. Rarely would the variance be substantial enough
to produce the division of markets against which the prohibition is
intended to guard. Exception of such structures from the prohibition
would eliminate the possibility of a type of litigation the costs of which
might exceed any benefits yielded.
One might argue this prohibition against royalties that increase
more than proportionately to output should be extended to license
arrangements not involving potential interlicensee competition but
75. This was one of the many outrageous abuses that led to a conclusion of anti-
tfust violation in United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 755 (D.N.J. 1949)
(lamp case). The licenses expressly provided that each licensee ias limited in its sales
in any one year to a certain fixed quota of General Electric's total net sales for that
year. In the large lamp field, for example, Consolidated Electric was restricted to selling
3.89093% of GE's total sales, Sylvania, 8.124%, and Kenrad, 1.7584%; in the field of
miniature lamps, Tungsol was authorized to sell up to 26.71956% of GE's sales, and
Chicago Miniature, 2.975%. Royalties were 3% of sales within the set quota. But if a
licensee's sales exceeded its quota by more than 5%, an additional royalty of 20% of
net sales became due.
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involving potential competition between the patentee and his licensee.
Quite clearly a patentee can use such a royalty structure to shelter his
own share of a market from licensee competition. The argument for
extension is unpersuasive, however. First, it is not in the immediate
economic interest of the patentee to supply through his own produc-
tion what a licensee can supply at a lower real cost. Secondly, the
licensee receives no sheltered market share since the patentee-com-
petitor has no royalty costs; so the arrangement lacks the kind of
licensee advantage that destroys assurance of comparability. The first
point has general significance and warrants brief elaboration.
The optimum objective for a patentee during the life of the patent
is to cause the entire complex of firms engaged in using the invention
to behave as if it were a single firm owned by himself. The maximum
profit he can earn is that which such a firm could earn by producing as
efficiently as possible and by selling at maximizing prices in all end-
product markets. The monopoly profits latent in those endproduct
markets set the outside limit on the patentee's return. Assuming that
actual consolidation under patentee ownership of all those firms is not
practicable, the patentee's objective is to induce by license arrangement
the same behavior that would attend consolidation-the same end-
product prices and outputs, the same production recipes and the same
profits flowing to himself, in part perhaps through his direct sales of
endproducts and in part through royalties. This is so whether or not
the endproduct is patented.
As I argued in regard to input substitution, one way to accomplish
this is to base royalties on unpatented endproduct sales, setting them
at a rate such that they effectively raise the marginal cost curves of
licensee sellers until those curves, aggregated, intersect the industry
demand curve at a point directly above the intersection of the indus-
try's real marginal cost curve with the marginal revenue curve, as illus-
trated in the footnote3 6 Forbidding use of unpatented endproduct
royalty structures prevents the patentee from achieving this result to
the extent his invention can be substituted against in the production
process; and the patentee's maximizing objective becomes dependent
on the demand curve for the invention which is, because of input
substitution, more elastic than the unpatented endproduct curve from
which it is derived. It nevertheless continues to be true that patentee
maximization during the life of the patent depends on minimizing
aggregate production costs exclusive of royalties; for anything that
76. See illustration at foot of next page.
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raises the aggregate marginal cost curve for the industry diminishes the
monopoly profit potential. Therefore, a patentee is better off to let
a licensee supply any portion of the output, whether patented or not,
that he can supply at a lower real cost than the patentee could supply
it; royalty income on those sales will exceed the monopoly profits that
could be earned by direct patentee sales.7,
A patentee might substitute his own more expensive production
for that of his licensee, thus sacrificing his own economic interest during
the life of the patent, in the hope of establishing a long-run position
of dominance in the market which will persist after the expiration of
the patent. But it is always possible for a producer to expand his
present market share by short-run sacrifices. In situations like the one
under consideration, there is little reason to believe that a patentee
could significantly influence his long-run position by this tactic. The
single licensee will become the low cost firm when the patent expires
and will take over a larger share of the market. If there is no other
FIG. C.
D and MR are the industry demand and marginal revenue curves. MC is the industry
marginal cost curve exclusive of royalties. MC + R is the effective marginal cost curve
after the imposition of royalties. Monopoly profits (royalties) correspond to the rectangle
pabc, and its area is independent of the division of output among individual producers.
77. The import of this analysis is not altered by the fact that the patentee, under
the circumstance described, will be using a different and more efficient production recipe
than will his licensees; he will not be substituting against his own invention, its use
for him being costless. The patentee, to this extent, will be more efficient in real
terms than his'licensees; but he will have no incentive to substitute his own production
for licensee production if, by reason of other cost savings, the licensee is nevertheless
more efficient than he is.
The analysis in the text underscores the illogic of the FTC opinion in Grand Caillou
insofar as it rejected the wholly credible explanation of why the patentee had established
the "discriminatory" royalty structure and found as a fact that the motive was to
protect the patentee's interest as a shrimp canner. See note 68 supra.
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entry the industry will then exhibit oligopolistic tendencies; but that
will be attributable to the number of firms and not to the earlier limit
on the licensee's market share.
For the foregoing reasons, then, there is no sound argument for
invalidating a royalty structure that increases more than propor.
tionately to output when the licensee's only competitor is the patentee.
The licensee receives no shelter against encroachment on his market
share and must be presumed to be accepting the royalty obligation in
exchange for a right of comparable value-the right to practice the
invention. The patentee's reason for seeking such a structure may be
based on administrative convenience of the structure, or on a miscon-
ception of his economic interest or on a non-economic consideration;
for he cannot gain in economic terms by substituting his output for the
more efficient output of his licensee. If the explanation is a misconcep-
tion of economic interest or a non-economic factor, the royalty struc-
ture may do economic harm; but no justification occurs to me for the
general subordination of unidentified non-economic objectives to eco-
nomic goals or for using the antitrust laws to assure that private eco-
nomic interests are correctly perceived.
B. Tying Provisions: A Second Look
I have previously described the way a tying clause can be used to
block input substitution. Prohibition of its use when that is its effect
is justified for the reasons given above.78 It is anomalous, however,
that the law should have arrived at its present rather extreme hostility
to tying clauses and yet never have questioned endproduct royalty struc-
tures which achieve the same result far more effectively.
The anomaly is lessened but not eliminated by recognition that tying
is subject to two additional objections. The elasticity of demand of a
user for a monopolist's product can be measured in some situations
with considerable accuracy by the extent of the user's consumption of
some other product. By tying purchases of the secondary measuring
product to his sales of the monopolized product, the monopolist can
engage in economic discrimination between users of the tying product.
In the most typical case the monopolist selects a tied product which
users with inelastic demands for the tying product consume in greater
quantities than do those with elastic demands. He then sells the tying
product to all at a lower price than would otherwise maximize his
returns and sells the tied product at a price exceeding its marginal
cost and, presumably, its market price. In theory, at least, a reverse
78. Pp. 301-02 supra.
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tie-in is equally effective. The monopolist sells the monopolized prod-
uct at a price higher than would otherwise be appropriate and simul-
taneously commits himself to supply the user's requirements for a
second product at a price below market value, the second product
being one consumed in greater quantities by users with elastic demands
for the invention. The effective price of the monopolized product is
thus reduced to users with greater demand elasticity.
The significant characteristic for present purposes of discriminatory
use of the tie-in is that the tied product must be supplied at a price
different from its competitive price in order to perform its crucial sur-
charging or rebating function. In order for a tie-in to perform an input-
substitution blocking function, a non-competitive price is also essential.
The existing prohibition against tie-ins extends, however, to situa-
tions where the tied product is supplied at a competitive price.-0 So
applied the prohibition must be justified on the third possible objec-
tion to tie-ins--the "market foreclosure" effect. By tying to his legal
patent monopoly the right to supply users' requirements of the tied
product, the monopolist captures a segment of the market for the tied
product and "forecloses" to competing sellers of the tied product that
part of the market represented by sales of the tied product for use with
the tying product. Case analysis generally stops with this descriptive
statement as if it adequately portrayed some economic evil. But other
than-by the use of pejorative language in making the statement, no evil
is portrayed. No price increase or output restriction is probable as a
consequence of the arrangement. Nor is it likely that output has been
shifted from more to less efficient producers; if the patentee were sub-
stantially less efficient than others at producing the tied product, the
arrangement would seem to be contrary to his economic interest.
Indeed, with regard to the threat of the patentee's acquiring a
monopoly position in the general market for the tied product, 0 it is
irrelevant whether the price is above, below or equal to the competitive
price. The price can only be above market if the patentee is charging
less for his invention than the licensee would have been willing to pay
absent the tie-in; the balance of the invention price is being paid in
this indirect way. The price can be lower than market only if the
patentee is ignoring his present economic interest or if he is indirectly
rebating to compensate for overpricing the invention. Both these
phenomena have implications for economic discrimination and input
79. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (194t7).
80. By the general market, I refer to sales of the tied product generally rather than
sales for use with the patentee's invention.
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substitution, but neither is relevant to the extent or duration of fore-
closure in the general market for the tied product.
Intelligent analysis of the foreclosure problem must start by focusing
on the distinction between sales of the tied product for use with the
tying product and sales for other uses. Let a represent the tying prod-
uct, b the tied product or its sale for alternative uses and b/a sales of
the tied product for use with a. The patentee has a legal monopoly on
a-and the patent can be presumed valid since there is no collateral
advantage to the licensee in a tie-in sale which destroys the assurance
of comparability. Subject to the input substitution and discrimination
phenomena, a patentee of a can extract all monopoly profits potential
in endproducts which include a. I have shown that a price for b/a other
than market price is essential if the patentee is to cope with those
phenomena. It is senseless and misleading then to speak of foreclosure
in the market b/a; the patentee already has achieved all that a tie-in
at market price can give him in that market.
With regard to sales of b for other purposes during the life of the
patent, the foreclosure concept is also vacuous. The patentee is guar-
anteed no sales of b by his control of b/a; he makes any such sales in
open competition with other sellers of b. If there are scale economies
in the production of b, he may be assisted in achieving the necessary
volume by his control of b/a; but short of the point of monopolistic
control over the total production and sale of b, achievement of such
economies should be encouraged rather than thwarted.
The temporal focus in which the foreclosure concept becomes rele-
vant is a long-run view which extends beyond the life of the a patent.
During the life of the patent the patentee may use his monopoly profits
from the invention to subsidize his expansion into the general market
for the tied product, at least to the extent of b/a. This conduct is eco-
nomically self-defeating in the short run, being comparable in all
respects to selling b/a below market price. But if b/a is very substan-
tial compared with b, the patentee may succeed in buying for himself
a substantial share of the general market for b. Upon the expiration of
the patent on a, the markets for b and b/a become legally indistinguish-
able. And at that time-after the patentee stops buying the share b/a
with patent-generated profits-if there are barriers to entry he may
continue to hold that market share and perhaps to exercise monopo-
listic power to raise price and restrict output in the general market
for b.
While this concept of foreclosure cannot be dismissed as pure non-
sense, I think it unlikely that the danger it anticipates is realistic in
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very many situations. An investment in the form of underselling carried
on over a fairly long time span is contemplated; and uncertainty
whether the supposed entry barriers will prove secure after the invest-
ment period terminates introduces substantial risk. Hence, if the neces-
sary investment is substantial, as it will be if the patentee is significantly
less efficient than other b producers, it is unlikely to be a sound invest-
ment in any but rare cases; and both the motive underlying tie
arrangement and its primary economic effects are likely to lie elsewhere
than in the foreclosure explanation. On the other hand, if the patentee
is about as efficient at producing the tied product as all other producers,
the investment will be small and the long-run game may be worth the
candle.
The legitimate functions that can be served by tie-in sales, on the
other hand, are also unimpressive in most situations. Patentee concern
that the tied product is of suitably high quality to be used in conjunc-
tion with his invention so as to preserve the invention's reputation for
utility can be met in most cases by generic specification. The adminis-
trative convenience yielded by the tie-in is generally insubstantial.
On balance the case against tie-in sales at market price is a close one.
In theory they should probably be allowed only in the following cases:
(1) where the general market for the tied product is much larger than
the submarket represented by sales for use with the tying product and
the tied product is sold for the prevailing market price; and (2) where,
although the conditions of (1) are not met, the tying seller can show
that the tie-in serves a legitimate objective which cannot be achieved
by other means and is socially more important than any economic harm
the tie-in might cause.
Whether the law ought to recognize these exceptions is a doubtful
question; one might argue that ease of administration called for a flat
prohibition in view of the very small number of situations in which
any significant value would be lost because of a flat prohibition.8' I
would recognize the first exception. It is sufficiently precise to avoid
administrative difficulty, and I cannot conceive how economic harm
could be caused by a tie-in under the conditions the exception specifies.
Input substitution cannot be blocked and discrimination cannot be
achieved if the tied product is sold at market price, the foreclosure
problem can be disregarded if the comparative market sizes are as
specified, and the existence of an independent market for the tied
product will facilitate ascertainment of market price. While the
81. See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws, 72
H.v. L. REv. 50 (1958).
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number of situations that qualify for the exception may be few, I see no
reason to deny sellers whatever advantages they may find in the tie-in in
those situations.
The second exception, if it can fairly be called an exception, is much
more troublesome. Given its very general, and subjective terms, it is
little more than a reassertion of the rule of reason in this particular
context and thus has the capacity to swallow the entire prohibition
against tie-ins. I am unable, nevertheless, to give it greater precision
nor can I assert with any confidence that no such exception should be
recognized.
The case law seems to be in a similar state of indecision regarding
the second proposed exception 2 and, with far less justification, ap-
parently has rejected the first exception. 3  For purposes of this article
an understanding of the nature of economic harm that can be antici-
pated by forbidding tie-in sales is sufficient. Like the Supreme Court84
I will leave to the indefinite future the task of articulating generally the
circumstances by which their use may be justified; for the tie-in prob-
lem I wish to discuss does not call for a general resolution of that issue.
The problem is the practice of package licensing. A patentee who
holds a group of patents offers to issue a license to use the group of
inventions for a singly stated royalty, the royalty being the same regard-
less of how many licenses are taken. Should this practice be viewed as a
prohibited tie-in, the license desired by the licensee being viewed as the
tying product and those he does not desire being viewed as the tied
product?"'
For reasons previously explained, I would require that all patent
royalties be based either on sales of patented products or on quantita-
tive consumption of unpatented inputs closely related to the licensed
invention. This restriction itself generally would prohibit the package
licensing of technologically unrelated patents; for only in most unu-
sual circumstances would a common royalty base be appropriate for
such patents. Although the reasons for this restriction were stated in
82. Compare United States v. Jerrold Electronics, 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960),
aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), with United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), and
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See Note, The Use of Tie.Ins
in New Industries, 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961).
83. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1947).
84. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1962).
85. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., s39 U.S. 827
(1950); American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959).
In the Hazeltine case the Supreme Court raised doubts about the validity of the prac.
tice but did not rule on it, holding that the issue was not presented by the record,
The practice was held to constitute misuse in the Shatterproof case, which relied on
Hazeltine as well as on the tie-in doctrine generally.
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another context, it will become apparent that the reasons for the
restriction are closely related to the objections that can be lodged
against package licensing. Therefore I discuss here only package licens-
ing of technologically related patents.
In the absence of other objectionable features in the license,80 there
is no reason to prohibit package licensing of patents which are techno-
logically related to such a degree that a common royalty base is per-
missible. The legal analogy which has cast doubt on package licensing
is based on the judicial condemnation of block-booking in the motion
picture antitrust cases.87 No satisfactory analysis of the economic conse-
quences of block-booking has ever been advanced by the courts; their
standard incantation against "extending the monopoly" and against
"foreclosure" has been relied on to vault to the conclusion of illegality.
The foreclosure analysis is not persuasive in the block-booking con-
text. If the tied motion picture is viewed as unique, a market unto
itself, then by virtue of the seller's copyright he already possesses a legal
monopoly over that market. If the tied picture is viewed, more realis-
tically, as one of many which the exhibitor might display to provide
entertainment, then the total market for films is vastly larger than the
submarket of those tied to the tying film; and the utility of the tie-in
to achieve a long-run sheltered market position in film publication is
minimal. Block-booking arrangements do not preclude the exhibitor
from acquiring and exhibiting films from other sources. The tied film
is not "used with" the tying fim as are staples in a shoebutton stapling
machine or salt in a salt dispensing machine. The exhibitor is free to
show a film acquired elsewhere the night before and after he shows the
tying film. Contrary to what may be one's first intuitive thought, the
exhibitor is not foreclosed or deterred from acquiring films elsewhere
even if he has paid more for the block of films than he would have
paid (under some alternate marketing system) for the individual films
in the package. If the least wanted film in the block will not attract an
audience adequate to pay the marginal costs of exhibition, it is worth-
less to the exhibitor and will not be exhibited. A different film that
will attract a sufficiently large audience to pay those costs, including
86. In Hazeltine the royalty was a percentage of sales of the unpatented endproduct.
339 U.S. at 829. In Shatterproof. too, the royalty base apparently was unpatented end
product, although the scope of the patents involved is not made clear in the opinion.
268 F.2d at 771. Hence both royalty structures may have been objectionable on this
ground.
If the tied license contained a stipulation of patent validity, prohibition of the tie-in
would make more sense; but a superior solution would be direct invalidation of stipula-
tion.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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the cost of the new film, will be acquired. The assumed fact that the
exhibitor paid more for the block than he would have paid under other
arrangements for the films of value to him has relevance only to the
size of the exhibitor's profits from exhibition of the desired films.
Whether the assumed fact that he paid more is true is a point to which
I will return.
Block-booking does not affect input-substitution if the royalty struc-
ture is not independently objectionable because based on endproduct
sales--receipts from exhibition. The exhibitor is not deprived of eco-
nomic incentive to shift his recipe so as to use more extensively com-
fortable seats or better theater location or prime broadcast time and
to use film input less extensively in view of its monopolized price.
Finally, block-booking does not maximize the distributor's receipts
by extracting from each exhibitor the largest sum he would be willing
to pay for each individual film. If the costs of ascertaining each ex-
hibitor's elasticity for each film is ignored, the producer could increase
his receipts by abandoning block-booking and bargaining film by filn
with each exhibitor. Hence the device does not achieve, but rather
foregoes, "perfect" economic discrimination in this classical sense.
Assume, however, that the realistic alternative to block-booking is
not a process of individual bargaining with exhibitors over individual
films, but rather that each individual film would be offered at a flat
sum to exhibitors generally throughout the country.M8 As Professor
Stigler has explained, 0 a distributor's receipts under that marketing
system would probably be lower than under block-booking. They
will be lower if one further assumption can be made: namely, that for
any given film different exhibitors, attempting to appeal to different
audiences in different parts of the country, will be willing to pay quite
different prices; and that any given exhibitor will be willing to pay quite
different prices for one type film than for another. Given these assump-
tions, both of which seem realistic, certain marketing consequences
follow. In marketing a single film the distributor would be unable to
obtain from exhibitors willing to pay a comparatively high price for
88. By a "flat sum" I mean a charge such as $500 per exhibition or per day or
per any other base that did not vary among exhibitors inversely with elasticity. If the
base selected were one that measured elasticity of demand with a high degree of accuracy,
receipts should exceed receipts under block-booking. The fact that producers have re-
sorted to block-booking may suggest either that no elasticity-measuring base is readily
available or that they anticipate that discrimination charges would be brought against
them if they selected such a base. My prior discussion of the inapplicability of classical
discrimination theory to a product with negligible marginal cost would be applicable
to such charges of discrimination.
89. Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SurrE.mV
CouRT Rxvimw 152.
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that film a price as high as those exhibitors were willing to pay; for to
set the uniform price that high would preclude use of the film by
many exhibitors willing to pay only lesser sums. But if films of dif-
ferent types are combined into a package, each exhibitor in his own
mind will assign different values to each film in the package; and the
set of maximum values that exhibitors will be willing to pay for the
package will be more homogeneous than the sets of maxima for indi-
vidual films in the package. In an extreme example, all exhibitors
would be willing to offer the same maximum, $10,000, for a block of
two films; but half of them would be "paying" $4,000 for film a and
$6,000 for film b, and the other half would be "paying" $6,000 for
a and $4,000 for b. The distributor therefore is able to take advantage,
to some extent of the individual instances of price inelasticity: while
all exhibitors are paying the same amount for the package, each is
paying a different amount, in accordance with his own demand inelas-
ticity, for each individual film. Greater receipts can be garnered by
selling the packages at uniform prices than the aggregate of receipts
yielded by selling the individual films at uniform prices. 0 Block-
booking, therefore, justifiably can be labeled a price discriminating
device by one who thinks the label helpful.
For the reasons set forth in my discussion of price discrimination,
I do not think that the potential of block-booking to achieve these
results is a sufficient reason to prohibit block-booking. Satisfactory
analysis must take into account the economic consequences of alter-
nate marketing systems, in particular distribution costs under those
systems, the restrictive effect of endproduct royalty structures and the
essential arbitrariness of any royalty base other than marginal cost, a
factor which renders the concept of discrimination unuseable where
marginal cost approaches zero.
The case against package licensing of technologically related patents
is even weaker than that against block-booking of films. No blockage
of input substitution occurs if the royalty base is an input closely
90. Professor Stigler presents the mathematical basis for this proposition in his article.
Id. at 153, n.3. The mathematics involved exceed the capacity of many lauyers, and I
will not repeat them here.
A doubtful reader may satisfy himself by constructing a matrix of ten horizontal
rows corresponding to Exhibitors 1-10 and nine vertical columns, eight columns corre-
sponding to films a-h and the ninth corresponding to the package. For each exhibitor
assign a value to each film at random from I to 10. The sum of ead row will represent
the maximum value that distributor would pay for the package of eight films; enter
the ten sums in the ninth column. Each of the nine columns (8 films and I package)
can now be represented as a demand schedule. The maximum receipts allowed by the
demand schedule for the package will exceed the sum of the eight individual film
maxima.
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related to the invention. The foreclosure argument is wholly without
foundation in this context: there can be no long-run market position
in supplying the tied patent. And the revenue maximizing potential
of package licensing, compared with probable alternative licensing
practices, surely is negligible.
The revenue maximizing potential of block-booking inheres in the
fact that the package is of value to a large number of exhibitors who
have different relative preferences for the various components in the
package; and it increases revenue only as compared with flat-sum
charges for individual films imposed on a measuring base not correlated
to elasticity. Although the two assumptions-relative preference dif-
ferentials and uniform single film price as an alternative marketing
system-may be realistic in the context of film distribution, neither
seems realistic regarding patent licensing.
Where the potential licensees of technologically related patents are
producing the same endproduct, as will often be the case, the assump.
tion that they will have markedly different relative preferences for
different patents in the group is not likely to be true. Their produc-
tion processes will usually be similar and some one patent will be the
most essential for all, some other the least essential for all. If relative
preferences do not differ, package licensing achieves no discriminatory
effect. Even- if potential licensees are producers of different endprod-
ucts, the probability of their having significantly different relative
preferences is, I think, less than in the case of motion picture exhib-
itors; for although different endproducts are involved, the intermediate
production stages at which the inventions are used are likely to be
similar. The relative values of technologically related patents do not
depend on matters as idiosyncratic as tastes in entertainment.
Licenses under one or more of a group of technologically related
patents are not likely to be of value to very large numbers of potential
licensees. The smaller the number of potential licensees, the less likely
is the alternative marketing system to be one of general offers to license
each patent at a uniform price. The patentee may resort to individual
patent-by-patent bargaining with each licensee or to a royalty structure
which may sound uniform but is based on a factor correlated to elas-
ticity. Either of these alternatives will have more discriminatory im-
pact than package licensing in most cases. He "may" resort to these
alternatives both in the sense that it may be economically practicable
for him to do so and in the sense that he will be legally free to do so.
The latter point follows, of course, from my earlier conclusion that
the law can not practicably deal with the phenomena of discrimina-
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tion in patent licensing other than by insisting generally on end-
product royalty bases and that such insistence would sacrifice more
important economic objectives.
Since the assumptions essential to the rationality of prohibiting
block-booking, however valid they may be in that context, are very
dubious in the context of package licensing, the prohibition should
not be casually imported into the latter cases from the former. There is
little reason to believe package licensing is an effective discriminatory
device. When it is used, both the patentee's purpose and the economic
effect of the device are more likely centered on cost savings of admin-
istration. Prohibition in such cases will force the patentee to more
effective discriminatory techniques theretofore eschewed because of
greater administrative costs. The patentee's net position may be worse
as a consequence of prohibition but only because he is forced to absorb
part of an increased real social cost that the prohibition has imposed
upon the entire economic system.
One final situation must be distinguished. Assume that a patentee
has a group of patents consisting of a valuable basic patent and several
trivial improvement patents. The basic patent expires in five years,
the improvement patents in ten. Package licenses are issued which run
until the expiration of the last patent and call for payments of 2€ for
each unit of an appropriately related input consumed during the ten
year period. In the minds of the licensees these payments are war-
ranted by the utility of the basic patent; they would pay very little
for the improvements if they could license the basic patent individu-
ally.
Can it be said that the patentee has extended the life of the basic
patent in any meaningful sense?91 It is immaterial that royalties con-
tinue to be paid after the patent expires: surely there is no economic
objection to a license under which a royalty obligation is computed
and accrues over five years but which allows the obligation to be paid
off over ten years with interest on the accrued and unpaid balance.
The effect of this delayed payout arrangement on licensee prices and
output is no different than if they had obtained a bank loan to finance
their royalty obligations.
In the hypothetical case described, however, the licensee had the
option to forego use of the invention for five years and to use it royalty-
91. In Shatterproof Glass the court invoked this line of reasoning as an alternative
ground for the holding of misuse. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 263
F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir. 1959)
327
The Yale Law Journal
free thereafter. His payments during the sixth through tenth years, like
his payments in earlier years, correspond to the value to him of using
the patent during the first five years. If the licensee is willing to pay
2l per unit consumed over a period of ten years, he would have been
willing to pay more than 2 per unit consumed over a period of five
years, how much more depending on prevailing interest rates among
other factors.
It is critical, however, that in the package licensing hypothetical
not only the payout period but the computation period is extended.
Assume that computation for five years at 4¢ with a ten year payout
would produce a stream of receipts with the same present value as
computation and payout for ten years at 2i. Although the private eco-
nomic interests of the parties may be identically affected by the two
arrangements, the output and prices of the licensees will not be; and
it is the latter to which the law should direct its attention. Royalties
affect marginal cost, and hence output and prices, of licensees only
during the computation period; thereafter any remaining obligation
is a fixed cost. Output will be more severely restricted and prices
higher during the first five years and output higher and prices lower
during the last five years under the 4 , five-year computation licenses
than under the alternative.
92
The basic question is whether there is an economic basis which
justifies depriving the patentee and licensee of freedom to bargain
for a license under which royalty computation, as opposed to royalty
payout, extends beyond the life of the patent to which the royalties
pertain. Since royalty computation after patent expiration will restrict
output after expiration, perhaps it is enough to say that such a license
does extend the monopolistic impact of the patent beyond its statu-
tory term and is illegal.0 That seems to me an inadequate analysis
for it ignores the fact that royalty rates generally will be lower and the
degree of restriction on output less during the life of the patent under
the longer royalty computation provision. Royalties will be lower dur-
ing patent life because allowing extended computation periods would
not significantly increase the patentee's bargaining power vis-h-vis the
licensee: the licensee has the alternative of foregoing the invention
92. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Brulotte v. Thys Co,, 379 U.S.
29 (1964). In a careless opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas held invalid a license under which
royalties continued to accrue after the expiration of the patents. He made no attempt
to reply to the dissent's plausible but erroneous assertion that the economic consequences
of the two types of arrangements were the same. The implications of the case for de.
layed pay-out arrangements are therefore unclear.
93. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
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for the patent period and using the invention without charge there-
after. The patentee must give up something to induce submission to
the more enduring restraint, for he has only a fixed period of exclu-
sionary power to waive.
But another restraint limits the incentive of the patentee to charge
higher royalty rates for the shorter period. He will diminish rather than
increase his royalty income if the royalty rate is so high that it restricts
licensee output short of the point where his marginal cost (apart from
royalties) equals his marginal revenue. And it is in precisely those
cases where this restraint would operate during a short computation
period that patentees would have maximum incentive to bargain for
extended computation periods. Prohibition of the extension is there-
fore justified, for in the generality of cases the prohibition will lessen
the aggregate restraint; the magnitude of increased restriction on out-
put during patent life will be less than the magnitude of restriction
that would be imposed but for the prohibition during the subsequent
period.
This conclusion does not warrant a flat prohibition on package
licensing, however; for a far lesser inroad on bargaining freedom will
achieve the objective. A package license should be held terminable at
the licensee's option upon the expiration of any patent covered by
the license. If the licensee does not choose to terminate upon expira-
tion of a given patent, that fact affords adequate assurance that the
royalty rate is comparable to the value of the viable patents licensed.
This rule would not prevent the parties from agreeing to computation
over the patent life with payments spread over a longer period; exer-
cise of a licensee's power to terminate would leave unaffected any
accrued royalty obligation.
C. Restrictions on Price or Output
The most notorious of patent license restraints is limitation of the
price at which the licensee can sell his endproduct. The validity of
such restraints has been litigated repeatedly over most of the life of
the antitrust laws.94 Several variations of this type of restriction must
be considered: the endproduct for which the selling price is fixed may
itself be patented or it may be an unpatented product to which the
invention is an input of greater or lesser essentiality. Each of these two
variations may involve a limit either on price or on quantity. Four
94. See, eg., Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); United States v.
Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1966).
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prototype restrictive clauses are thus identified. Each of the four may
occur in a factual setting which does or does not involve two or more
competing licensees. The possible variations will be examined in light
of the general criterion I have invoked throughout this article: is the
restriction of a type that impairs assurance of comparability between
the social utility of the invention and the disutility of monopolistic
restraint? Here as elsewhere assurance of comparability may be im-
paired either because the restraint is significantly less detrimental to
the licensee than advantageous to the patentee, or because the restric-
tive impact of the license falls upon unpatented goods and services to
a greater extent than is justified by technological and administrative
considerations."5
A license which restricts the price at which the licensee can sell an
unpatented endproduct to which the invention is merely one of various
inputs should be prohibited even if only one licensee is involved. Such
a clause generates a monopoly return to the patentee only by shelter-
ing his own sales from licensee competition. This is plainly so if no
royalty is being paid by the licensee: patentee sales are then the only
source of patentee income. Less obviously but no less inevitably, this
is the only effect of a price restriction even if the license calls for roy-
alties too. A royalty obligation increases licensee costs and therefore
the price at which he must sell if his total costs, including return to
his capital and personal labor ("profits"), are to be covered. The amount
of royalty obligation either is or is not of sufficient magnitude to force
the licensee to sell at the fixed price. If it is of sufficient magnitude,
the price clause serves no independent purpose; if it is not, the eco-
nomic effect of the price clause on patentee income is to shelter his
own sales at the fixed price.
But sales at the fixed price generate a monopoly profit that depends
on the elasticity of demand for the endproduct; and as I have shown,
the percentage change in the quantity of endproduct demanded will
generally be less than the percentage changes in the quantity of pat-
ented input demanded in response to a change in input price. Hence
monopoly profits will be greater and output of the endproduct lower
than if the monopolistic restraint were confined to the invention itself.
Use of other inputs in the production process is unduly restricted both
because of excessive endproduct restraint and because, in the case of
licensee production, input substitution occurs less extensively than if
the same selling price were compelled by royalty obligations. Thus in
95. See pp. 312-14 supra.
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any case in which the price restriction serves any function, the clause
fails to meet the requirement that the patentee confine as narrowly as
practicable the restrictive impact on unpatented goods and services.",
Such price restrictions are also objectionable on grounds which will
be discussed in conjunction with patented endproducts.
A limit on licensee output of an unpatented endproduct has all the
adverse consequences of a price restriction. The restriction is inoper-
ative if royalty obligations would force a price as high and an output
as low as that imposed by the output quota. Whenever the quota is
operative, the licensee will charge the highest price at which he can
dispose of his quota; and the effects on patentee income and input
substitution are those which would result from a price limit. In one
important respect an output limit is even more harmful than a price
restriction: the latter eliminates price competition; output quotas
render futile all forms of non-price competition as well. The two types
of clauses should be subject to the same legal prohibition.
The foregoing analysis of price or output limits on unpatented end-
products applies equally to cases involving only one licensee and to
those involving two or more selling the endproduct in competition
with one another. Additional adverse effects of such clauses in mul-
tiple licensee cases will be discussed hereafter.
Where the price or output restriction applies to sales of a patented
endproduct, the restriction is not open to the foregoing objections.
Although consumption of unpatented goods and services which are
inputs to the endproduct will be restricted, that restriction is inherent
in the lawful restriction on use of the invention and essential to the
generation of monopoly profits correlative to the utility of the inven-
tion. Hence if one could assume that the same degree of restriction
would occur in the generality of cases from increased licensee costs
attributable to royalty obligations and from direct license restraints
on price or output, there would be little reason to prohibit direct
restraints. There are, however, persuasive reasons for rejecting that
assumption and for accepting the contrary proposition that far more
drastic restrictions are likely to follow from price or output restraints
than from the cost pressure of royalty obligations.
Although I think patentee purpose should be dismissed as irrelevant
for legal purposes because of difficulty of ascertainment, a consider-
96. Cases involving price restrictions on unpatented endproducts have held them
invalid. See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); United
States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
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tion of patentee purpose is suggestive of economic consequences in
the present context. The patentee would seem to have a strong incen-
tive to achieve monopolistic restriction on output of his invention by
means of royalties rather than by direct restraints on price or output.
Assume that the maximizing price for patented widgets is $1.00 each,
that industry sales will be ten million units at that price, that mar-
ginal and average total costs for all producers at that output are 5.85,
and that the patentee's direct sales constitute 25% of the market.
Potential monopoly profit is $1,500,000,97 and the patentee can garner
all that profit if the industry, apart from the patent, is competitive
and the royalty is 15% of gross sales. If, instead, the patentee sets price
at $1.00 and imposes a 5% royalty he will receive only $750,000 in
monopoly profits, half from his own sales and half from royalties.0 8
The other three-quarter million in monopoly profit will be realized
by the industry, but it will stay in the pockets of the licensees. In addi-
tion to giving up half the potential monopoly profits the patentee will
incur significant costs in assuring compliance with the $1.00 price by
his licensees, who will be in an economic position to shave prices and
further eat into his profits by taking away his market share. This exam-
ple can be generalized as follows: a price restriction is inoperative
except to the extent it dictates a price in excess of that which would be
dictated by royalties; and imposition of an effective price restriction
forsakes monopoly profit to the extent sales are made by licensees. In
the present example the effective price restriction is $.10 per unit,00
licensee sales are 7.5 million units and $750,000 of profits are forsaken.
In view of this inevitability one would suppose that there was no need
for prohibiting price restrictions: patentees would not use them.
Two objections to the foregoing analysis are likely to be made, but
neither will withstand examination. First, it may be objected that the
patentee is entitled to protect himself against licensee price competi-
tion and that a royalty does not guarantee that objective.1 00 But if the
patentee is as efficient as his licensees, a royalty does protect him by
giving him a cost advantage to the extent of the royalty. Only if his
costs, which include no royalty, exceed the sum of licensee costs plus
royalty will the licensees be able to compete with him effectively.
Since the patentee can demand royalties of a magnitude correlative
97. ($1.00-.85) 10 million.
98. $.15 (14) (10,000,000) from his own sales plus $.05 (s) (10,000,000) from royalties.
99. $1.00 sale price less (.85 average cost + .05 royalty)= $.10.
100. See Hearings on H.R. 4523 Before the House Committee on Patents, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 1032 (1935) (testimony of Charles Neave).
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to the utility of the invention, 101 royalties afford a cost advantage pro-
portionate to patentee contribution. Unless the patentee is substan-
tially less efficient than his licensees, royalties will afford a wholly
adequate competitive shelter. And if the patentee is substantially less
efficient than his licensees, it is contrary to his economic interest to
substitute his inefficient production for that of his licensees. 102 There-
fore an economically rational patentee can derive through royalties
as much protection from licensee competition as is justified by the
value of his contribution.
Second, it may be objected that a price restriction gives the patentee
continuing flexibility of control whereas a royalty provision is fixed
once the license is executed. It is true that the typical price clause,
which requires the licensee to charge at any point in time tie same
price the patentee is then charging, gives more flexibility than the
typical royalty clause which sets a percentage of some base for the
entire life of the license. But clauses of those types need not be used:
a rigid price clause could be used although the parties are unlikely to
find it desirable; and a royalty clause could reserve to the patentee
101. A patentee will not necessarily be able to bargain for royalties fully commen-
surate with the economic value of his invention; for the market for the invention may
be highly imperfect. Because substantially all the patentee's costs are sunk costs, he
will license the invention for almost nothing if he has no other alternatives. The full
economic value of the invention to a prospective licensee sets a ceiling on what the
licensee will pay. The precise point within that range at which agreement will be
reached will depend on the bargaining skills and on the alternatives of the parties.
A patentee with capacity to exploit the invention directly in the licensee's field has
a substantially stronger bargaining position than does a patentee who lacks that capacity.
Similarly, if the potential licensee industry is competitively structured, the patentee
will have alternatives; and he will be able to negotiate a royalty approximating the
value of his invention.
On the other hand, a patentee who lacks capacity for direct exploitation and whose
invention is applicable in an industry which is monopolistically or oligopolistically
structured will have very little bargaining strength. The situation of such a patentee
is not materially improved by his ability to use a price restriction. By hypothesis he has
no substantial direct sales to shelter with the restriction. A potential licensee who already
has a monopoly will pay nothing for the service of being subjected to a price restriction.
Potential licensees in an oligopolistic industry often would be benefited by a price
restriction and this fact will increase the value to them of the license as o pped to the
invention. This increase in value raises the ceiling but not the floor of dhe bargaining
range. But patentee continues to lack any significant alternative, and he is unlikely to
receive a substantially higher royalty.
Any incremental royalty such a patentee does receive is a payment for the service
of eliminating inter-licensee competition rather than for use of the invention.
Attempts to justify the use of price restrictions by reference to the plight of such a
patentee should be rejected. His unfortunate situation is similar to that of all other
suppliers and customers who must deal with an industry so structured. The appropriate
legal response is an assault upon the industry structure. It is wholly inappropriate to
allow such a patentee to improve his position marginally by selling, not his invention
but a restrictive clause that will further suppress competition in the industry and thus
worsen the position of all others who must deal with the industry. It is even more
inappropriate to make price restrictions available to patentees generally because of the
asserted marginal value of the clauses to patentees in the situation described.
102. See pp. 316-17 supra.
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power to alter the royalty rate, perhaps within limits, from time to
time. It is no doubt true that licensees would resist variable royalty
clauses more strenuously than they resist variable price clauses; but
the difference in resistance to be expected is closely related to the vice
of price clauses-namely, that licensees are beneficiaries of such clauses
and have little incentive to resist them. There is no reason to believe
that a patentee could not bargain successfully for a royalty rate subject
to his unilateral power of alteration from time to time up to some fixed
maximum rate; and for the reasons stated above, such a clause would
serve the patentee's economic interests much more effectively than
would a variable price clause. Hence the objection based on flexibility,
at least in the naive form stated in this paragraph, assumes the point it
attempts to prove by starting with a rigid royalty clause and a flexible
price clause.
A more sophisticated form of the inflexibility argument can be made.
It starts with the roughly accurate observation that a patentee's ability
to dictate price gives him a flexible tool with which to assure that the
industry operates at the price and output that maximizes industry
profits. 10 3 Next it is correctly asserted that even a flexible royalty clause
would not assure to the patentee ability to bring about this maximiz-
ing of industry price and output, particulary in an oligopolistic indus-
try. In such an industry there may be no such close relationship
between firm costs and prices as under either competitive or monop-
olistic conditions. Therefore a small increase in the flexible royalty
rate might not produce the desired price increase; and a small reduc-
tion in royalties would be even more likely to fail to bring about the
desired price decrease.
All this may be conceded; the deficiency of the argument lies in its
irrelevance. What interest has the patentee in whether the industry is
operating at optimum price and output? None, except insofar as he
is either a direct seller or a royalty recipient or both. In his capacity
as a direct seller, he benefits from control over industry price only in
accordance with his percentage of total sales; he shares his potential
monopoly profit with licensees to the extent they make direct sales.
He would be better off with the less precise control device of a flexible
royalty rate unless he has a very large fraction of the market.
With respect to the patentee's capacity as a collector of royalties, gen-
103. Even this statement is not wholly accurate since it ignores the possibility that
firms may he operating at outputs at which their individual marginal costs may be
unequal and therefore the industry is not operating at minimal cost. See Lxkmscni, Tilt
PRICE SYSTM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 216 (3d ed. 1966).
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eralization is more difficult. If, as is usually the case, his royalty is a
percentage of sales, he has no interest in optimum industry price. Roy-
alty income would be maximized by a lower price where demand
elasticity was unitary. Similarly, a lower price would benefit him more
than the maximizing price if his royalty was based on a production
input. Only if the royalty base was net profit, a base I believe is seldom
used, would royalties be increased by industry price maximization.
This second argument regarding the flexibility of price restrictions,
then, is plainly invalid unless the patentee's direct sales constitute a
large share of the market; and even in that situation he is failing to
capture all his profit. Such a patentee should insist on both a price
restriction and a flexible royalty rate. The former would allow precise
control over industry price and output, and the latter would enable
him to extract all the resulting benefits. Arguably a price clause should
be permitted if the patentee enjoys a large share of the market and
also has power to vary royalties and uses that power to garner all
monopoly profit.
But even that argument should be rejected. Such a patentee can
achieve his legitimate objectives without the price clause. By setting
his own price at the industry optimum he can prevent any licensee
from charging significantly higher prices. And by raising royalty rates
he can prevent any licensee from charging less. Such a patentee does
not need a price restriction; and since restrictions pose grave threats
of abuse in other contexts they should be flatly prohibited.
In view of the fact that royalty obligations serve the interest of
patentees much better than do price clauses, how does one account
for the fact that price clauses are so extensively used? The answer is
that price clauses are used precisely because their favorable economic
impact inures to licensees as well as patentees, because their adverse
economic impact falls not on the parties but upon the customers of
the parties, and because the monopoly income they generate may ex-
ceed substantially the value of the licensed invention. 10 -
In the one situation of the patentee who makes a large percentage
of direct sales and also has the power to vary royalties, there would be
little difference in industry performance whether or not there was a
price clause. A form of low-cost-firm-price-leadership would result, the
patentee being the low-cost firm by reason of his control over royalties.
104. The argument in this and immediately following paragraphs is made by Helmut
F. Furth in one of the few useful pieces of scholarship dealing with patent licensing
problems. Furth, Price Restrictive Licenses Under the Sherman Act, 71 HArv. L. Rxv.
815 (1958).
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A patentee could bargain successfully for such a powerful position only
if his patent was both economically valuable and legally invulnerable.
It is in situations of patents which are not both valuable and invul-
nerable that price restrictions significantly affect industry performance.
Control over price is used to achieve monopolistic pricing in the in-
dustry, but a large part of the profits remain in the pockets of licensees.
The patentee does not extract it because he does not have the bargain-
ing power to extract it. The price restriction is the backbone of a
loose-knit cartel.
More specifically, a price restriction clause that is operative always
has the primary consequence of dividing with the licensees, in pro-
portion to their share of market sales, the monopoly profit potential
of the endproduct. Because it does so it has several secondary conse-
quences. First, licensees have no incentive to challenge validity of the
patent. If the patent were held invalid, competition among the licen-
sees, the patentee and perhaps new entrants would deprive licensees
of their present share of monopoly profits. It is true that some out-
sider might challenge, or threaten to challenge the patent, but this
fact does little to compensate for the elimination of licensee incentive
to challenge: the licensees constitute the group most likely to possess
knowledge revealing invalidity; and, moreover, an outside challenger
can often be bought off by issuing him a license containing price re-
strictions and thus bringing him aboard the gravy train.
Second, the licensees have an incentive to suppress any unpatented
product that competes with the patented product. An agreement to
suppress such products is, of course, a prohibited conspiracy. But con-
spiracies are difficult to prove even if something sufficiently formal to
be called an agreement does exist. And in any event the parties have
no need of agreement: each will realize that the interests of all call
for suppression. Again, introduction of such a competing product by
an outsider is possible, but licensees constitute the group most likely
to possess knowledge of the existence and market potential of such a
product. Again, the outsider may be bought off by letting him into
the club, and the outsider's incentive to break up the game is mini-
mized by the facts that he would possess no shelter from competition
and would suffer the hostility of the club members in the ensuing
competition.
Third, licensee incentive to invent around the licensed patent is
far less than if all monopoly profits were being absorbed by royalty
obligations. Investment in experimentation that would be warranted
by the prospect of avoiding royalty obligations and acquiring a monop-
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oly position for himself is less attractive to a licensee who already hag
a shared monopoly and is paying low or nominal royalties.
Because of these effects on licensees, the price restrictive license
destroys all assurance of comparability between the degree of monop-
oly restriction being imposed on customers and the value of the pat-
entee's contribution. The suppression of potentially competitive
products may afford a substantial degree of monopoly power to a pat-
ent which is invalid or which constitutes little or no contribution to
knowledge. If the supressed products are old products on which the
patented product is an "improvement," the conspiratorial overtones
of the arrangement may be quite obvious.205 Licenses will probably
have to be issued to all existing producers of the old product before
any licensee will commit himself to even a nominal royalty; and the
awareness of customers and other outsiders of the existence of the
"unimproved" product will generate resistance to substantial price
increases for the new product, may lead to cheating by licensees, and
may require elaborate policing steps by the patentee. These circum-
stances may generate sufficient evidence of "conspiracy" to support a
§ 1 charge. But where the patented product is new and the alternatives
are suppressed by the failure to introduce them rather than by their
withdrawal, proof of conspiracy will be difficult or impossible. Since
the anticompetitive conduct is inherent in the price restriction, use
of such clauses should be flatly prohibited. Not only do they threaten
monopolistic exploitation far beyond that commensurate with the
value of the patentee's contribution, but they also undermine the ob-
jectives of patent policy by weakening incentives of licensees to invent
around the licensed patent since it is a source of benefits rather than
of royalty obligations.
The position regarding price restrictions suggested by the Third
Circuit, that such a clause is permissible if it appears in only one li-
cense, is unsound. 0 6 All the harmful effects described above can occur
105. Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
106. Newburgh foire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956) (dictum).
The court was led to this position not by any economic consideration but by attempt-
ing to parse language in earlier and inconsistent Supreme Court opinions. An intelligent
comment on the case can be found in Note, Patent Price Restrictins and the Antitrust
Laws: A Balance Upset, 67 YA.E L.J. 700 (1958).
The conclusion reached in the Note is that the "narrow revision" of the law by
judicial action is unsatisfactory and that "broad revision, requiring delicate adjustments
must be left to Congress. Narrow revision, including flat prohibition of price clausts,
is found unsatisfactory because: (1) it would not prohibit other anticompetitive license
practices that have similar effects, and (2) because it would affect some patentees more
drastically than others.
The first objection to flat prohibition by judicial action ignores the ability of the
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where there is only one licensee if he and the patentee hold a sub-
stantial portion of the relevant product market. A far more sensible
distinction would permit price restrictions if the patentee and his
licensees, whatever their number, enjoyed less than half the relevant
market; for the existence of substantial competition from companies
not being force-fed monopoly profits would minimize the potential
damage of the price restriction. But in the absence of some demon-
stration that the clause yields patentees some advantage not obtainable
by devices less destructive of competition, I see no reason ever to
uphold such a clause.
In discussing royalty structures that increased more than propor-
tionately with increases in licensee output, I suggested that such
clauses were tolerable if they occurred in a single license. Such clauses
are different from price restrictions because, unless there are multiple
licensees, they benefit only the patentee. A price restriction would be
more analogous to such clauses if the patentee had power to sell for
any price he wished but the licensee could not sell below a set price;
but the analogy would still be defective. Under the increasing royalty
percentage the licensee's output is restricted only by the pinch of in-
creasing royalty obligations and those obligations represent gains to
the patentee. The licensee's willingness to incur those royalty obliga-
courts to control the use of other restrictive clauses and thus reestablish the logical
symmetry of which the author is enamored.
The second objection, based on equity as between various types of patentecs, is un-
persuasive for more complex reasons. Patentees of consumer products would be more
drastically affected than patentees of intermediate products, the Note argues, because
demand for the former is more elastic than for the latter. The existence of this asserted
difference in demand characteristics is neither documented empirically nor supported
by persuasive theoretical argument. Demand elasticity for intermediate products attribut-
able to input substitutability is ignored; and elasticity attributable to elasticity of de-
mand for the end product to which the patented product is intermediate is acknowledged
in the last sentence of a long footnote but is ignored in the text. 67 Ya L.J. at 709,10
n.31.
Patentees capable of producing the entire optimum volume of the patented product
would be less drastically affected by flat prohibition than those not capable of doing so,
the Note argues. The basis for this assertion is inadequate for two reasons. First, the
Note relies upon advantages which would be held by patentees capable of large scale
production whether or not price clauses are prohibited. See text at n.26. Second, the
ability of the patentee to control industry output by using a price clause is assumed to
be equivalent to is ability to maximize his own revenue. It probably is true that a
patentee with power to vary selling price unilaterally can control industry price and
output more delicately than one who can vary royalties; but except to the extent of
his profits on direct sales, controlling industry output and price d6es him no good,
See note 103 supra. He maximizes royalty income only to the extent he varies royalties,
This fact is acknowledged cryptically in the last sentence of another long footnote, see
67 YALE L.J. at 707-08 n.25, but it is ignored in the text. The argument in the text is
gravely impaired by the footnote acknowledgement.
Finally, I do not think that minor differences in impact upon different types of pat.
entees-if any differences in impact exist-justify preservation of a licensing device that
has the primary function of destroying comparability between the patentee's contribu-
tion and the degree to which monopoly restraint is imposed on the cndproduct market.
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tions gives some assurance of comparability, for he has received no
assurance of monopoly profit from the face of the license. A price re-
striction not tied to the patentee's own prices also suggests that the
patentee had a patent of some inherent value; for on its face it affords
the licensee only the small comfort of high prices on whatever fraction
of industry sales the patentee chooses to allow him. But a critical dif-
ference remains: under the price clause, to the extent the fixed licensee
price exceeds that to which a greater royalty obligation could have
forced it, the patentee is sharing the monopoly profits; and this fact
suggests restraint unwarranted by the value of the invention.
A license restriction on licensee output-restriction to a set percent-
age of industry sales, or to a specific quantity quota or to a quota set
from time to time by the patentee-should be treated just as a price
restriction for the consequences are identical. Licensees share the ben-
efit of restriction on industry output through resultant high prices;
they have no incentive to market competitive products or to challenge
validity of or to invent around the patent; therefore assurance of com-
parability is destroyed.
D. Restrictions on the Field of Utilization
The term "field restrictions" causes difficult problems of analysis
primarily because it is used to refer to license clauses that have very
different functions and that should be recognized as raising very differ-
ent problems. For several reasons a patentee whose invention is sus-
ceptible to application in two or more independent areas of economic
activity may wish to impose different terms on applications in the dif-
ferent areas. He may wish to charge different royalty rates or base
royalty rates on different royalty bases in the different fields; or he may
wish to vary as between fields the license terms in other respects-for
example, to bargain for a grant-back clause from licensees in field #1
but to forego grant-backs and concentrate on bargaining for the highest
possible royalty in field #2.
This general function of the field restriction is entirely appropriate.
Use of differential royalties raises the pervasive problem of economic
discrimination and requires further discussion; but assuming that in
each type of license the royalty structure and any restrictions imposed
are lawful, it is my conclusion that field restrictions used to perform
this function should not be prohibited.
Assume a patentee whose invention is useful in fields #1 through
#5 issues identical licenses to one hundred licensees, twenty of whom
are in each of the five fields at the time of agreement. Each license
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expressly contemplates that the licensee may enter any one or all of the
other four fields and provides in substance the following arrangement:
Royalties in field #1 shall be 5 per unit of input a consumed; in field
#2 they shall be 10% of your expenditures for input b, and you shall
issue to me a royalty free, nonexclusive license under any improvement
patent you may acquire that is useful in field #2; royalties in field #3
shall be 7 per unit of input c consumed, etc.
No objection can be taken to this license pattern except on the
ground that the patentee is maximizing his royalty income by setting
rates on the basis of elasticity of demand for use of the invention in
the different areas. For reasons previously given that objection is un-
persuasive. To require a uniform royalty structure in different areas
of economic activity would substantially diminish rewards to patentees
to no useful purpose and often with harmful consequences. Uniform
royalties would require not only the same rate but the same base, and
a common base would not be available in the different areas in many
cases unless an endproduct sales base were permitted. Such a base is
unacceptable because of its effect on input substitution.
Even if a common base were available in a given case in the sense
that there was a common input in the several production processes, it
would not necessarily be an appropriate base in each area-appropri-
ate in the sense of constituting an input closely related to the inven-
tion. And if the common input was an appropriate base in all areas,
it would nevertheless be likely that producers in one area would use
the base more intensively than those in other areas so that discrimina-
tion would not really be eliminated but merely disguised. Phonic but
not economic equality would have been achieved. The very factor that
makes an input base appropriate is its capacity to measure the utility
which the licensee is deriving from the invention.
All the foregoing difficulties inhere in the fact that the classical con-
cept of economic discrimination furnishes no adequate basis for nor-
mative rules when applied to a product which has no marginal cost.
Finally, if one managed, in some way I cannot conceive, to eliminate
charges based on licensee utility, one would not have accomplished
anything worthwhile. Forced to abandon charges based on utility in
each field of application, a patentee would maximize against an aggre-
gate demand for use of his invention and select a point on that demand
curve approximating unitary elasticity. All potential applications of
the invention having lesser utilities would be abandoned: they could
not afford the uniform price which would exceed their old price. All
applications with a higher utility would use the invention, many with
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greater intensity than before. One cannot generalize that the resulting
shift of resources from low utility uses to high utility uses would reflect
an advance for the economy. One cannot even predict that more exten-
sive use would be made of the invention; for although prohibiting the
separation of markets diminishes income to the seller, it does not nec-
essarily increase the quantity of the product that will be purchased.
10T
Field restrictions may be misused, however, to achieve an allocation
of markets among actual or potential competitors. Like price restric-
tion clauses, the greatest potential for causing economic harm exists
when field restrictions are used in conjunction with patents of little
commercial value. The economic loss caused by a price restriction is
indicated by the difference between the fixed price and the price that
would have been compelled by royalty obligations; the loss caused by
a field restriction is the difference between the endproduct price that
occurs as a result of the field restriction and the highest price that
might have been compelled by royalty obligations. Since in both cases
a practical limit on endproduct price is set by the relationship between
demand for the endproduct and costs other than royalties, the poten-
tial of the restrictions for harm varies inversely with the value of the
patentee's contribution and his resultant ability to bargain for royal-
ties. Any monopoly income that prevailing endproduct price yields
that does not flow to the patentee either through royalties or his own
direct sales remains in the pocket of the licensee. Such income does
not serve the purpose of the patent system and hence corresponds to
unjustified restriction on output.
The foregoing conclusion can be illustrated by examining the cases,
first, of a very valuable patent and, subsequently, of a trivial patent.
Assume a patentee makes a startling breakthrough in laser technology
which makes possible inexpensive and reliable motion picture photog-
raphy and the reproduction of sharp images in three dimensions, a
significant advance on present holography techniques; and assume,
further, that viewers of all types find three dimensional reproductions
so much more satisfactory than plane images that the technique has
the potential to supplant totally present motion picture technology.
The device would obviously have potential application in motion pic-
ture entertainment, industrial training films, military training films,
advertising films, educational films and perhaps home movies. The
elasticity of demand for use of the technique would differ in each of
these fields, and the patentee might license its use at maximizing roy-
107. See Appendix, infra, at note 5.
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alty R 1 in field #1, R2 in field #2, etc., issuing licenses at those royalties
to all applicants in each of the several fields. In each field there would
be a number of licensed competitors. Each licensee would pay royalties
according to the rate for his field and his individual rate of utilizing
the royalty base for his field. From the several licensees in field #1
the patentee would receive a total sum of royalties, TR 1, from those
in field #2, TR 2, etc., and his aggregate royalty income would be the
sum of these totals. This pattern of licenses is wholly appropriate.
Assume, alternatively, that the patentee licensed only one user in
each field at the highest royalty for which he can bargain, and the sin-
gle licensee then, because of the commercial significance of the patent,
displaced all unlicensed competition in his field. Several inquiries con-
cerning this alternative are appropriate: (1) Is output in any given
field likely to be more severely restricted under this alternative than
under the first license pattern described, with the consequence that
this license pattern may be labeled "undesirable"? (2) Is the total roy-
alty income obtainable from any given field likely to be greater under
this than the first described license pattern with the consequence that
patentees will have an incentive to adopt this license pattern if allowed
to do so?
During the life of the patent, output of the field is likely to be lower,
but probably not significantly lower, under the one-per-field license
pattern than under a multiple-license pattern, and this is true whether
the patent covers the endproduct itself or only a vital input.108 If the
patent covers only a vital input, then to some extent other inputs will
be substituted against it; but this will occur whether there are one or
many licensees. If the single licensee selected in the one-per-field pattern
is not as efficient as other potential licensees, output in the field will be
further restricted by the licensee's higher costs; but since selection of an
inefficient licensee is contrary to the patentee's interest, reasonable
assurance against this possibility is afforded; and this possibility alone
would not seem to warrant legal prohibition. To the extent that the
patentee misjudges field demand or licensee costs and fails to bargain
successfully for a royalty which extracts full monopoly potential, out-
put is likely to be more restricted under the one-per-field pattern; for
the single licensee presumably will capture the remaining monopoly
108. In my discussion at this point I assume that the patentee is confined to an
appropriate royalty base, but the assumption is not essential to the analysis. If the
patentee is free to use an endproduct royalty structure although the endproduct itself
is not subject to the patent, then the degree of restriction under both patterns will be
greater; but the comparative restriction attributable to the license pattern will not be
affected.
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potential himself, whereas competition between multiple licensees may
cause the differential to be passed on. Multiple licensees may also be
preferable because they will offer greater product differentiation and
will have greater incentive to achieve further technological advance.
Consideration of the performance of the field after expiration of the
patent affords a further basis for preferring multiple licensees. Com-
petitive conditions are likely to be restored more quickly if the field
has not been confined for the patent's life to a single licensee who, by
the expiration of the patent, may have achieved a position which
heightens entry barriers.
Finally, the strong ideological preference of our society for multiple
participation as opposed to monopoly should not be disregarded if
economic considerations are roughly in balance.
The second inquiry is whether one-per-field license patterns yield
incremental returns to patentees. If the answer to this question were
negative, then prohibition of such license patterns could easily be jus-
tified since the objectives of the patent system would not be thwarted
in any way. However it is probable that such patterns yield incremental
returns to the patentee even in the case of a valuable patent. If the
patentee has correctly estimated and successfully bargained for the full
monopoly potential of the patent in the field, the sole licensee is little
benefited by his exclusive position during the life of the patent. While
he enjoys his exclusive position, he has the quiet life of the monopolist
but none of its economic fruits. It seems probable that the licensee will
pay a premium royalty rate if, but only if, he has some assurance of
the continuity of his exclusive position and in addition, one of the
following factors is present: he values the prospect of establishing a
dominant position in the field during patent life because of the pos-
sibility of exploiting that position subsequent to patent expiration; or
he estimates demand and cost functions in the field differently than
has the patentee, expects to be able to garner monopoly profits beyond
those which would be absorbed by the royalty demanded for a non-
exclusive position, and offers the premium royalty for the exclusive
position as a mode of sharing with the patentee the additional monop-
oly profits the licensee expects.
To the extent that payment of the premium is induced by the li-
censee's long-run expectation of a dominant position sheltered by entry
barriers of some sort, the premium does not constitute income of the
kind contemplated by the patent system. Such income does not corre-
spond to the value of the patentee's contribution measured during the
permissible time period but is comparable to an extension of patent
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life. To the extent the premium is attributable to what has been de-
scribed as different estimates of cost and demand functions in the field,
it is income that corresponds to patent value: the position of exclu-
sivity is a factor strengthening the bargaining power of the patentee
in his attempt to extract the full monopoly power of the patent as esti-
mated in advance of agreement.
If one considered only cases involving very valuable patents, the
arguments for and against toleration of one-per-field licensing patterns
would thus be fairly closely balanced. While such patterns probably
generate incremental income for patentees, the magnitude of the incre-
mental income is likely to be small; and only some indeterminate por-
tion of it will be attributable to invention value. In any case where
there is incremental income there will be incremental restraint on
output; and some indeterminate part of the restraint will be unjusti-
fiable in terms of patent policy because it is attributable to monopoly
profit shared with the licensee and licensee anticipation of post-patent
market position.
Cases involving comparatively trivial patents must also be consid-
ered, however; and in such cases resultant restraint on output may
substantially exceed that justifiable by invention value. An industry
characterized by loose and fairly competitive oligopolistic structure
can be restructured into a series of monopolistic satraps by parceling
out exclusive fields within the industry to the existing participants.
Here too the one-per-field license pattern, if permitted, will generate
patentee income; for in addition to whatever value the invention may
have, licensees will pay something for the service of carving up the
market into monopolized fields. But patentee interest in such income
plainly is not protected by patent policy, and the resultant restraint
transgresses antitrust objectives.
To this analysis it may be objected that if the patent is not of great
commercial significance, there is no real barrier to entry by outsiders
into any one or all of the fields. While technically valid, the objection
is not persuasive: it proves too much. On similar reasoning there is no
reason to forbid price conspiracies or monopolization or horizontal
mergers; for in theory the existence of monopoly profits will signal
entrants who will erode the established market positions. But in prac-
tice the unjustified market positions endure long enough to make the
game worth the candle for conspirators and monopolists. With one-
per-field license patterns as with price restrictions, those in the best
position to assess correctly the true value of the invention and the
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practicality of operating without using it or of having the patent de-
dared invalid are, by the licensing device, converted from potential
attackers to committed defenders. The fact that some were willing to
take licenses, pay royalties of some amount, and abandon alternative
production routes to the endproduct creates a fagade of legal invulner-
ability and economic importance for the patent which may be enough
to deter more thorough examination by individuals whose primary
efforts are directed elsewhere. Unless a device which has such adverse
economic potential is also essential to achievement of desirable goals,
the argument against blocking its use must fail.
In my opinion the limited utility of one-per-field licensing patterns
to patentees as a bargaining device to extract the last drop of potential
royalty revenue from valuable patents does not justify acceptance of
misuse of the device; nor do I believe that proper and improper use
can be identified by factual inquiry on a case-by-case basis.
In formulating rules governing this problem, however, care must be
taken lest more be thrown out than bathwater. Any prohibition so
sweeping in its scope as to block differential royalty rates applicable
to different fields would be unwise. Nor is it realistic to require a
patentee, in negotiating with a potential licensee presently interested
in field #1, to anticipate all other possible fields of use and pre-
scribe in the license what royalties would be if the licensee chose
to expand his operations into other fields. The parties should be
free under those circumstances to execute a license that applies
only to field #1. Negotiations between them on a mutually accept-
able royalty applicable to field #2 can be left for a future date
when the licensee's interest in that field becomes less theoretical.
Whether the license is merely silent as to other fields, leaving applica-
tion by the licensee in other fields subject to infringement remedies, or
contains promises that the licensee will not practice the invention in
other fields, should be immaterial; neither a misuse defense nor an anti-
trust claim should be available to the licensee or to any third person on
this state of facts alone.
The appropriate weapon with which to strike at the restricted field
license is to require the patentee to issue to any qualified applicant a
license to practice the invention in any field previously licensed on
terms equal to those in existing licenses. A licensee under a currently
effective license in any field, by reason of that fact alone, should be
regarded as a qualified applicant with respect to any other field and as
entitled, upon application, to be licensed to practice in such other field
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if that other field has been licensed to any third person. Only a breach
of his original license of sufficient importance to warrant its cancella-
tion which the licensor has invoked as a basis for cancellation should
exclude from eligibility a person to whom the patentee has voluntarily
issued a license. An applicant who is not licensed under the patent in
any field should be presumed qualified, subject to the patentee's ability
to prove the existence of facts justifying a refusal to deal with him.
Such facts would include prior acts of commercial dishonesty by the
applicant or lack of financial solvency or other facts which raise sub-
stantial doubt about the applicant's willingness or ability to comply
fully with the license terms. Notwithstanding proof of such facts, issu-
ance of the license should be required if, in light of the facts shown,
the court can issue an order which fully protects the interests of the
patentee in faithful performance. If, for example, the refusal is based
on undercapitalization of the applicant, the court should order the li-
cense issued on the condition that the applicant posts a bond or estab-
lishes a trust fund to insure royalty payments. Reasons for refusal other
than financial would be more difficult to deal with by protective order;
and if the facts asserted are found true and the refusal reasonable in
light of the facts, issuance of a license would not be required.
Although this proposal may be said to involve "compulsory licens-
ing" and has an objective embraced by earlier compulsory licensing
proposals, it differs from them in two important respects. First, it
avoids the nearly insuperable problem of deciding what constitutes a
reasonable royalty. Issuance of a license would never be compelled
until the patentee's resort to the market place on a voluntary basis had
provided an answer to that question. Second, the patentee is not pre-
cluded from reserving for exploitation through his own direct produc-
tion and sales the whole or any subpart of his invention's possible
applications. He merely is precluded from auctioning off monopolistic
positions to others, the restrictive impact of which may far exceed the
real value of his invention because a division of markets rather than
rights to practice the invention is the objective of the licensees.
For much the same reason, it cannot be objected that the definition
of a "field" is difficult and that the proposal is unworkable for that
reason. The patentee adequately defines the field in which the appli-
cant has an option to practice when he issues the first license. Whether
the field as defined in the first license constitutes a separable market
in economic terms is an issue with which the court need not concern
itself: it is enough that a first licensee wanted a license thus circum-
scribed and that the applicant now also wants such a license.
346
Vol. 76: 267, 1966
Patent Monopoly
E. Territorial Restrictions
Most of what has been said regarding field limitations is equally
applicable to territorial limitations. A pattern of licenses or assign-
ments which carves the United States up into geographic subdivisions
and thereby confers on licensees a monopoly position in their respec-
tive subdivisions has obvious potential for economic harm. Obviously,
too, it makes possible imposition by the patentee of different royalty
rates in different areas scaled to the demand elasticity in each area.
The latter should not be a source of concern; the former should.
Again in the present context it is true that the potential for harm
from market subdivision is inversely related to the economic value of
the invention. The more valuable the invention, the more likely it is
that royalty obligations would force an endproduct price approximat-
ing a monopoly price in the area; and the less valuable the invention,
the more likely it is that licensees will be seeking not the right to use
the invention so much as a legal umbrella for market division.
As with respect to field restrictions the optimum solution, in my
opinion, is to compel the issuance of identical licenses to all qualified
applicants with respect to any geographical area for which an assign-
ment or a license has previously been issued. The patentee's power to
auction off exclusive positions will thus be destroyed without impairing
significantly his ability to capture through royalties the economic value
of his innovative contribution.
Also left unimpaired is the patentee's ability to preserve for himself
a territorial monopoly. Until he has issued at least one license or as-
signment with respect to a territory, there would be no obligation to
issue any license for that territory. Hence it cannot be asserted persua-
sively that the proposed solution would bear more harshly on small
than on large patentees; each would be able to reserve for himself an
area suitable to his potential for direct exploitation and to gather roy-
alty income from the balance of the United States. The patentee would
also be able to provide for subsequent expansion of his exclusive area
in anticipation of the growth of his own productive and distributive
facilities. Licenses to adjoining territories could be made terminable
on a given future date or at the patentee's option on or after a given
date. Licenses then issued involuntarily to qualified applicants would
similarly be terminable and the patentee's interest would be preserved.
Two points peculiar to territorial restrictions should be noted. The
potential of territorial restrictions for economic harm has been limited
by the long-standing doctrine that the patentee's monopoly is "enx-
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hausted" by the first sale of a patented product.100 Although the basis
for this doctrine is probably to be found in the historic hostility to
restraints on alienation'10 rather than judicial devotion to competitive
processes, a major impact of the doctrine is to allow patented products
to flow across the territorial boundaries of restrictive licenses. This
erosion of insularity mitigates the restrictive effect of geographic mo-
nopolies. It also reduces the patentee's ability to impose differential
royalty rates; to the extent there is inter-area competition through re-
sales, disparities in demand elasticity in different areas cannot be ex-
ploited by local licensees and hence cannot be exploited through roy-
alty differentials by the patentee.
But the check imposed by the resale doctrine is only partial. To the
extent that the cost of transportation and of additional handling by the
redistributor is a significant fraction of final price, a tariff wall remains
to shelter the local licensee. The redistributor's costs, apart from trans-
portation, may be substantial, among other reasons because some de-
gree of surreptitiousness may be required to avoid impact of infringe-
ment and contributory infringement doctrines: the law is not entirely
clear as to the significance of knowledge on the part of either the seller
or redistributor of the fact that the latter intends to redistribute in an
area foreclosed to the seller."' And since the courts have treated the
"first sale" rule as one of metaphysics rather than of the purposeful
implementation of social objectives, 12 it is difficult to predict results in
any given case. Hence the existence of this conceptual doctrine, what-
ever its reach, should not be thought to make unnecessary or inappro-
priate purposeful doctrinal modifications which strike specifically at
potential abuses of territorial restrictions.
A second peculiarity of the territorial restriction is the presence in
109. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852), Adams v. Burke,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 1895);
Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913). But see Skee Ball Co. v. Cohen, 286 Fed. 275
(1922).
110. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REV. 945, 999 (1928).
111. Compare Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355 (1893) (territorial assignee who knew
that buyer intended to use product in another territory not liable for infringement by
reason of sale) with Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed. Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) ("Whether
a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to
the" purchasers is not a question before us . . . [H]owever . ..such a question would
arise as a question of contract and not as one under the inherent meaning ... of the
patent laws.") See also General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co,, 305 U.S.
124 (1938) where the Court declined to answer, because not posed by the record, the
analogous question in the context of field restrictions.
112. "In the essential nature of things, when the patentee sells a machine . . .
whose sole value is in its use ... he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article
passes without the limit of the monopoly," Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456
(1873).
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the patent code of language asserted to be a statutory basis for such
restrictions." 3 Indeed, it has been suggested that since territorial re-
strictions are no less harmful than price, output and field restrictions,
all such restrictions must be tolerated so as not to create inconsis-
tencies." 4
Only by amateurish literalism or cynical distortion can it be argued
that § 261 places a general imprimatur of legality on territorial restric-
tions. As the total content of the present section and its history shows,
the purpose of the provision is totally irrelevant to the issues discussed
in this paper; and the language of § 261 can be given its full intended
effect quite consistently with the suggestions I have made.
Section 261 has its genesis in § 4 of the Patent Act of 179 u3 12 which
merely authorized assignment by the patentee of his title and interest
in his invention.116 Statutory authorization was necessary "because
since patent rights are creatures of statute and not of common law, the
transfer of legal title thereto cannot be regulated by the rules of the
latter system.""17
The procedural and formal rigidities of the 19th century between
law and equity, between legal and equitable title, and between con-
tracts and conveyances lead to distinctions of substantial practical im-
port between patent assignments and patent licenses. Made in com-
pliance with the statute, an assignment vested in the assignee a legal
title which was an adequate basis for the commencement by the as-
signee of infringement actions, the execution of licenses or further
assignments, and application for extensions of the patent term." 8 A
warranty of title was implied unless negated by the instrument." 0
Legal title prevailed over prior equitable incumbrances if obtained for
value and without notice, 2 0 could be held by several persons as tenants
113. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1964). "[P]atents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable
in law by an instrument in writing. The patentee . . . may in like manner ... convey
an exclusive right under his . . . patents, to the whole or any specified part of the
United States.
"A certificate of acknowledgement under the hand and official seal of a person au-
thorized to administer oaths in the United States . . . shall be prima fade evidence of
the execution of an assignmenL...
"An assignment . . . shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser . . . for
valuable consideration, without notice ... unless it is recorded in the Patent Office .... ."
114. Note, Patent Price Restrictions and the Antitrust Laws: A Balance Upset, 67
YALE LJ. 700, 706 (1958).
115. 1 Stat. 318, § 4 (1793).
116. Ibid. "[iMt shall be lawful for any inventor . . . to assign the title and interest
in the said invention . . . and the assignee, having recorded the . . . assignment
shall thereafter stand in the place of the.., inventor...
117. AVALmm, PATENTs § 274 (1st ed. 1883).
118. Id. at §§ 272-95.
119. Id. at § 282.
120. Id. at § 286.
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in common and perhaps by joint-tenancy, 121 and was subject to volun-
tary, but not involuntary, partition.
22
But any transfer of interest that did not convey a sufficiently broad
range of interest to the transferee was regarded not as an assignment
but as a mere license.123 Unlike an assignee, a licensee was merely a
contracting party, not a property owner with title.124 He received noth-
ing more than the privilege of practicing the invention to the extent
described in the license without being subject to liability for infringe-
ment. 25 Licenses could be written or oral and did not have to be re-
corded.1 26 Unless the document expressly authorized transfer, a license
was not transferable; and if made transferable, it was such only in its
entirety unless expressly made transferable in parts and to a plurality
of persons. 27
Because of the important differences between assignment and license,
it was important that there be a sharp definition of that range of in-
terest which was sufficiently broad to be the subject of assignment as
opposed to license. No such definition was written into the 1793 pro-
vision. 28 This deficiency was corrected in the 1836 act which assimi-
lated to the assignment category "every grant . . . of the exclusive
right . . . to make and use, and to grant to others to make and
use the thing patented within and throughout any specified part ...
of the United States."' 29 Transfers of that breadth were required to
be recorded 3 0 and were regarded as the minimum quantum of interest
to which the qualities of "property" and "title" attached; and with
those qualities went a complex body of interpretive rules.' 3' Finally in
121. Id. at § 292.
122. Id. at § 295.
123. Id. at § 296.
124. Id. at §9 305, 306.
125. Id. at §9 296-300.
126. Id. at §9 303, 304.
127. Id. at § 310.
128. See note 116 supra.
129. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117 (1836): "[E]very patent shall be
assignable in law, either as to the whole interest, or any undivided part thereof, by any
instrument in writing; which assignment, and also every grant . . . of the exclusive
right ... to make and use, and to grant to others to make and use, the thing patented
within and throughout any specified part . . . of the United States, shall be recorded
in the Patent Office .. "
130. See note 129 supra.
131. See, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891). See WAixr, PATENT$
§ 296 (1st ed. 1883).
Even today it is not unusual for courts to allow characterizations of legal relationships
to control the answer to questions bearing little apparent relationship to those charac,
terizations. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Linzell, 107 Ohio App. 351, 152
N.E.2d 380 (1957), aff'd, 168 Ohio St. 259, 153 N.E.2d 773 (1958) (plaintiff had received
"mere licenses" rather than leases to maintain signs on property subsequently taken
by eminent domain and therefore was not entitled to compensation.)
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1870 an express statement of the sanction for failure to record, nullity
as against a bona fide purchaser, was added.132 When reprinted in the
Revised Statutes of 1875, the section was broken into two sentences;133
in 1897, the sentence making certificates of notaries prima facie evi-
dence of execution of an assignment was added; 3 4 in 1941 the section
was expanded to include applications as well as patents; 13 and in 1952
the several sentences were rearranged into their present order, placing
the paragraph relating to certificates between the authorization to as-
sign and the requirement of recordation.13°
As a consequence of these technical modifications the basic authori-
zation to transfer by assignment rather than by license interests of a
minimal quantum now stands alone in the first principal paragraph of
§ 261 and is susceptible to being misread as a legalization for all
purposes of assignments of exclusive right to a specified part of the
United States. But that reading is wholly erroneous. The section re-
mains today what it has been for over a century: a demarcation of the
dividing line between interests sufficiently extensive to be transferred
by assignment and those which are to be transferred by license. The
modern reader, less sensitive than his predecessors to refined distinc-
tions between contract and conveyance, legal and equitable title, and
persons who are and are not proper parties in interest, is liable to err;
but internal corroboration of the original purpose is present in the
section: It deals with assignments, not licenses; and the sentence that
is critical for present purposes still reads, "The . . patentee ... may,
in like manner (i.e., by assignment), grant an exclusive right . . . to
.. .any specified part ... .
The section should be given the full import intended for it. The
assignee of an exclusive territorial right has "property" and may sue
for infringement within his territory. His document should be inter-
preted by the suppletive rules appropriate to assignments, and so forth.
But to allow this section to preclude intelligent harmonization of di-
vergent objectives of the patent and antitrust laws would be to parody
the process of statutory interpretation. The statutory phrase antedates
the Sherman Act by more than fifty years, and neither at the time of
132. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 36, 16 Stat. 198: ". . . part of the United States;
and said assignment.. . shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser... unless
it is recorded in the Patent Office .. "
133. Rrv. STAT. § 4898 (1875): ". ° . part of the United States. An assignment ...
shall be void ...."
134. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 5, 29 Stat. 692.
135. Act of Aug. 18, 1941, ch. 370, 55 Stat. 634: "Every application for patent or
patent ... shall be assignable ....
136. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1964).
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its passage nor at any time during the interim hundred forty years has
Congress given any evidence that the language represented a consid-
ered judgment on the substantive propriety of territorial restrictions
and their economic consequences. 13 7 On its face the section leaves un-
touched the validity of territorial restrictions in licenses; it should be
construed as irrelevant to the substantive validity of similar restrictions
in assignments.
VIII. In Anticipation of Rebuttal
In retrospect it can be seen that a major theme of the proposals
made in this paper is that patentees should be blocked from conferring
upon licensees the ability to monopolize generic endproducts and thus
to capture the monopoly profit potential in the demand for the end-
products rather than the profit potential in the demand for the inven-
tion. I use the term "generic endproduct" to emphasize that the theme
has embraced situations where the endproduct itself was patented. A
patented endproduct may have more or less close functional substitutes,
and if licensees are deprived of incentive to substitute functionally
equivalent endproducts against the patented endproduct, the situation
is analogous to those in which incentive to substitute unpatented in-
puts for the patented input is blocked.
To this theme it might be objected that the patentee who licenses
would be put in a less advantageous position than one who exploits
directly through his own manufacture and sales. In the case of direct
exploitation, a patentee will not substitute against his patented input
or against his patented endproduct. Surely the economy is no worse
off, the argument would run, if licensees are enabled to behave in
essentially the same way. Indeed, it could be said, the economic value of
the invention is best measured by the extent of restriction and profits
that would attend direct patentee exploitation; and to prevent the
patentee from capturing a part of these incremental profits by splitting
them with licensees on whom he has conferred sheltered positions is to
deprive the patentee of part of that value. The argument concludes
137. I have been unable to find any discussion of the territorial assignment language In
§ 261 either in Congressional reports or in floor debate. The general references that have
been made to the section as a whole confirm the view that it has been carried forward
without any purpose to alter the meaning it had in 1836.
See, e.g., CONG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2683 (1870) ("[t]here are not new nor
additional provisions. . . ."); 29 CONG. REcoRD 901 (1897) (the only change is "a matter
of detail.'); H.R. REP. No. 790, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1941) (the only change intended
was to make § 261 ... "applicable to assignments of application as well as of patents.');
H. R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5, 9 (1952) (purpose of the bill was the codifi-
cation and enactment of title 35 with only minor procedural changes).
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by asserting that an important consequence of depriving patentees of
the ability to auction off positions of market power over generic end-
products is that fewer licenses will be issued and exploitation by direct
patentee sales will be more frequent with the ultimate consequence of
greater concentration and diminished opportunities for small potential
licensees.
Although this line of objection cannot be dismissed as patently friv-
olous, I find it wholly unpersuasive for several reasons. First, it is in-
consistent with the basic structure of the patent system. The only pos-
sible justification for adopting the private monopoly device as a mode
of subsidizing innovative activity is to take advantage of free market
assessment of the value of a patentee's contribution. A direct system of
government subsidy would avoid all the economic damage of monopo-
listic restraint and would certainly be preferable but for the enormous
political and administrative difficulties of determining an appropriate
reward.
But free market assessment is thwarted if the patentee is permitted
to sell not the bare right to use the invention but the right to monop-
olize generic endproducts in which it is useful. The two things are not
the same, the latter always being as great or greater in value as the
former; and moreover they do not bear any constant proportion to one
another. To permit patentees to sell endproduct monopoly positions
both impairs the degree of precision with which comparative inven-
tion values are assessed and generally increases the values assigned.
I do not imply that the market for innovation is perfect and would
make highly refined assessments but for license restrictions. It is not
As Professors Kaysen and Turner have argued with admirable style,
the market is highly imperfect: "innovation is a lottery, and it is the
high prizes that count.138 But that unavoidable fact does not justify
the further avoidable impairment of market operation that results
from requiring that it assess invention value by assessing generic end-
products.139
Even when the invention is "essential" to the generic endproduct in
the sense that without use of the invention no functionally equivalent
138. KAYsEN & TuRtmt, ANrrrusr PorucY 163 (1959).
139. A footnote is the appropriate place to anticipate the observation that the ulti-
mate logical conclusion to which my position leads is that patentees should be required
to license in all cases so that they will be denied the possibility of endproduct monopoliza-
tion through self-production. The observation recalls a parable which ends, "I know
how to spell 'banana' but I don't know when to stop."
This last, logical, step would require, for reasons of administration, denial of self.
utilization until one or more licenses were issued.
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product can be produced at a cost anyone is willing to pay, the value
of the invention is what the market places on use of the invention, not
on the endproduct. For the susceptibility of the invention to input
substitution in the production process is an unavoidable element of
value. Hamlet cannot be played without Hamlet; but the merit of the
performance will depend heavily on the rest of the cast, the scenery,
and even the padding on the seats.
In the more frequent situation where the invention is not essential
to the generic endproduct because of the availability of either old or
easily discovered new substitutes for it, it is of vital importance for
market assessment to focus on invention use. If the patentee is per-
mitted to share a monopoly over the endproduct, incentive, among
licensees to bring those substitutes into play is diminished or destroyed;
and since the licensees will usually be those in the best technological
position to learn of the substitutes and assess them comparatively with
the invention, alternative routes to the generic endproduct will often
be obliterated.
When the alternative route to the endproduct is already known,
restrictive license patterns blend indistinguishably with the classic
patent-umbrella cartel. And distinction is difficult between what is
already known, what is readily perceptible and what, itself, ranks as
invention. To require that invention utilization rather than end-
products be the focus of market assessment would restore incentive
to resort to alternatives and would constitute a major step toward
eliminating this type of horizontal parallelism. That step is important
because of its direct economic consequences in product markets. It is
important because of the potential savings of scarce human resources
now invested in antitrust enforcement. And it is important because
decisions in such cases, turning as they must on highly speculative
assessments of the comparability of patent value with obversed re-
straint, are a source of considerable business community disaffection
for the antitrust laws generally.
Finally, the prediction that substantially fewer patentees will issue
any licenses does not trouble me at all. Its accuracy is doubtful. Hold-
ers of strong and valuable patents-patents that will serve as the
cornerstone for an industry-who have or can acquire the capacity to
exploit the invention fully by self-production probably do so now.
That course yields monopoly profits for patent life, affords a strong
market position thereafter, and avoids the administrative costs of
establishing and policing a license system. Those who neither have
nor can acquire adequate capacity will license because they must.
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There may be a shift at the margin, but there is little reason to think
the shift will be substantial. Any negative value that reasonably may
be assigned to that shift will be far outweighed, I believe, by the
impact of the proposals on markets affected by patents which are not
both legally invulnerable and economically valuable.
It is wholly unimportant whether willingness to license is dimin-
ished on the part of holders of patents which are either legally vulner-
able or of minor economic value; and the vast preponderance of
patents falls in these categories. No shift even at the margin is pre-
dictable, for to insist upon exclusive utilization will provoke assaults
on validity of patents in the first category and investigation of alterna-
tive methods so as to circumvent those in the second category. If the
patentees choose to license, they will do so for royalties commensurate
with invention value and the probability of validity. With rare excep-
tions readiness of patentees to license is a mixed blessing for which
no substantial price should be paid.
IX. In Conclusion
Subsidization of innovative activity is probably necessary to achieve
the devotion to that activity of an optimum flow of resources.1 40
Adoption of the monopoly device for this purpose has the great dis-
advantage of underutilization of all significant inventions but may be
justified by the preference for free market assessment of invention
value over administrative assessment.' 4 ' It is essential to market assess-
ment that comparability exist between the benefits that flow to the
patentee and the burden imposed upon licensees; if in their bargain-
ing process they are allowed to externalize the burden of payment by
constraints on licensee conduct or by adoption of certain royalty
structures, the adverse interest of the licensee no longer serves to check
the degree of monopoly and restraint imposed.1 42
Apart from blatant techniques such as the physical destruction of
competitors, impairment of comparability occurs through economic
arrangements which unnecessarily extend the restraining impact of
high price to goods and services other than the invention itself. Some
minimal familiarity with price theory is essential to understanding the
impact of different arrangements. 43 In particular two economic phe-
nomena recur repeatedly in analysis of licensing problems: that of
140. Pp. 267-72 supra.
141. Pp. 272-75 supra.
142. Pp. 277-79 supra.
143. Pp. 279-80 supra.
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differential pricing in accordance with demand elasticity, and that of
arrangements which affect substitution of inputs for the patented in-
put. Because incremental use of an existing invention is costless, the
classic concept of economic discrimination cannot be applied in this
context; and with limited exceptions the law should not attempt to
control differential pricing practices. 44 Arrangements which block
the substitution for the patented product of other factor inputs, on
the other hand, is a serious problem to which inadequate attention
has been given. 45 These considerations lead to a number of specific
proposals for judicial and legislative action.
Judicial Action
1. Royalty structures based on licensee sales of unpatented end-
products should be prohibited on the ground that they restrain out-
puts and increase prices of the endproducts to an extent not com-
parable with the value of invention. 14 Adoption of such a royalty
structure should be held to constitute misuse of the licensed patents
and a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
2. Royalty structures, other than those imposing a constant charge
per unit of an appropriate input, which, when expressed as a per-
centage of licensee sales, increase as licensee output increases, should
be prohibited if there exists a licensee other than the one to whom
the royalty structure applies who is in competition with the one to
whom the structure applies.147
3. An exception to the prohibition against tie-in sales should be
recognized where the tying product is patented, the total market for
the tied product substantially exceeds the submarket for tied sales and
the tied product is sold for prevailing market price.
1 48
4. Package licensing of patents to which a common input royalty
base is appropriate should not be prohibited provided that the license
gives the licensee an option to terminate the license on the date of
expiration of any one patent included in the package. 40
5. Restrictions on either a licensee's price or output should be
prohibited.15 0
6. Restrictions on the field in which the licensed patent can be
144. Pp. 280-99, 306-12 supra
145. Pp. 299-306 supra.
146. Pp. 299-312 supra.
147. Pp. 314-18 supra.
148. Pp. 318-22 supra.
149. Pp. 322-29 supra.
150. Pp. 329-39 supra.
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applied should not be prohibited, but when such a clause is used, a
subsequent refusal to issue to any qualified applicant a license iden-
tical to any license in which a field restriction appears should be held
a misuse of the licensed patent.5 1
7. Restrictions on the geographic territory in which an invention
can be practiced should not be prohibited. But when a license con-
taining such a restriction is issued, a subsequent refusal by the licensor
to issue to any qualified applicant a substantially identical license
should be held a misuse of the licensed patent by the licensor. And
when an exclusive territorial assignment is executed, a subsequent
refusal by the assignee to issue a license substantially identical to his




Legislative enactment of any of the foregoing proposals would be
wholly appropriate although each of them can also be implemented
appropriately by judicial action. Legislation defining the character-
istics which make an applicant a "qualified applicant" for the purposes
of proposals 6 and 7 would be particularly helpful.10
If the courts continue to exhibit blind literalism in construing the
conveyancing clause in § 261, an amendment explicitly limiting the
effect of that language to its originally intended purpose will be
appropriate.154
Only one of the proposals offered-one offered rather tentatively-
is necessarily dependent on legislation for its implementation. If it is
thought important that resort to differential royalties based on elas-
ticity differences be subjected to legal controls in those instances when
the practice arguably causes economic harm, Congress should establish
administrative machinery through which to permit exceptions to the
general rule against unpatented endproduct royalties. Exceptions
should be narrowly confined to those situations where, by reason of
absorption of substantial real cost advantages through differential
royalties, there is reason to believe that aggregate output of an indus-
try is more restricted by the differential royalty structure than by
blocking input substitution.r 5
151. Pp. 339-46 supra.
152. Pp. 347-52 supra.
153. Pp. 345-46 supra.
154. Pp. 348-52 supra.
155. P. 310 supra.
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Appendix
Some Basic Economics
For any particular product, a schedule can be made showing the
quantity that will be purchased in a unit of time if various prices per
unit of product are charged. Such a schedule, when represented graph-
ically, yields a demand curve for the product. Price per unit is meas-
ured on the vertical axis; units of product sold per unit of time are
measured on the horizontal axis. Since more units of product can be
sold in a unit of time at lower prices per unit of product than at
higher prices, the demand curve will slope downward from left to
right.
The curve will slope downward to the right for two reasons. First,
customers who would buy some, but only a few, units at very high
prices, will buy a larger number of units at lower prices. Second, other
customers will not buy any units at very high prices but will buy
some units at a lower price. Finally, at some quite low price, perhaps
at zero, all potential customers would be buying as many units as they
have any use for; they could be induced to take more only if they
were paid to do so.
The slope of the curve may be gradual or steep, depending on the
characteristics of the product and on whether reasonably close substi-
tutes for the product are available. If the product is medicine, for
example, customers will pay high prices for the prescribed dosage
when they are ill; but they have no use at all for larger amounts even
when ill, and they have no use for any at all when they are well.
The quantity of medicine that can be sold depends principally on
population size and frequency of disease and only secondarily on price.
The slope of the demand curve for medicine will be quite steep at all
realistic prices. Phonograph records, on the other hand, might have a
gradually sloped curve at all but extremely high or extremely low
prices. People can get along without them altogether; but at low prices
many people would accumulate very large numbers.
The slope of the curve at any given point may be referred to as its
elasticity and is measured by comparing the percentage change in
quantity purchased which results from a percentage change in price.
If a 2 per cent change in quantity is brought about by a 1 per cent
change in price, the curve, or demand, in that price range is elastic
and has an elasticity of 2.0; if the same 2 per cent change in quantity
is produced by a 2 per cent price change, elasticity is unitary, and
equals 1.0; and if a 4 per cent change in price produces that result,
demand is inelastic and equals 0.5.
The curve discussed in the preceding paragraph represents demand
for a product. A seller of that product will not necessarily face the
same demand curve. The schedule of how much a seller can sell at
various prices will be the same as the schedule for the product if, but
only if, he is the only seller of that product-if he has a monopoly
on the product. If there are other sellers of the same product, he will
obviously have to share the market and will only sell some fraction
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of the total quantity purchased at any given price. To characterize
the situation as "sharing" might suggest that the demand curve facing
the seller would be a new curve representing a constant fraction, at
every point, of the product curve and lying somewhat to the left of it.
But the existence of other independent sellers has another, more sig-
nificant, impact: it assures the availability to consumers of the same
product at roughly the prevailing price; and should one seller raise his
price significantly, consumers will buy more from other sellers and the
first seller will sell substantially less. The "sharing" need not occur in
a stable proportion. Hence the existence of other independent sellers
of the same product not only means that each seller's demand curve
will lie to the left of the product curve but also that, in general, it will
be more elastic, at least for prices higher than that presently prevailing.
The last qualification is made necessary by the possibility that other
sellers will learn of a price reduction by the first seller and respond
by reducing their prices. If this occurs, the first seller will not increase
his proportion of the total product sales; but he will sell a larger
absolute quantity since total sales will increase at the lower common
price in accordance with the demand schedule for the product. It will
be noted that the preceding paragraph tacitly assumed that other
sellers would not respond to a price increase by the first seller and
hence that his proportion as well as his absolute quantity of sales
would decrease. This assumption is generally realistic even if other
sellers do learn of the price change by the first seller; for unless his
change was motivated by a cost increase which his competitors also
experienced, the competitors need only continue selling at a price
heretofore found satisfactory in order to increase their proportion of
the market at his expense. Even more obviously the assumption is
realistic if other sellers do not learn of the price change of the first
seller.
On the basis of the content of the preceding paragraphs demand
curves of several basic types may be drawn. In figures 1 through 3 the
lines on the right are hypothetical product curves. Some are more
steeply sloped than others, and these differences may be thought to
represent variations in the degree to which the products are important
to consumers both because they satisfy needs that are, or are not, fun-
damental and because reasonably adequate substitute products satisfy-
ing those needs are, or are not, available.
In each of the three figures the curves on the left are hypothetical
demand curves for individual sellers. No separate seller's curve has
been drawn for the monopolistic seller-unlike other sellers his curve
is the product curve of the product he monopolizes. The seller's de-
mand curve in figure 1 is the curve facing a seller in pure competition
and is drawn over the range of outputs he might reasonably contem-
plate. In this market there is a very large number of sellers of a homo-
geneous product, each of whom sells a very small part of total product
output. Each can sell all he produces at the existing price and can sell
nothing at higher prices. His curve is perfectly, or infinitely, elastic.
In figure 2 the left hand curve is one that might represent the situ-
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FIG. 1. Demand curves for seller in perfect competition (d-d) and for his industry or
product (D-D).
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FIG. 3. Demand curves for seller in imperfect competition (d-d) and for his industry or
product (D-D).
ation of a seller in an oligopolistic industry, one comprised of a small
number of sellers, three, seven, perhaps as many as ten. The kink in
the curve occurs at the existing price, and hence a price line has been
added in this diagram. Below the kink the curve roughly parallels the
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product curve reflecting the probability that competitors will match
price reductions; above the kink the curve is more flattened, reflecting
the probability that competitors will not match price increases.1
In figure 3 the left hand curve represents an imperfectly competitive
market, perhaps one possessing too many sellers to behave in the oligop-
olistic manner illustrated in figure 2, or perhaps one where product
differentiation is sufficient to soften extreme oligopolistic interdepen-
dencies, but not one possessing both product homogeneity and tie
very large number of very small (relatively) firms necessary for perfect
competition.
Generally within a short time period, sellers will sell each unit of
product at the same price for which they sell every other unit of prod-
uct, either because of legal constraint on their conduct or because
competition forces them to do so. They have no wish to sell at prices
lower than the lowest profitable price, and they cannot extract any
higher price from any one consumer because a competitor would
promptly offer to satisfy that consumer's needs at a lower but still
profitable price. If a seller must sell each unit at the same price as
every other unit, the slope of the demand curve he faces becomes
critical. A contemplated price reduction motivated by the desire to
make more sales per month must be evaluated by the seller very dif-
ferently than if the new lower price would apply only to the new
sales that would not be made during the month but for the price cut.
The price reduction will apply to and reduce the profitability of all
the other units of product which could have been sold at higher prices.
Hence the net revenue that will be garnered by the sale of one addi-
tional unit per unit of time will always be less than the price of that
unit if an across-the-board price reduction is necessary to make that
sale; and a general reduction will be necessary if the seller's demand
curve is sloped at all and if all units must be sold at the same price
per unit.
For any demand curve it is possible to draw another curve repre-
senting the net effect on revenues of making ever larger numbers of
sales. The sale of one unit per month at the highest price anyone will
pay for it garners the price of the unit. But the sale of two units per
month, necessarily at a slightly lower price, garners twice the price of
each unit which is less than the sum of the one-unit-sale-price and the
tvo-unit-sale-price. So it is with each successive number of units; the
return to revenue as a consequence of the last, or marginal, sale always
being less than the price at which the sale was made. Since the demand
1. This paragraph in particular involves extreme oversimplification. The critical
feature of an oligopolistic industry is that the number of firms is sufficiently small that
the conduct of one firm significantly affects, and is mutually recognized as affecting,
the situation of each other firm. To make any general statement about the demand
curve facing a firm in such an industry it is necessary to make some assumption about
the way other firms will react to the first firm's conduct. The assumption in the text,
that other firms will match price reductions but not price increases, is the assumption
most frequently made in the literature; and the curve illustrated corresponds to that
assumption.
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curve represents the price at which each of these successively larger
quantities can be sold in a unit of time, the curve representing the
marginal revenue to be derived from the successively larger quantities
will lie below the demand curve at every quantity after the first unit;
and the marginal revenue curve will itself slope downward so long as
the demand curve follows a linear descent.
Reflection on the foregoing paragraphs will now make apparent
several features about marginal revenue curves generally. First, if a
seller's demand curve is horizontal, indicating that he can sell any
quantity he wishes to produce at the same price, his marginal revenue
curve will be coincident with his demand curve, reflecting his ability
to add to his revenues the full amount of each successive sale price.
Second, the marginal revenue curve is always coincident with the
demand curve at the first unit of quantity. Third, if the demand curve
slopes down smoothly, marginal revenue will become equal to zero
and then turn negative (cross the horizontal axis) at that quantity at
which the demand curve achieves unitary elasticity; for beyond that
point a given percentage decrease in price will yield a lesser per-
centage increase in quantity sold, and the effect of any such change
will be to decrease aggregate revenue.
In figures 4 and 5 are shown the same seller demand curves as were
shown in figures 2 and 3 together with their corresponding marginal
revenue curves. Note that there is a discontinuity in the marginal
revenue curve at the point where the oligopolist's demand curve kinks.
In describing a seller's economic situation and predicting his re-
sponses to that situation, the seller's cost patterns are of importance
equal to that of demand characteristics for his product. Demand curves
describe graphically how much product he can sell at various prices;
cost curves describe graphically how much product he can produce at
various costs; the relationship between the two sets of curves indicates
the level of operation that will take fullest economic advantage of
his situation.
Analysis of cost characteristics is facilitated by separating the cost
elements into two basic categories: fixed costs are those that remain
constant in amount regardless of how the seller changes his level of
operations within the output range available to him with his existing
physical facilities and long-term contractual arrangements; and vari-
able costs are those that will increase or decrease as he chooses to
operate at higher or lower levels of output. The line between the two
categories is not sharp, even if some precise time period is arbitrarily
selected as the period within which to test for variability. And as the
time period being considered lengthens, larger portions of costs will
fall into the "variable" category. Nevertheless, the categories are
analytically useful.
Each category of costs may be described in either of two ways: in
aggregate or total amount, or in relation to units of output, as proves
to be more helpful for any given purpose. By definition, the aggregate
of fixed costs is the same at all levels of output. Obviously most items
of variable costs will increase as output increases and aggregate vari-
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FIG. 5. Demand curve for seller in imperfect competition and corresponding marginal
revenue curve.
able costs will increase as output increases. Representations of total
fixed cost, total variable cost and total cost are shown in figure 6.
Average fixed costs, average variable costs and average total costs are
obtained by dividing each category of aggregate cost by the number of
units of output. Representations of those functions are shown in
figure 7.
Another way, and a very useful way, of thinking about and repre-
senting variable costs is to focus on the additional amount of cost
necessitated by the production of each additional unit of product.
For any unit of product, the additional cost attributable to its pro-
duction is called its marginal cost. Since fixed costs do not change,
the additional cost of producing one more unit is necessarily attrib-
utable to variable cost changes; and hence the marginal cost curve
bears a close relationship to the average variable cost curve. The
average variable cost of the first unit of product obviously is equal
to total variable cost at that production level and is also equal to the
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FIG. 7. Average Fixed, Average Variable and Average Total Cost Curves.
additional cost of moving from no production to the one-unit level.
Hence these three presentations of variable cost all start at the same
point. As successively larger output levels are considered, the following
relation will be seen to exist: so long as the incremental cost of pro-
ducing a unit is less than the incremental cost of producing the preced-
ing unit, both average variable cost and marginal cost will fall; and
since average variable cost is affected by the higher incremental costs
of earlier units but marginal cost is not so affected, marginal cost will
be less than average variable cost. At that output level where returns
to larger scale cease to yield successively lower incremental costs for
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successive units, marginal cost will reach its minimum; it will still be
below average variable cost, and as the marginal cost curve flattens
and first starts to rise, average variable cost will continue to fall. At
that output level where the incremental cost of a unit exceeds the
average variable cost of all preceding units, average variable cost will
start to rise. Hence the marginal cost curve reaches its minimum at
a smaller output level than will the average variable cost curve; it
will rise and intersect the average variable cost curve at the minimum
of the latter; and it will lie above the average variable cost curve at
all outputs where the latter is rising and below it at all outputs when
the latter is falling.
These precise statements about the relationship of marginal cost to
average variable cost can be made without qualification because the
relationship is a mathematical one implicit in the definitions of the
two concepts. The statements about the relationship are "true" in the
absolute but limited sense that two plus two may be said to equal four.
No empirical data is necessary to make the statements; on the other
hand the statements tell us nothing about the real world. The relation-
ship between demand and marginal revenue is also of this mathe-
matical character. Statements of this character are to be contrasted
with statements about observable phenomena which are susceptible to
being shown true or false by empirical data. The statement that a
product demand curve always slopes downward to the right is of this
latter type, and it is only the factual validity of that statement that
gives the related mathematical relationships practical utility.
Empirical statements about costs similarly are prerequisite to useful
application of the curve relationships described above. Despite their
empirical quality, I will make such statements without citation to
supporting data on the grounds that they are intuitively probable, that
to varying degrees they have been validated elsewhere and that they
are regarded as common knowledge in economic literature.
Over that range of outputs available to the firms within a time period
too short to permit major alterations of existing physical plant and long-
term contractual arrangements, average variable cost usually will be
high at very small and at very large outputs and will reach a minimum
at an intermediate point. This is to say only that the firm will be most
efficient at some fairly narrow range of outputs, presumably that range
contemplated when its plant and long-term contractual arrangements
were made. If the firm is viewed prospectively, however, over a time
period long enough to permit more fundamental rearrangements, the
range over which efficient production may be achieved will broaden.
In almost all industries, there are some returns to scale; hence even
in the long run average cost will be high and declining at very low
outputs. If unavoidable inefficiencies of very large scale are encoun-
tered, the curve will rise again at those large outputs. The long-run
average cost curve is one which is tangent to a series of alternative short-
run curves. Figure 8 illustrates a long run cost curve that might be ab-
stracted from a series of short run alternatives.
Profit maximization over some time span is assumed to be the basic
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motivating factor of all economic behavior. The course of action
which will maximize profit in any time span is indicated by superim-
posing the cost and demand curves appropriate for that period. To
produce a unit of output for which the incremental revenue yielded
by its sale would be less than the incremental cost of producing the
unit would be inconsistent with the purpose to maximize profit.
Similarly, that purpose would be thwarted by failure to produce a
unit whose incremental cost was less than the incremental income its




FIG. 8. Long Run Cost curve derived from a series of alternative short run possibilities.
operate at the output level where marginal cost equals marginal
revenue; it will charge a price indicated by the demand curve at that
output level; its gross revenue will be q units multiplied by $p, the
area of the rectangle oqp'p; its total cost will be that portion of the
gross profit rectangle which lies below the line TC TC'. Since, as a
matter of definition in economic analysis, a fair return to invested
capital is included in "cost"-the "opportunity cost" of the capital
involved-any profit in excess of cost thus defined, here the part of
the gross profit rectangle pp'TC'TC, is defined as monopoly profit.
The fact that only marginal cost is relevant to profit maximization
deserves emphasis. The point p' in the demand curve directly above
the intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue is the optimum
price for the firm whether that point is above average total cost or
below it. If p' is above ATC, a monopoly profit will be earned at that
price. If p' equals A TC normal returns to capital will be earned. If
p' is less than A TC losses will be sustained; but to adopt any other
price and output would merely increase the amount of loss. Fixed
costs thus are relevant to the ultimate profit or loss position of the
firm, for they make up part of total costs; but they are wholly irrele-
vant to the optimum level of operation in the short run, for by defi-
nition they will be incurred whatever output level is adopted.
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The significance of monopoly can now be stated in two alternate
terms. In the more traditional focus-the impact of monopoly on the
economic system-monopoly is undesirable because it results in a
lesser output than would be forthcoming under competitive conditions
assuming production costs are the same under competition and monop-
oly. Since the demand curve for the monopolistic firm is the same
curve that pertains to the product produced, it will slope downward
FIG. 9. Profit maximization under non-competitive conditions.
to the right; and the marginal revenue curve that corresponds to it
generally will slope even more sharply. Hence the marginal revenue
curve will intersect the marginal cost curve at an output less than would
be dictated by a less steeply sloped demand function. More of the prod-
uct could be produced by the monopolist at costs less than the prices
buyers would be willing to pay for additional units; hence there is
underutilization in the economy of the monopolized product itself
and of the labor, raw materials and other production factors consumed
in its production.
Alternatively the significance of monopoly can be described from
the standpoint of the monopolist. It benefits him in several respects.
He need not share but can garner to himself all the profits that are
potential in the market for the product. To the extent there are econ-
omies of scale obtainable within the range of output called for, he
can obtain them without concern that a competitor's efforts to follow
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a similar course will result in excess capacity. Unless the total market
is smaller than the output of an efficient plant, his marginal costs will
equal or exceed his total costs, and he will earn an unusually large
percentage return on his investment because price will exceed mar-
ginal cost. These are the private gains traditionally associated with
monopoly.
It is not true, however, that restricting production to that indicated
by the equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost is inherently
advantageous to the monopolist. The monopolist would profit even
more if he produced a larger output per unit of time, that indicated
by the intersection of marginal cost and demand, provided only that
he could prevent the lower prices at which the additional output must
be sold from affecting his ability to sell at higher prices the other units
of output. Up to that output where marginal cost equals demand
(price) there are profits to be made. He could achieve this ideal situ-
ation if he were able to extract from each buyer the largest amount
that buyer would be willing to pay for the first unit the buyer needed,
and then to extract the largest amount the buyer would be willing to
pay to get a second unit, and so forth for each unit and each buyer
until he was no longer able to sell another unit to any buyer at a
price exceeding marginal cost. Under these highly theoretical condi-
tions the monopolist would maximize his returns, and he would also
produce a larger output such that price equaled marginal cost. Hence
restriction of production is not inherently advantageous to the monop-
olist but rather is the tactic which maximizes his return so long as
he is subject to the constraint, practical or legal, that a single, uniform
price be charged for all units of output.
Although the possibility just described is wildly theoretical, its
implications have practical applications. The fact that the demand
curve does lie, in part, above the level of uniform price indicates that
there are some customers who are willing to pay more than they are
presently paying for at least some units they are .presently buying.
Those buyers, with respect to those units, are receiving benefit from
the "one uniform price" constraint and from the fact that the monop-
olist's self-interest dictates that he produce up to the output where
marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The aggregate of this benefit
to all who receive it is called consumer surplus and is represented
graphically by the triangular area enclosed by the vertical axis, the
price line and the demand curve in figure 9.
A firm is said to practice economic, or monopolistic, discrimination
if it charges different prices for different units of the same product, or
charges prices pl and p2 for different but related products having mar-
ginal costs of mcl and mc2 such that the ratio of pl to mcl is unequal
to the ratio of p2 to mc2. If there is competition for the sale of each
unit, discrimination cannot occur;2 for a firm's attempt to extract
2. One type of discrimination, as defined, can occur even under "perfect competi.
tion." It is illustrated by "off-season" rates by resort area hotels: Marginal cost of ac.
.commodating off-season customers is no less, but they are charged less than peak-season
guests. It may be objected that the example is not one of perfect competition, and in a
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more than the prevailing price for any unit will be defeated by other
firms' willingness to sell at prevailing price. Hence the existence of
discrimination depends upon the lack of alternatives available to the
disfavored buyer and hence upon some degree of monopoly.
Generally speaking, the nature of the practical constraint that pre-
vents the monopolist from charging different prices for different units
d2
?d d D MC
Ps I-- - - --
Pf
I \ ! d2D
mri Ih MR
I I I
qf qd qs, qa
FIG. 10. The two submarkets are represented by demand curves did. and dd, and
their corresponding marginal revenue curves tra and mr,. Together they constitute the
total market DD and its marginal revenue curve MR. Marginal cost at the appropriate
total output is indicated by the intersection of MR and MC, and its value is superimposed
on the segregated marginal revenue curves by the broken construction line. Under uniform
pricing quantity qs would be sold at price Ps. Under discriminatory pricing quantity qf is
sold at price Pf in the favored market, elasticity of demand being greater in that market
in the relevant price range; and qd is sold at Pd in the disfavored market. Revenue is
always increased by discrimination: the areas (Pf X qj) + (Pd X qd) > Ps X qs. In the
case shown, since the several demand curves are straight lines, the rates of change of the
several elasticities are the same and output remains unchanged: qf + qd = qa = qs.
of product, thus capturing consumer surplus and augmenting profit,
is the potential resale of his product by those who buy cheap to those
who buy dear. To the extent that the monopolist by some device can
segment his customers into groups which differ from one another in
their demand characteristics and can prevent retransfers of product
between the groups, he can increase his profits and diminish consumer
surplus. This segmentation may be possible, for example, on a geo-
graphic basis if transportation costs are a substantial part of total cost
of the product; for inter-area resale will not then be profitable. Where
a service rather than a commodity is the firm's product, segmentation
is generally feasible because retransfer between segments cannot occur.
To the extent the monopolist is able to segregate his customers,
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he maximizes his return by selling to each segment of the market that
quantity of product necessary to make the marginal revenue in each
segment equal to the marginal cost of the entire output. More gener-
ally stated, the discriminating monopolist continues to regard his sup-
ply (cost) situation as a single, aggregate function; but he calculates
separate demand and marginal revenue curves for each of the segre-
gated submarkets and disregards the aggregate demand curve which
the sum of the submarkets would yield. He then notes the price and
output in each submarket at which the marginal revenue curve in
that submarket equals marginal cost of total output; and in each sub-
market he offers the indicated portion of output at the indicated
price. Since the marginal revenue curve will lie farther below the
demand curve in submarkets with less elastic demand than in those
with more elastic demand, the consequence will be to offer lower quan-
tities at higher prices in less elastic submarkets and larger quantities
at lower prices in more elastic submarkets than would be appropriate
if a uniform price were charged. Revenue will be increased and con-
sumer surplus will be decreased. A simple example is shown in figure
10.
The effect on aggregate output is less certain: it depends, obviously,
on whether the increased sales in more elastic markets exceed, equal
or are exceeded by the decreased sales in less elastic markets. Because
output is necessarily greater under perfect discrimination3 than under
single price monopoly, it might be supposed on intuitive grounds that
each additional subdivision of markets approached that end position
and would result in some increase in output.4 But the assumption is
false; the effect on aggregate output will depend on the comparative
rates of change of elasticity in the demand curves of the several segre-
gated markets over those price ranges involved in the shift from uni-
form to discriminatory pricing. Output will increase if demand in
the favored market is becoming more elastic faster than demand in
the disfavored market is becoming inelastic; it will decrease if these
conditions are reversed.
theoretical sense the objection is valid. Instantaneous entry and exit of firms from the
industry in response to week-to-week changes in rates of return on capital would eliminate
the discrimination, but as a practical matter they do not occur. Nevertheless the industry
approximates perfect competition about as closely as any actual industry.
3. The theoretical possibility is called perfect discrimination.
4. This erroneous assumption is not uncommon and may underlie, implicitly, some
of the dispute about the social desirability or undesirability of economic discrimination.
5. The classic treatment of the subject is ROBINSON, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFEcr Cokt-
PETrrION 188-95 (1959). That output must be larger when the point of perfect discrimina.
tion is reached is not inconsistent: at that point each unit of product is being sold In
accordance with the dictates of a separate "demand curve" which is a point adjoining the
price axis where the rate of change of elasticity in infinite.
370
Vol. 76: 267, 1966
